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REGIONAL

Iranian-Palestinian Relations Discussed

44040239 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
5 Feb 89 p 5

[Article by Salih Qallab: "Palestinian Relations With Tehran Began With High Hopes, Ended With Bitterness and Great Disappointment"]

[Text] London (AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT)—On the 10th anniversary of the Iranian revolution and in the context of AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT's historical review, it appears useful and necessary to pause over the important and fundamental issue of Palestinian-Iranian relations in the Khomeyni era. When did these relations begin? How did they develop? What factors governed their course and caused them to reach the point they reached in recent years? In reviewing the history, stages, and principal turns of these relations, one must point out that the first contact between Khomeyni and the Palestinian resistance leadership was in 1969, when Mr Yasir 'Arafat delegated two employees of the Baghdad Fatah office to meet with Khomeyni in his al-Najaf residence, south of the Iraqi capital. The two explained to him the state of the Palestinian revolution, its aspirations and goals, and asked him to issue a fatwa [legal opinion] allowing zakah [donations of alms] to be earmarked for Palestinian resistance fighters. From that time, until he moved from al-Najaf to his temporary residence in the village of Neauphle-le-Chateau in the suburbs of Paris, there were no official contacts between Khomeyni and the Palestinian resistance leadership. However, contacts between him and the PLO intensified during the period he spent in France. Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] sent a number of senior officials to visit him, including his political adviser and Fatah Central Committee member, Hani al-Hasan, who was later appointed Palestine's first representative in Tehran after the success of the Khomeyni revolution.

In the second half of the seventies, with the star of the anti-shah Iranian opposition already in the ascendant, a number of cadres from this opposition began flocking to Beirut for weapons training in the camps of the Palestinian groups and to engage in information and propaganda activity against the shah's regime, taking advantage of the Lebanese situation at that time and PLO resources.

Among the hundreds of Iranians who worked in the ranks of the Palestinian resistance, particularly the Fatah movement, and who trained in its camps, one can mention the names of Jaleddin Farsi (the rival candidate to Hasan Bani-Sadr for first president of the Republic of Iran), former Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Chamran, and Mohammad Montazeri, son of Khomeyni's deputy, Hosseyn Montazeri, who died in an explosion that took the lives of a large number of Iranian officials, including Ayatollah Beheshti.

Just as the Fatah movement took in a number of Khomeyni supporters, opened training camps for them, and supplied them with needed assistance, other Palestinian groups, such as the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] and the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine], did the same thing for Iranian groups close to their outlook and standing on the same ideological ground with them, such as the Mojahedin-e Khalq, Feda'iyian-e Khalq, the Peykar movement, and the Iranian Communist Party (Tudeh).

Reviewing conditions and considerations of that period, one can say that many factors led the Palestinian resistance to embrace any phenomenon of the Iranian resistance. Foremost among these factors was a pervasive feeling among Palestinians and Arabs generally that the shah's regime with its alliances and aspirations constituted a thorn in the side of the Arab nation.

The prevailing feeling was that the shah of Iran stood on the side of Israel in equal hostility to the Arabs. He had designs upon Arab land, did not respect the strong links between the Iranian people and the Arab nation, and was trying to revive extinct Persian glories of the past by turning his back on Muslims and the Islamic mission.

Given this sense and feeling, there was a strong desire on the part of Palestinians and Arabs in general to see the shah's regime collapse under the blows of the growing opposition. Palestinians and Arabs in general looked forward to the day when this major Islamic state would become their rear support base in confronting Israeli expansion and liberating Palestinian land and usurped Islamic holy places.

Historic Journey

Thus the Palestinian leadership at its various levels, with Abu 'Ammar himself at its head, was closely following Iranian developments late in the seventies, both in Iran and among exiles, moment by moment. One can imagine how great the joy of the Palestinians was when they saw the former shah of Iran emerge from the confrontation defeated and begin going from one country to another in search of a refuge.

If one takes into consideration that the gradually unfolding events that ended, as everybody knows, with Khomeyni's return to Iran and the victory of the Iranian revolution, occurred while bitterness reigned over the region from one end to the other, one can understand Abu 'Ammar's decision to pay Tehran an unusual visit a few days after Khomeyni's return.

Since I was one of those who accompanied Abu 'Ammar on that historic visit, I can now recall it moment by moment and all that happened during it on the Palestinian and Iranian sides. I recall that as the airplane was landing at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran, with matters still not finally settled, the PLO chairman felt that the Palestinian horizon had extended itself from Qal'at

al-Sha'iq in southern Lebanon to the extreme north of Iran; that if a hostile plot aimed at removing Egypt from the field of confrontation, Khomeyni's revolution had placed Iran, with its enormous resources, on the side of the Arabs and the Palestinian resistance.

Abu 'Ammar, with a 45-man delegation, travelled from Damascus Airport to Mehrabad Airport in Tehran aboard a special Syrian DC-9. Most of the delegation members were non-Palestinians. Jalal-al-Din Farisi, some Lebanese Shi'ite clergy, and a group of Iranian soldiers who had been working with the international forces in South Lebanon were on the same airplane.

I can remember now that after the airplane crossed the Syrian, Iraqi, and Iranian borders on its way to Tehran, I moved from my seat in the back rows to where Abu 'Ammar was sitting in the front rows. I found him sewing a button on his shirt. When I sat down beside him, I looked out of the window on his right and saw two military Phantom airplanes approaching our plane. Beginning to be afraid, I said to him, "Aren't you afraid that the pilots of those two planes might be remnants of the shah's followers and the infamous Savak, and that they might lead our plane to Israel or shoot it down with a rocket and then escape toward the occupied territories?"

Perceiving that my fears were almost a kind of panic, Abu 'Ammar stopped sewing the shirt button and repeated the Koranic verse, "Naught shall visit us but what God has prescribed for us" [Koran 9:51]. He added, "I am a believing person. My faith always puts me at ease. I take all necessary precautions; then I entrust my affairs to God and go forward. Destiny is in God's hand, may He be praised and exalted!"

While Abu 'Ammar was about to continue the conversation, still watching the two military airplanes from the neighboring window, he noticed that one of the pilots was waving to him in greeting. His expression relaxed, and he was overjoyed. "Can this be happening?" he asked. "Can anyone imagine that an American-designed F-16 would come out to receive the leader of the Palestinian revolution and protect him?"

In a surge of tremendous enthusiasm, Abu 'Ammar began to enlarge upon the hopes he fixed upon this recent event. He repeated several times that he had begun to feel closer to Palestine and Jerusalem. Placing Iranian might beside the great Arab might would open a front that Israel could not oppose.

It was the conviction of the PLO chairman that Iran under its previous regime had been a wound draining the Arabs and their resources. Under the new regime, Tehran would be a twin to Jerusalem, Baghdad, Riyadh, Beirut, Algiers, and Casablanca.

First Shock

When the airplane with Abu 'Ammar and the accompanying delegation landed at Mehrabad Airport in the evening hours, there was an irregular armed demonstration there to greet him. Some were cheering in Persian, some were firing shots with apparent nervousness. When everything became confused, the Palestinian leader's bodyguard became worried about him and tried to withdraw with him into a side corridor of the airport, but he refused and started repeating the cheers that the people were shouting.

After cheers in Persian and volleys of bullets over the head of Abu 'Ammar and the members of the delegation accompanying him, the person who was supposed to receive the Palestinian delegation officially stepped forward. It was an unknown cleric. The expectation had been that some major personality of the new regime, such as Ahmad Khomeyni, Hosseyn Montazeri, Beheshti, Yazdi, or Prime Minister Bazargan, would be there to receive the leader of the Palestinian revolution.

The accompanying delegation was obviously disappointed by this unexpectedly luke-warm reception, but Abu 'Ammar, whose hopes were farther reaching and more important that these formalities, pointed out that conditions were still unsettled. The new Iranian officials could be excused for not performing the duties of a proper reception; on the one hand, they were busy settling accounts with remnants of the former regime, and on the other hand, they had learned of the Palestinian delegation's arrival only when the airplane was already circling over Mehrabad Airport.

Unexpectedly, Abu 'Ammar and the accompanying delegation were taken from Mehrabad Airport to the 'Alavi School, in a northern district of Tehran where Khomeyni was staying, in a large bus whose shades had been rolled down and which had been provided with men armed with American M-16 rifles. The latter from time to time shouted cheers in Persian.

Although night had fallen, we stole glances out of the drawn shades of the bus and saw surging waves of people, some cheering, some dancing, and some firing shots. On the side streets, we saw men wearing turbans, women wrapped in chadors, and children running about in every direction.

Substantial Dinner

Finally, having passed through broad and narrow streets and made many turns, safely passing each ambush for the next, we arrived at the 'Alavi School. In fact, our exuberant feeling had not been affected by the lukewarm reception or by our having been taken from the airport in a bus. Our intoxication from vast hope was stronger than our exhaustion after the long wait in Beirut and in Damascus and the long journey that we regarded as a trip into the unknown beset with fears and dangers.

Mahmud 'Abbas (Abu Mazin), an Executive Committee member and Fatah Central Committee member, was one of the principal members of the delegation. On the way from Mehrabad Airport to the 'Alavi School, I complained to him that I was very hungry. He reassured me that we were now in Persia, a country famous for its rich cuisine and varied foods. However, to my great shock, and probably also to the great shock of the others, we were summoned into military-style kitchens adjoining the school. Each of us was given a bit of rice pilaf with just two dates.

How great was our surprise when Abu 'Ammar was utterly delighted with this dinner! He was also delighted that they squeezed us, with the exception of him, into a large room of the school, having supplied us with just two blankets. Among the things the PLO chairman said was that the atmosphere reminded him of the atmosphere of al-Karamah—i.e., when he was with his commandos in the bases of the city of al-Karamah in the Jordan Valley in 1968. He preferred living in such an atmosphere to staying at a luxury hotel or large guest house.

Actually, these secondary matters did not seriously affect any delegation member, either the main members or the secondary ones, in the least. Everyone realized that Tehran's new rulers were living under exceptional circumstances. Matters were still unsettled and unstable. Palestinians in particular were obliged to show understanding for Iran's exceptional circumstances.

The Palestinian delegation's first night, the one during which it stayed at the 'Alavi School (the delegation subsequently moved to Nakhost Vazir, the prime ministry), was enough to throw light on a number of matters that became fully manifest only in subsequent stages.

First, Khomeyni received only Abu 'Ammar and a limited number of members of the official delegation. The expectation had been that he would probably receive all the delegation members, if only to greet them.

Second, during the talks with Abu 'Ammar, Khomeyni deliberately spoke Persian, with Jalal Farsi playing the role of interpreter in the talks, despite the fact that Khomeyni had lived some 16 years in the Iraqi city of al-Najaf, lectured to his students in classes and academic discussions in the language of the Koran, and was said to have written a number of books in Arabic.

Third, on the night of Abu 'Ammar's arrival in Tehran or on the following night, a number of former Iranian officials were executed in the 'Alavi School, within sight and hearing of a number of members of the Palestinian delegation. Among those executed that night were former Prime Minister 'Abbas Hoveyda and General Nasiri, who had been in charge of the SAVAK apparatus during the deposed shah's regime.

Palestinian Expectations

Khomeyni did not speak a great deal, but turned the Palestinian delegation over to his son Ahmad, Foreign Minister Yazdi, and Sadeq Qotbzadeh, who was serving at that time, but had not yet become foreign minister. (He was subsequently executed on a charge of being an American agent.) Abu 'Ammar noticed that the Iranian officials were speaking different languages about matters on the agenda; Ahmad Khomeyni had one opinion, Qotbzadeh had another opinion, and the same held for Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr, Beheshti, Taleqani, and the others.

There was not the slightest doubt about Abu 'Ammar's feeling of joy and happiness when the Israeli embassy in Tehran was converted into an embassy for Palestine and when he heard the demonstrators who greeted him during his tours in a number of Iranian provinces, shouting abuse at Israel and threats at the United States.

In reality, however, Abu 'Ammar wanted something more than cheers and more than fiery slogans against Israel and the United States. He had come to Tehran with great dreams of establishing an eastern front against the Zionist state, a front stretching from southern Lebanon to the farthest reaches of Khorasan.

His talks with Iranian officials therefore concentrated mainly on the need to create bridges of confidence and love between Iran and the Arab states. He used to say that the joy of all the Arabs, without exception, had been even greater than the joy of Iranians at recent events. A few negative elements that had emerged in recent or more remote periods and had poisoned relations between brothers in a single religion and culture had to be overcome.

Even during the days of his brief visit to Tehran, Abu 'Ammar tried to reach agreement with Iranian officials on a time table for regional meetings to remove regional causes of tension, initiate a new course of intensified efforts for the prosperity and happiness of the people of the region, and for the biggest goal—confronting the imminent Zionist danger and liberating usurped Islamic holy places.

Because he did not realize his goals and hopes during this visit, Abu 'Ammar appointed his political adviser, Hani al-Hasan, to represent him in Tehran and pursue the task of overcoming past differences and mistrust and working to establish a political and even military front linking Iran to the Arab states in confronting Israel.

Since I stayed with Hani al-Hasan for a time while he was living in an office adjoining Nakhost Vazir (the prime ministry), I can affirm that during this period when the Palestinian resistance was passing through one of its most difficult periods, this high Palestinian official's effort was directed toward this very issue. I saw how he travelled to the city of Qom, about 150 km south

of Tehran, several times a week to seek Ayatollah Montaziri's aid in persuading hard-liners that exporting the political revolution was impossible and wrong and that fanning the fire of old hatreds served only Israel and the United States.

Story of the Hostages

Although Abu 'Ammar and the Palestinian revolution leaders felt they had failed to change Iran's course under the new regime and shift Iran's resources from antagonism and confrontation to the establishment of an eastern front to confront the forces of "International Arrogance," they felt that Iran could provide a great service to the Palestinian cause with regard to the American hostage issue.

Despite previous experiences, Palestinian leaders felt that the Iranian leadership would not be slow to seize the historic moment and turn the issue of the American hostages and their release into a weapon in the PLO's hand, to move Washington to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people and force it to abandon the agreements that former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had concluded with Israel and under which Washington had pledged itself not to open any dialogue with the PLO.

Details of the issue were as follows: After the American hostages were detained in Tehran, the United States asked the PLO, as one of the forces closest to the Iranian revolution, to intervene with Khomeyni and his aides to guarantee the hostages' release. Abu 'Ammar thought that an auspicious opportunity had presented itself. He moved immediately and quickly sent a delegation of his senior advisers to Tehran with a letter explaining the importance and implications of having the release of the men take place under PLO auspices.

Unexpectedly, the delegation members brought back lengthy lectures on "revolutionary ethics" that Iranian officials had read to them. They reported that the Iranian leadership considered it strange and improper that the Palestinian revolution should intercede for "Satanic forces." Several times in Tehran, members of the Palestinian delegation heard people tell them that the Iranian capital was displeased by the actions, behavior, and leadership of the PLO.

Nevertheless, even though matters became as clear as daylight, Abu 'Ammar after the outbreak of the Gulf war (at the beginning of the war, the Palestinian position was not to take sides one way or the other) resumed his previous attempts. He thought the Palestinian revolution had sufficient standing in Tehran to move the Iranian leadership to a cease-fire and a halt to the war, which in addition to the sorrow and destruction it was causing in the region was taking place first and last at the expense of the Palestinian cause.

Spurred by this motive, Abu 'Ammar travelled many times to Tehran. Once he went overland, across the Soviet-Iranian border, to persuade the Iranian leadership to listen to the voice of conscience and the pleas of the Islamic World, the international community, and friendly forces, stop the firing, and go to the negotiating table for an honorable and peaceful settlement. But matters remained the same and events proceeded in their now well-known way, before the step of last August's cease-fire.

War of the Camps, PLO Split

While talking about Iranian-Palestinian relations during the last 10 years, one should mention that despite Tehran's anti-PLO bias in the years following the departure of Palestinian forces from Beirut after the 1982 Israeli raid, the PLO did not close its office (its embassy) in the Iranian capital and continued to maintain extensive ties with one tendency or another in the Iranian leadership.

It may not be known to many that the first installment of aid (\$5 million) offered to the dissidents who split from the PLO came from Iran. The sum was delivered to a delegation of dissidents led by former Fatah Central Committee member Nimr Salih (Abu Salih), who later was expelled from the dissident group after severe internal disputes and divisions.

Things did not stop there. In addition to the harsh campaign that Iranian information media launched against the PLO leadership and against Abu 'Ammar in particular, hard-line Iranian tendencies threw their weight during the war of the camps in Lebanon onto the side of the forces fighting against the Palestinians.

As some people say, the PLO, despite its subsequent siding with and complete support for the Iraqi side, has continued to maintain a special relationship with Hizballah, known for its friendship with certain Iranian tendencies. This means that the PLO has continued to keep a line open to Tehran and that it is now waiting for life to flow into the arteries of the peaceful settlement proposed for the Gulf conflict, so that it can return to its previous relations with the Iranian capital.

Trade Talks Held With Iran

44000306 Muscat *TIMES OF OMAN* in English
9 Feb 89 p 17

[Text] A round of talks was held in Doha recently between senior officials at the Qatari Economy and Trade Ministry and a visiting Iranian economic delegation led by Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Trade Mojtaba Khosrow-Taj.

An official source at the ministry told QNA the two sides reviewed economic and trade relations between the countries and means of enhancing them.

The Iranian delegation stressed the importance of boosting trade exchange and discussed prospects for exchange of technical expertise especially in industrial and construction fields.

The Iranian side has presented an offer for a number of investments in several fields in Iran especially by private sector, the source said.

Under-Secretary at Qatar's Ministry of Industry and Agriculture, Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Mana also met with the Iranian delegation.

Istiqlal Party Leader Boucetta Discusses Regional, Domestic Issues

45040175 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
20 Jan 89 pp 24-25

[Interview with Mohamed Boucetta, president of Istiqlal Party by Tawfiq Jazulit; in Rabat; date of interview not specified]

[Text] Mr Mohamed Boucetta holds a prominent position in Moroccan and Arab political and diplomatic circles. He is the leader of the Istiqlal Party which fought the battle for Morocco's independence and is fighting today for the complete unity of the Maghreb's territory. Today, the Istiqlal Party is fighting to lay a solid foundation for a true democracy, to put the principle of human rights in action, and to build the unity of the Arab Maghreb on the basis of the spirit of the Tangier Conference.

Boucetta has been the dean of diplomacy in his country for 6 years. He enjoys a special relationship with King Hassan II, the king of Morocco, who seeks his advice on national and crucial issues.

Because of continuous developments experienced in the Arab Maghreb area, AL-HAWADITH met with Mr Mohamed Boucetta and interviewed him about various Moroccan and Arab issues. These developments are marked by the relaxation of political and economic restrictions and the adoption of positive steps to end the problem of the Western Sahara. It is possible that the formation of a new and responsible government in which the Istiqlal Party may participate will be announced in the coming weeks.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you believe the return of Palestinians to their country and the establishment of a Palestinian state will be expedited by international detente, by the declaration of a Palestinian state, and by the Palestinian people's determination to continue their uprising?

[Boucetta] There is no doubt that as far as the destiny of the Palestinian question is concerned, a positive development is underway. The Palestinian people suffered from the occupation of their country; they endured expulsion from their land as well as inter-Arab disputes;

and they suffered from setbacks which accompanied the course of their struggle. The evolution of world public opinion in the past few years has been tangible. Although the Fes Conference did provide a fresh, new outlook on the cause, no effective mechanism was developed to implement its resolutions. Then came the uprising of the stone children in the occupied land. That amounted to a warning to the world's conscience and to the superpowers, especially the United States, which, despite Israel's intransigence, took steps to deal more objectively with the tragedy of the Palestinian people. But Israel's intransigence will fade away in the face of the Palestinians' determination and that of world public opinion to establish a Palestinian state. Looking at the situation realistically, I believe that the coming months will be decisive. A just solution will be prescribed, and that solution will restore the Palestinian people's legitimate rights to live an honorable life and to establish an independent state.

[AL-HAWADITH] Although international detente may have given the Palestinian question fresh, new prospects, Lebanon, undoubtedly, is still experiencing the strain of internal division and foreign intervention. Does this mean that in your view the crisis in Lebanon is likely to continue unabated in the absence of an effective Arab role?

[Boucetta] A spirit of harmony and fraternity among feuding groups in Lebanon would be the natural remedy for the Lebanese tragedy. Since the Palestinian question has taken a new course which gives us reason to be optimistic, the early signs of that new course indicate that Arabs can come up with a practical solution to the crisis in Lebanon, and they can place emphasis on limitations to the presence of foreigners on Lebanese territory. It is my personal judgment that Lebanon will remain the scene for tragic events as long as feuding groups in Lebanon fail to agree on common grounds that would save the country from the danger of partition and division.

[AL-HAWADITH] You visited Egypt recently at the invitation of the ruling party in that country. During your visit you were received by President Husni Mubarak. What is your evaluation of Egyptian-Moroccan relations at the present time?

[Boucetta] I visited Egypt to attend the conference of the African League. It was an opportunity to meet with President Husni Mubarak and a few leaders of the National Democratic Party, whose relations with the Istiqlal Party are good. Relations between Egypt and Morocco are developing continuously. In that regard the unlimited support which Egypt, as well as Algeria and Tunisia, gave Morocco when we were fighting for independence must be commended. After the Camp David Agreement when Arabs decided unanimously to sever all ties with Egypt, officials in Morocco continued their efforts to restore Egypt to the Arab rank, despite that

unanimous decision, because of that country's strategic importance. We believe that Egypt's absence from the Arab rank is a loss to Arabs and a victory for our enemies.

[AL-HAWADITH] The establishment of a second republic in Tunisia involved positive developments requiring a change which benefited Tunisians. What is your personal evaluation of the Tunisian experience? What are its implications on the prospects of building a unified Arab Maghreb?

[Boucetta] Tunisia's experience proved to be successful, and it yielded results in record time: the principles of public liberties and multiple parties were adopted, and a complete change was effected in official institutions. Regarding Tunisia's role in putting together the structure of the Arab Maghreb, there is no doubt that former President Habib Bourguiba was an advocate of unity in the Arab Maghreb. But it was because of domestic, political factors that President Bourguiba did not succeed in making this wish for unity materialize. The sudden change in political and economic life in Tunisia may have shaped the position held by Tunisian leaders on the prospects of building a united Arab Maghreb. We in Morocco sensed that Tunisia's constructive activities, which were evident in its many initiatives and suggestions, were aimed at laying the first cornerstone of this unity. Tunisia is moving sincerely and enthusiastically in that direction.

[AL-HAWADITH] The Istiqlal Party's relations with Algeria's National Liberation Front Party involve the history of relations between the two parties and the battles which each party had to fight. There were periods in the history of that relationship, early in the seventies, when relations were cool. This was the result of a disagreement over Morocco's title to the Western Sahara. What is the nature of relations between the two parties at the present time?

[Boucetta] Once again, relations are proceeding on a normal course. We are being called upon to assume our historic responsibilities to struggle with a spirit of unity that would serve the interests of people in the area and contribute to their prosperity. Do you know that the Istiqlal party, the National Liberation Front Party, and Tunisia's Destourian Party made up the national liberation movements in the Arab Maghreb at that time? It was their close unity which produced the 1958 Tangier Conference, that historic conference which laid the foundations for a united Arab Maghreb. In 1983 the Istiqlal Party undertook the task of organizing the silver anniversary of the Tangier Conference to revive a purposeful and constructive dialogue. The responsiveness of our brothers in Algeria and Tunisia provided the best evidence that they wanted to start a dialogue and were willing to do so. Our brothers in Algeria and Tunisia are willing to strengthen relations involving our mutual struggle, and they are willing to contribute to constructive efforts.

[AL-HAWADITH] It seems that Algeria's policy toward Morocco stems from the principle of dissociating the problem of the Western Sahara from the question of bilateral relations between the two countries. To what extent has this policy been successful?

[Boucetta] During the summit-like meeting they held in Algeria, the five countries of the Arab Maghreb agreed to disregard bilateral border disputes and the problem of the Western Sahara. They agreed to set up a solid foundation to define the general parameters for a united Arab Maghreb. It is obvious that Algeria's policy in this regard is based on a search for useful methods which can be used to build the Arab Maghreb. Algeria's policy is based on letting disputes take their natural course in finding just solutions. I think that Algeria's choice of such a policy was a fortunate one because the effort to put the Arab Maghreb on the map will definitely help find a solution to problems which colonialism left behind.

[AL-HAWADITH] Last year's events in Algeria required that fundamental changes be made in the leadership of the National Liberation Front and in the country's official organizations as well. These events strengthened President Chadli Bendjedid's position as well as that of the party's moderate, pro-unity wing. Does this mean that the future slogans of the Arab Maghreb countries will be easing restrictions, practicing democracy, and observing human rights?

[Boucetta] We proclaimed these slogans many years before the events in Algeria. Political parties in the Arab Maghreb fought against French colonialism to liberate the land. At the same time they were striving to liberate the people, the people of the Arab Maghreb. Because the people of the area interact with each other, events in Algeria had an effect on Morocco and on Tunisia. The opposite of that is also true. I am pleased to say that Algeria is moving steadily towards more freedom, more democracy, and further easing of restrictions. Nothing will reinforce these trends but a desire for unity and a desire for a constructive effort. The desire to upgrade bilateral relations and to turn them into a full-fledged and an effective unity will also reinforce these trends.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do you agree with the idea which suggests that the countries of the Arab Maghreb must benefit from the experience of the Gulf Cooperation Council?

[Boucetta] Yes, we must benefit from the experience of the Gulf Cooperation Council. We know that before our brothers in the Gulf established their council, they were anxious to learn about the facts and resolutions of the Tangier Conference. We in the Arab Maghreb fell behind in our efforts to achieve unity, but our brothers in the East made progress. The Gulf Cooperation Council has undoubtedly been a successful experiment from which we must benefit. We must consider it a model for us to follow, even though it ran into a few obstacles.

[AL-HAWADITH] Experts on Moroccan politics affirm that the Istiqlal Party's effectiveness and power have been reduced because it is no longer in power. They say the party is playing a secondary role on the political scene in Morocco because it has returned once again to the opposition. Do you agree with that opinion?

[Boucetta] Whether it is in power or not, the Istiqlal Party is considered the oldest political party in Morocco. It is the broadest and the most far-reaching party in the different sectors of society. The party derives its strength from its ancient history of struggle and its unswerving positions on national and crucial issues and on the rights of Moroccan citizens. While the party may not play a decisive role in Moroccan politics, its role has not been reduced at all. The Istiqlal Party has a message to deliver; it has principles; and it is here to stay. Because of that the party has the ability to adjust to the country's conditions and requirements. It has the ability to capture the interest of the rising generations and to recruit them to serve the country's interests and contribute to its prosperity.

[AL-HAWADITH] It is almost unanimous that the present government lacks an element of responsibility and the ability to confront difficulties. What do you think is the reason for that?

[Boucetta] The reason manifests itself basically in the absence of an integrated government program and in the absence of solidarity and coordination among the members of government.

[AL-HAWADITH] How would you evaluate the present Council of Representatives?

[Boucetta] I am still adhering to my position. Because the general elections were forged and the people's wishes were falsified, the Council of Representatives lost its credibility and its effectiveness as a legislative authority whose principal role is to monitor the government's activities. Projects which are presented by the real opposition, namely, the Istiqlal Party, the Socialist Union, and a few other leftist parties, are either turned down or disregarded. How can we accept a council which produces such meager results at the end of its sessions because of its composition and the manner in which the government deals with it?

[AL-HAWADITH] The Council of Representatives passed the new budget, and the present government, with the unequivocal support of international financial institutions, is insisting on putting the "privatization" policy into effect. What is your party's position on the liberal economic approach which places its resources in the private sector's hands?

[Boucetta] Our economic program depends on the principle of equality, whose aim is to give everyone an equal opportunity. We seek the fair distribution of all the country's wealth. Regarding "privatization," our position is unequivocal. It manifests itself in the manner we

look at each sector separately. Before subjecting this or the other sector to the government's supervision and before we let the private sector operate one sector or another, we take into account the country's and the masses' interests. We also advocate that we learn from the negative effects of the "nationalization" policy which enriched one group in society at the expense of other groups. It is essential that guidelines be established for the privatization policy lest the rate of unemployment rise as workers and employees are discharged from their jobs as was the case in the Export and Marketing Bureau. It is worth noting that it might be useful to turn over to the private sector some sectors which were exempted from privatization by the government's plan. The management of Morocco's Royal Airlines failed to develop domestic air routes, and the National Royal Postal and Telecommunications Bureau failed to develop an appropriate form of telephone usage. The level of telephone usage is still below the required standard. This is our position, and it is consistent with our aspirations for the country's economic development and for serving the interests of the masses.

[AL-HAWADITH] If we hold the opinion that the present stage requires political changes on the order of the present government's composition, what formula would you propose for your participation in a responsible, coalition government?

[Boucetta] We did not demand participation in government. In principle, I personally would not refuse to take part in the next government because we are always striving to bring our program to the attention of national public opinion. We want a coalition government to put all or part of that program into effect. It is my opinion that the next 2 years will be crucial for Morocco. A referendum supervised by the United Nations will be held in the Western Sahara to assert its Moroccan character. That in itself will require a tremendous and a major effort. It will also require total mobilization. Also, we are looking forward to the 1990 general elections. We are looking forward to honorable and clean elections and to credible elected institutions. If we are asked to participate in the next government because our contributions will be sought to help in achieving these two objectives, we will be willing to do our part to strengthen the continuity of democracy and solidify the unity of our soil on the basis of a minimum [standard] for economic, political, and social programs, chief among which is education.

[AL-HAWADITH] Observers think that the Polisario delegation's visit to the country and that delegation's meeting with Morocco's monarch implies that both sides recognize each other's existence. In your opinion, do you think this is true? What are the positive elements of this visit?

[Boucetta] The statement made by King Hassan II cannot cause confusion and cannot be misinterpreted. The king expressed his willingness to talk with anyone from the Maghreb, and that includes members of the Polisario. This means that talking, not negotiating, was the purpose of such a meeting. There are, of course, those who think that the meeting in Marrakesh amounted to clear recognition of the Polisario, but I don't share that opinion with those who subscribe to it. I rather think that this event paves the way to a swift conclusion to the Sahara problem. It is known that the Moroccan people are unanimous in their support for the position of King Hassan II on that question in particular. Official statements indicate that none of the areas recovered from the Western Sahara would be given up, and there would be no retreat from the official position which has been in effect since the Nairobi Conference. It is the official position that the Moroccan administration and the Moroccan army remain in the districts of the Sahara while the United Nations is conducting its referendum. Any other arrangement would infringe upon Morocco's sovereignty.

[AL-HAWADITH] The Istiqlal Party is still calling for full independence for Moroccan territory, including Ceuta and Melilla and al-Ja'fari Islands [Chafarinas]. Can it be said that Moroccan diplomacy failed to hold the intransigence of the Madrid government in check since it has not been able to drag it to the negotiating table?

[Boucetta] For years the Spanish government has been trying to stamp a Spanish character on the cadres and landmarks of Ceuta and Melilla in the absence of an official Moroccan position to deal with the fact that Spain is going overboard in its traditional colonialist mentality. In the face of that, King Hassan II made an appeal in which he called for the establishment of a think tank that would make an earnest contribution to the matter and offer objective alternatives to solve the problem of the two port cities and the occupied islands. This is undoubtedly a good suggestion. I think we should deal firmly with the Spaniards to bring an end to their colonial presence. Unless Ceuta, Melilla and al-Ja'fari Islands [Chafarinas] are returned to Morocco, developing relations between the two countries would be pointless. The Moroccan government is being called upon to assume a more effective role and to put an end to the conduct of the Spanish government regarding the two port cities.

'Abd-al-Majid, Bishop Discuss Coptic Affairs
NC2802161689 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic
1500 GMT 28 Feb 89

[Text] Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, deputy prime minister and foreign minister, and Dr Butrus Ghali, minister of state for foreign affairs, met today with Bishop Basilius, bishop of the Coptic Church in Jerusalem.

Bishop Basilius stated that he asked Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid to contact the Israeli Government on the issues of restoring Egyptian sovereignty over the Egyptian Coptic holy places in Jerusalem, particularly the Dayr al-Sultan monastery and allowing the erection of a new building for the Coptic school. He added that 'Abd-al-Majid had stated that Egypt is following up the matter and that he discussed it at his meeting last week with the Israeli foreign minister.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Jordanian-Palestinian Committee's Support to West Bank Described

44040200 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
30 Dec 88 p 10

[Text] Amman—A conference on housing and infrastructure organization organized by the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Council was concluded yesterday in the occupied homeland.

A number of working papers were discussed at the conference. They pertained to housing, the role of housing in national steadfastness, and ways to activate this role.

Among the papers presented at the conference was a report on the achievements of the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Council pertaining to the contribution made by the Jerusalem Fund. A report was also presented on the housing sector during the uprising.

Housing Sector

Since the intifadah [uprising] revolution began on 8 December 1987, the masses of our Arab Palestinian people in the occupied lands have been making one sacrifice after another in opposition to the Zionist occupiers and their methods, which oppress and destroy all realms of economic and social life in the occupied homeland, in addition to denying the most basic human rights, especially the right to appropriate shelter and housing. The enemy commanders are well aware of the material and spiritual importance of psychological stability and attachment to the land and the homeland. Therefore, since the start of the occupation, they have resorted to denying Palestinian citizens the right to housing through a series of measures and arbitrary regulations and official decrees, such as the destruction of entire villages and cities (including 'Amwas, Yalu, Bayt Nuba and Qalqiliyah, in which there are an estimated 6,000 houses), limiting the granting of permits, or using various flimsy pretexts to prohibit building activities in large areas.

The occupation authorities have found justification in the daily acts of resistance and uprising activities for actualizing their policy aimed at destroying houses and

blowing them up as collective punishment, as happened in the warrior village of Bayta, the village of al-Khudr and the city of Nabulus, after molotov cocktails were thrown at military vehicles.

The matter developed to the point where the houses of rock-throwers were blown up according to an iron fist policy, following the enactment of a law equating rocks with weapons. In the first year of the uprising, 140 houses were blown up for different security reasons.

In a related development, the occupation authorities, in response to acts of resistance, began a wide-scale operation to survey houses built without permits. Without prior warning, they destroyed approximately 260 of these houses in different areas of the occupied lands, despite the fact that some of them were built before the occupation in 1967. The destroyed houses included 5 houses in the village of Bayt Ta'mur/Bethlehem.

In addition, the occupation authorities have in some cases resorted to closing off houses, or part of them, as punishment for those resisting the occupation. This policy has been applied on a wide scale during the uprising, and has included buildings housing libraries, associations, unions, clinics and pharmacies.

During the uprising, the authorities have increased their determination to implement a policy aiming at limiting the spread of Arab building activities and to limit them to the most narrow area possible. This has led to extreme stinginess regarding the approval of requests for building permits. Moreover, the authorities have used the granting of permits as an inducement in bartering for the cessation of combative actions in several areas.

The continuously escalating implementation of the aforementioned policies by the occupation authorities since the start of the uprising has exacerbated the housing shortage afflicting the originally occupied Palestinian lands, where there was a shortage of 25,000 housing units in 1986. This shortage could grow to 28,000 units by the end of 1989 as a result of these policies.

In the face of these policies, Palestinian citizens have assumed the task of mitigating the housing shortage by building unauthorized buildings, especially in remote areas, despite the resultant dangers. In doing so, they are exploiting the circumstances which accompanied the uprising, and which favor them, such that:

- The stridency of monitoring and search raids carried out in Arab areas by employees of the administration's agencies has tempered because these employees now fear resistance operations aimed against them.
- Informants in the villages who report to the administration's agencies have been suppressed, and prevented from reporting on the construction of new buildings without permits.

- The strike days announced in uprising declarations have been exploited to rapidly construct buildings far from the eyes of administration personnel. In this respect, cooperation among citizens is helping to complete the work quickly.

During the uprising, work has permanently halted on the administration's infrastructure programs for the Arab villages and cities in the occupied lands, which were initiated by the municipal and village councils before the uprising.

Achievements of the Joint Council

Since the artificial Zionist entity came into being in 1948, and occupied the western part of Jerusalem, which was entirely occupied in 1967, the Zionist entity has been tireless in its efforts to obliterate the city's Arab and Islamic cultural and historical sites, and to Judaize them completely. In this regard, it has pursued diverse methods, including: Annexing the city of Jerusalem officially to its artificial entity; considering the city its capital; changing the demographic situation in the city; eliminating Arab institutions and Judaizing them; eliminating the Arab economy and absorbing it into the crucible of the Israeli economy; creating a housing shortage in the city; destroying the educational and cultural process; creating the so-called infrastructure plan for the city of Jerusalem, which aims, among other things, to slice off about 20 percent of the area of the West Bank and to incorporate it within the Zionist entity; and practicing various savage and barbaric methods for eliminating the Arab, Islamic presence from the city by imposing taxes, intimidating and tormenting citizens, and repeatedly attempting to Judaize the lands surrounding the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock Mosque.

The confrontation between the Palestinians in Jerusalem and the occupation authorities is a cultural, life process. Since its establishment in 1979, the Joint Council has been actively expending all of its material and spiritual abilities to thwart the enemy's plans aimed at Judaizing the city, and subsequently engulfing it and compelling its inhabitants to immigrate and scatter. Support has come from all social and economic sectors in the city and its environs. The amount collected between 1979 and 1986 totals 39,546,307 Jordanian dinars, or 28.14 percent of the total amount of allocations disbursed to support the occupied homeland.

In 1984, the Islamic Conference Organization transferred \$15 million, i.e. 5,715,000 Jordanian dinars, to the account of the Joint Council. This is the amount allocated by the administrative committee of the Jerusalem Fund in its April 1984 session to support Jerusalem, with the understanding that allocations and expenditures of this sum would be made through the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Council. The entire amount was allocated during 1985 and 1986 to support several sectors designated by the aforementioned committee. Subsequently,

the fund used its own resources to support the rest of the sectors, in the light of the contributions made by sister Arab countries as agreed at the Baghdad summit conference.

Preservation of Identity

Past efforts to support the Arab, Islamic identity of Jerusalem have demonstrated the need to supply a series of yearly support requirements needed by the majority of the vital sectors. This support assists in enabling the city and its Arab Islamic institutions to remain steadfast in the face of a most insolent Zionist attack, which aims to uproot them and erase the characteristics of their Arab, Islamic identity.

The financial allocations needed to achieve the fundamentals pertaining to this task total approximately 17 million Jordanian dinars.

Faysal Al-Husayni Talks About Elections 44000302 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 3 Feb 89 p 4

[Interview with Faysal al-Husayni by Yehuda Litani and Joel Greenberg: "The Barrier of Fear"]

[Text] Faysal al-Husayni, fresh out of jail, is intent as ever to pursue dialogue with Israelis. The soft-spoken activist, interviewed in his home at the foot of the Mount of Olives, was anxious to dispel fears which he says block the way to conciliation between Israelis and Palestinians.

Our conversation was interrupted repeatedly as he welcomed a stream of visitors from throughout the West Bank. Men, young and old, trooped in, kissing him on both cheeks before sitting down and sipping Turkish coffee under a wood-cut portrait of al-Husayni's father, 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni, the legendary Arab commander killed at the Battle of the Qastal in the 1948 War of Independence.

Al-Husayni's release from prison last week (after a prolonged period of administrative detention) was a major media event. His meetings in jail with the coordinator of activities in the territories, Shmu'el Goren, generated controversy in Israel, and his conditional support for elections in the territories brought upon him the wrath of the PLO and local Palestinian critics. Thrust into the limelight after months in jail, he seemed to be wincing, taken aback by the commotion caused by his comments.

In his meetings with Goren, safely within the confines of the prison walls, he had been free to speak his mind without negative consequences, al-Husayni recalled:

"Mr Goren told me, 'I know you from the files, now I would like to hear from the man, not from the files. As part of my job, I must talk with Palestinians, and hear their views. I would like to inform you that we are not going to renew the administrative detention order against you, and I would like to hear your point of view.

Please put it very clearly and frankly, without any fear that we are going to renew your arrest. Whatever you say will not affect your situation.'

"I told him, 'Even if you arrest me, I will not change my thoughts.' So we started talking, and I put forward my views—why we believe the best solution is a Palestinian state beside an Israeli state; why the solution for the Palestinian people must be for the whole Palestinian people, and not only for the Palestinians here; why we believe the PLO is the sole representative.

"He asked me, 'But you, the people here, have made this intifada and through you the PLO has arrived where it has, so why not come forward and be the leader? Why don't the leaders here talk with us, and reach peace with us?'

"I told him: 'We can't give you a leadership from here, because the leadership is there. But we can help you with another thing. Maybe we can build a ladder for you to come down from the high tree you have climbed, which we know is so cold, and come down to the warm international community, where the PLO is, to sit and talk and solve the problem.'

"I went on to say: 'I had hoped that you, the Israeli people, could build this ladder for your leaders, because I believe that only the strong can go and make peace. Only the strong can say, OK, I can go to negotiate and bargain. The only thing the weak can do is jump and sit on a tree, and after that there are problems coming down.'"

Al-Husayni's meeting with Goren came at the end of six months of incarceration in a separate cell in the criminal section of the Kfar Yona jail near Netanya.

"I could see other prisoners. They knew who I was. There was nothing out of the ordinary in their behaviour. We exchanged words sometimes. Whenever they saw my picture in the newspaper, or when my name was mentioned on television, they would say, 'Faysal, Faysal, you're on television.' The atmosphere was friendly, and sometimes they would flash a V-sign when they saw me.

"I could read newspapers, HADASHOT, YEDI'OT AHARONOT, and MA'ARIV sometimes. I could read books I had brought. I read history books, books on relations between Israelis and Palestinians, between Palestinians and Jordanians and between the Jordanians and the Israelis. I also read some philosophy books and novels. By the way, I liked the novel of (Israeli novelist) A. B. Yehoshu'a, 'The Lover.'"

Al-Husayni views the process of dialogue with Israel as an exercise in realpolitik. Why, we asked, does he think he was released by the authorities?

"This is their politics. Politics dictates that you don't like or hate anyone. There is no final 'no' in politics. You have your objective, the other side has its objectives. You have your dreams, the other side has its dreams. Peace can only be made with your enemy, and you can't find a 'beautiful' enemy. Your enemy is the Palestinian people, and the representative of your enemy is the one you can talk with. The Israelis should tell their government to go ahead and talk to the leadership of the Palestinian people, which is only the PLO, and try to reach a solution.

"We don't think it is our duty to talk only with the leftists in Israel. We must also talk with the centre, and, mainly, we must talk with the government, because the government is the representative of the people. Who says I like Mr Shamir, or Mr Rabin? It doesn't matter whether I like the leadership of my enemy; it is the leadership that the Israeli people elected.

"Mr Rabin has started to act in a way that shows he understands that the Palestinian problem can't be solved by security and military actions, only by political means. If he has reached this understanding, very well. Now at least, Mr Rabin has come with something to which we can say 'no.' We have something to reject now."

The Rabin plan for elections, interim autonomy, and ultimate confederation between the territories and Jordan or Israel is unacceptable for several reasons, al-Husayni said.

"The problem is that he's talking about elections here, to solve the problem of the Palestinians here, without the Palestinians outside. From this very point he is destroying the whole idea of having elections. When we talk about elections, we are talking about elections as a step toward a Palestinian state, toward the unity of the Palestinian people. From the Rabin plan, I understand that he looks at elections as a means to block the Palestinian state and any idea of the unity of the Palestinian people.

"No one can say 'no' to elections: the question is under what conditions, and to what purpose?

"Rabin is making an offer to the Palestinians living here, as if we are a group of tourists living in a hotel, who have the right to live on the premises, but not our relatives. We are a people living on its own land, whose relatives can also come live here.

"The Israelis would like to solve the problem of Palestinians abroad as a refugee problem, and our problem here as a minority problem, as part of Israel or of Jordan. But we are not struggling to be a minority and to solve the problem of only half our people. Our problem didn't start in 1967, it started in 1947.

"They must understand that we are one people, and our people must have their own state. Instead, they tell us: 'You can be part of Jordan, part of Israel, but never part of yourself.'

"If Rabin is talking about confederation, such an arrangement is between states. If it is between states, it means the Israeli state, and the Palestinian state for the whole Palestinian people. If it is indeed for the whole of the Palestinian people, then I agree with Mr Rabin that we can decide to have a confederation with Jordan, Israel or Egypt. We surely will have to go to some kind of confederation, because small states can't live alone."

Here, al-Husayni turned to the fears he believes are the main obstacle to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

"We know there is a lot of fear in the Israeli community, though I can't understand why you, who are strong, with such a big army, are so afraid of us.

"If you remember 'Alice in Wonderland,' she was afraid that an illusory monster would eat her up. She knew it was an illusion, but she was afraid, until someone told her: 'Look Alice, what you see is an illusion, it's coming from your mind, and your fear is not only harming you, but everyone around you. You must confront this illusion and say, "I am not afraid of you," and it will disappear.'

"I believe the Palestinian Alice did her job. It confronted the Zionist movement, the Zionist idea and Israel, and said: 'Look, I am not afraid, I can build my state here beside you. I don't want to throw you into the sea. You can stay here beside me, you are not the monster, I agree to live next to you, and I can make sure that you'll feel secure here.'

"The Israeli Alice must grow up, say the same thing, and stop making problems not only for herself, but for the whole world. When this happens, she can join the tea party."

Al-Husayni leaned forward, speaking with emotion:

"Look, security is a very important thing for you. So tell us how we can avoid harming your security...Let me tell you something: In 1983, my mother died in London, and I decided to ask the Israelis if they would allow me to bring her body and bury her here. So I went to District Commissioner Rafi Levi at the Interior Ministry and told him that I am Faysal al-Husayni, my mother died in London and I would like to bury her. He said, 'OK.'

"I made the arrangements, and my lawyer went to the Russian Compound to get a permit from the Shin Bet which would allow me to go to Jericho to collect my mother's body (from Jordan), since I was restricted to Jerusalem at the time.

"When I returned to Mr Levi, he told me: 'Faysal, who was your mother married to?' I told him, 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni.' He said: 'It is forbidden to bury her here.' I said, 'Why is it forbidden? I would like to know who gave the order.' He said, 'It wasn't me, it is for security reasons and the order has come from the military government in the West Bank.'

"I asked him, 'What kind of security reason?' He said, 'It would endanger the security of the state.' I told him: 'Please tell me, if a body of a dead woman can endanger Israeli security, tell us Arabs what are your conditions for making peace with you?'"

Interrupted by the arrival of new guests, al-Husayni walked us out the door to continue his tale in the quiet of his front yard.

"I called my acquaintance Tzvi Alpeleg of Tel Aviv University, and told him: 'You are a writer and you also have connections with the army; tell me how can a body of a dead woman endanger Israeli security?'"

"He started working on it and came back and told me: 'I called the military government, they say Levi is lying, they have nothing against such a thing, and after 48 hours they will allow the burial.'

"So, you see, using just 'security' will lead nowhere. Tell us about your fears and we can solve the problem together. I am also afraid of you, and need explanations from you about the situation.

"You musn't be afraid of the Palestinian state, you should fear the destruction of Israel. Tell us about your fears, so we can sit together and solve the problem—not at our expense, so there will be no state; but so that there will be no fear.

"This is what I would like to tell the Israeli people, and after that, let them tell it to Mr Shamir."

With that, al-Husayni shook our hands and walked back into his house, swallowed up in the crowd of well-wishers who packed his living room.

ALGERIA

Base Wage Rates To Increase

45190040c Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
4 Jan 89 p 3

[Article: "Government Program: Lower Wages To Increase as Soon as January"]

[Text] Mr Mohamed Nabi, minister of labor, employment, and social affairs, announced yesterday that, as a result of the measures on low wages and the protection of

the workers' purchasing power included in the government program which was approved by the People's National Assembly, an executive order providing for an increase of the lower monthly wages was signed.

The decree took effect on 1 January 1989; it provides for the following adjustments in the base monthly wages of the national wage schedule:

a) The lowest wages in the national wage schedule, i.e. Category 1, Section 1, increase from 1,120 dinars per month to 1,500 dinars per month, i.e. a 33-percent increase, or 380 dinars per month;

b) For Categories 1 through 4, the sliding-scale increase ranges from 380 to 255 dinars per month;

c) For Categories 5 through 10, i.e. skilled and specialized workers, the increase in the base wages is uniform: 250 dinars per month;

d) To prevent any overlapping of base wages with the categories immediately above, Categories 11 and 12 receive a sliding-scale increase, varying according to the section; for Category 11, the increase ranges from 190 to 130 dinars, and the average increase for Category 12 is 90 dinars per month.

This measure affects 1,897,200 workers, i.e. 78.3 percent of the active wage-earning population.

By sector, 80.3 percent of workers in the economic sector are covered by this increase, and 75.5 percent in the public institutions and the administration.

Mr Mohamed Nabi indicated that this measure is also the result of recently promulgated decrees, which contain provisions allowing for an increase in wage-earners' income, especially those employed in jobs with a high-nuisance level when the actual degree of nuisance was not taken into account in the rates, and in connection with the improvement of production and productivity, under current regulations. The minister of labor, employment, and social affairs recalled that this measure was also included in the government's program aiming to protect and preserve the purchasing power of citizens, and in particular that of workers; the program provides for measures aiming to:

- Stabilize the prices of staples and consumer goods and their availability;
- Strengthen price controls;
- Improve the control of distribution circuits, including for produce.

According to Mr Mohamed Nabi, this increase of lower wages will add up to 7.2 billion dinars per year.

It will also require increased and sustained efforts to increase production and improve productivity, two prerequisites to ensure that this additional income is offset

by an equivalent amount of goods and services, so as to prevent any upsurge of inflation and make it possible for the wage increase to serve its purpose in terms of improvement and preservation of the purchasing power.

Road Improvements Needed for Tamanrasset Area
45190040b Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
4 Jan 89 p 7

[APS article: "Arteries of the Deep South"]

[Text] Road infrastructure constitutes the fundamental factor in the development of a local community. In the Tamanrasset Governorate, the road network totals 5,854 km, including 1,977 km of unclassified trails.

But we should recall that the governorate is crossed by the trans-Saharan highway which is currently being repaired by three national road contractors.

The trans-Saharan highway, or African Unity Highway, is truly the backbone of the governorate; but it was allowed to deteriorate to such an extent that it could no longer play its assigned part in the local development of the governorate. To remedy this situation, a major operation was launched to improve and extend the trans-Saharan highway network and connect El-Golea to In-Guezzam—a distance of nearly 1,300 km.

On the El-Golea-In Salah-Tamanrasset section, work started at the end of 1986 and is nearing completion; on the other hand, no contractor has yet been selected for the section connecting the governorate seat to In-Guezzam (430 km).

Because of the size of the program, the National Service seems to be the only contractor capable of meeting the challenge: it has the experience required as well as adequate human and material resources.

During the inspection tour he just completed, the minister of public works asked many questions on road conditions in the governorate, where roads and the airport remain the only means of communication. In this respect, and taking into account the resources implemented, the minister stressed the need to undertake work on the Tamanrasset-In-Guezzam section as soon as possible; he also gave firm instructions to solve the problem of asphalt supply, a major obstacle, others being the lack of equipment (spare parts) and the unfavorable climate conditions under which construction must take place.

During 1988, the road infrastructure sector launched studies on the construction of 875 km of roads and started putting road signs on 1,100 km of roads, out of a planned 1,670 km.

The opening of new roads, in particular from In Salah to Aoulef and Tit-Silet and from In Amguel to Ideles, would give new impetus to the social and economic development of the governorate.

The other concern of local authorities remains repair of the runway at the governorate seat airport, which is also deteriorating from the effect of the climate.

A new air terminal was recently built and other work done to improve and enlarge the airport, and this infrastructure must now be taken care of fast to prevent any interruption of air traffic.

For now, air transport officials insist on repairing the secondary runway, which has been closed for over 4 years.

Support for Cereal Grain Production Yields Increase

45190040a Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French
5 Jan 89 p 6

[Article by A. Benslama: "Measures To Support Cereal Production"]

[Text] In the Constantine Governorate as in many other regions of the country, the plowing and sowing campaign was influenced by the rainfall pattern. There was not much rain in October and November, when it was eagerly hoped for: only 21.7 mm, whereas the average for that period is 90 mm. On the other hand, there was more rain than usual in December: 138 mm, instead of the average 62 mm.

However, although these December rains were late, which forced a number of farmers to sow on dry soil, they were particularly beneficial to seed germination and emergence. Abundant rainfall during several days at the end of the year, therefore, caused some delay in the closing of this plowing and sowing campaign; it was 90-percent completed on 31 December 1988. Still, farmers had to work twice as hard in the past few days to achieve the overall objective of 63,006 ha.

This acreage is divided among several speculations: durum wheat: 27,518 ha; soft wheat: 14,995 ha; barley: 18,462 ha; oats: 2,590 ha.

Note that, due to the gradual reduction of fallow land, these objectives are 3,000 ha larger than during the previous campaign. Note also that the reorganized sector holds 34,242 ha and the private sector 28,824 ha.

Of course, several organizations pooled their efforts to ensure that the campaign would progress as smoothly as possible. As far as supplies are concerned, CCLS [expansion unknown], which started deliveries in early September, achieved its objective of treating and packing 70,000 quintals of seeds. Deliveries were made directly to the

farms (EAC [expansion unknown], EAI [expansion unknown] and seed-growers), and to community stores for the private sector, so that farmers did not have to undertake long trips.

To develop new varieties, and also to support production, a program aimed at taking over 500 ha throughout the governorate, from plowing to harvesting, and allowing farmers to reap the eventual benefit of the program, deserves notice.

Another program, this time a joint program of CCLS and BARD [Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development], is drawing up lists of recipients of seed credits to ease credit-granting procedures and save farmers' time.

CASSAP [expansion unknown], for its part, has implemented a rational procedure that enabled it to meet all fertilizer requirements with no supply interruption. Similarly, NAFTAL [expansion unknown] was able to meet most of the demand for fuel. Yet, this organization experienced some tire shortages. In addition, EDMMA [expansion unknown] (the former ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office]) sent field personnel to assign the machinery.

In this respect, farmers are now waiting only for the arrival of spare parts. They have organized to help one another when machinery breaks down.

Thus, with the satisfactory preparation of seed-beds made easier by a long period without rain, and the campaign as a whole well organized, the agricultural development department of the governorate displays a wholesome optimism.

EGYPT

Military Playing Increasingly Powerful Role in Economy

36130043 Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish
30 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by Gorm Rye Olsen: "Egypt's Military: From Political Pariah To Economic Power Factor"; first paragraph is INFORMATION introduction]

[Text] The Egyptian defense minister has provided the officer corps with such extensive privileges that a significant share of the country's economic activities has come into the hands of the military.

The military, which the assassinated President Anwar Sadat did everything to hold down, has become the most powerful factor in Mubarak's Egypt. While Sadat was always controlling the military by shuffling the top military leadership around, President Hosni Mubarak has allowed his defense minister, Field Marshall Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, to become so powerful that he is viewed by many as being Egypt's most powerful person

after the president. Some observers even believe that Abu Ghazala is Egypt's most influential man as the country gets ready to enter the new decade.

Abu Ghazala owes his power to both his personal qualities and his flair for the political. In contrast to President Mubarak, the defense minister is a brilliant speaker, and furthermore, he has a sense of humor. He is popular both among the masses and in religious circles. Throughout the 1980's he has been able to maneuver the Egyptian military into a very central position in the country's political life, which has steadily been becoming less authoritarian and less militarized.

Popular With the Military

Abu Ghazala has secured for the Armed Forces all manner of advanced American weapons systems. He has also gotten the domestic Egyptians weapons manufacturing system humming, and, not least, he has secured a whole string of material benefits for his officers.

Taken together, these things have contributed to the defense minister's popularity with the Armed Forces. When compared to the backing Abu Ghazala enjoys from the officers, his popularity with the people may be of the slightly more superficial sort.

For many years, the defense minister and President Mubarak have taken turns observing the most important international soccer matches in which Egyptian teams participated. Mubarak has been unlucky enough to be present at a string of ignominious defeats for the Egyptian teams. Abu Ghazala, on the other hand, has observed no small number of matches at which the Egyptian team carried off the victory.

Fewer Soldiers—More Officers

It is worth noting that Egypt's Armed Forces have acquired a prominent position for themselves in the 1980's while at the same time the number of men in uniform has fallen drastically. However, the reduction in the number of soldiers was achieved exclusively by sending enlisted men and noncommissioned officers back home. Officers, on the other hand, remained. The result is a top-heavy military.

Given this situation, Abu Ghazala has nonetheless been able to get the changing governments to grant substantial pay increases to Egyptian officers. Barracks, military vehicles, and yes, even the uniforms have improved markedly in just the past 10 years. But just as important to Abu Ghazala's social security net for the officers corps has been an extensive range of special perquisites for the military's top men.

Land and Real Estate Speculation

In Nasr City on the outskirts of Cairo, right near the officers' academy in the suburb of Heliopolis and near a number of major military camps, thousands of luxury apartments have been built. Sale of the apartments has been offered exclusively to officers and that at heavily subsidized prices.

For many officers, the purchase of such an apartment has been synonymous with yet another source of income, thanks to rent money. By the middle of this decade, 5 percent of all homes built were by and for the military. Most of this construction occurred in the new desert towns outside Cairo.

A major share of the money for these vast construction projects came in via the sale by the military of valuable land near Egypt's big cities. The military as an organization also earns money by selling land to private citizens in the new military towns in the desert. By purchasing land in these towns, Egypt's upper class can escape the Nile Valley's filthy, overcrowded cities.

While the entire Egyptian officers corps has access to cheap housing, special educational opportunities for their children, special hospitals and good health care, their own inexpensive, though no less exclusive stores, not to mention private vacation areas, a small, select group of officers has begun to get directly involved in the production of weapons and a long list of other products.

Egyptian industry has been stagnant since 1982. In the same period, by contrast, the military has established its own factories which produce optical equipment, windows, and doors for the military's own housing, packaging, and a number of other goods.

Next to the military's civilian industries is the big Egyptian weapons industry. For several years, Egypt has been self-sufficient in hand weapons, mortars and almost all calibers of ammunition. The country is also just about self-sufficient in missiles and howitzers. To this add the joint French-Egyptian production of the Gazelle helicopter, the German-Egyptian Alpha jet and the Brazilian-Egyptian-produced training plane, the 100 Tucana.

After Israel, Egypt is the Middle East's biggest arms exporter. There is no doubt that the Egyptian arms industry has earned a great deal of money by exporting weapons to Iraq during the Gulf war which lasted 8 years. The amount earned from the sale of exported arms is a major secret. Furthermore, the same is true of the money earned by the arms industry.

Regardless of the profitability figures for the military's industries, it is incontrovertible that military industries enjoy a great many advantages not enjoyed by other industries. Thus the military has access to raw materials, semimanufactured articles and energy at subsidized prices. According to current Egyptian law, all industries

which produce with the intention of exporting are supposed to pay the world market price for what they consume. However, the military is permanently exempt from this law. Thus the military industries purchase electricity at half the world market price. So, while the Egyptian state treasury subsidizes the military's exports, the revenue these produce goes directly to the military and not to the state's hard currency fund.

Advanced Military Agriculture

The Egyptian military has also moved into agricultural production and the reclamation of new land for growing. This has occurred with reference to the fact that national security is dependent on "food security." With its vast financial resources and its almost unlimited manpower resources, the military has turned into Egypt's biggest agribusiness organization. By investing in high tech, the military has set up dairy cattle farms and dairies, poultry farms, fish farms, and farms to feed cattle. The military has also gotten involved in the very lucrative production of fruits and vegetables. And finally the military is in charge of processing, packing and marketing its agricultural products itself.

Gradually, the military organization has come to account for 20 percent of the total Egyptian food production.

Contempt for the Public Sector

Abu Ghazala and the Egyptian officers see the public sector as incompetent. Their judgment is of both the administration and the state-owned industries. The private sector, on the other hand, is seen as the only dynamic partner around to work with if Egypt's future development is to be managed. The military thinks of itself as being competent to initiate such cooperation by dint of its internal technical expertise and management know-how.

Extensive cooperation between the military and the private sector already exists. Among other things, every year the military invites tenders worth several hundred million Egyptian pounds on various non-military ventures from the private sector—both the domestic and the foreign.

In addition, the military attempts to secure access for military technicians to the private sector's advanced technologies, both in food production and in other manufacturing activity. This trait indicates the possibility of Egypt's developing a model familiar in Latin America. There, there are strong ties between the military and segments of the upper bourgeoisie.

Democratization

Parallel to all this, President Hosni Mubarak is attempting to democratize the former military dictatorship. "Democracy" and "open dialogue" are key words in

Mubarak's vision of a democratic Egypt. Thus for several years the country has had a very unfettered and critical press. Several parties compete for voter support when there are National Assembly elections.

Mubarak's cautious steps towards more democratic conditions in the ancient land of the Nile face many obstacles. The economy is about to fall apart. With a foreign debt of over 44 billion dollars, the International Monetary Fund is demanding drastic economic reforms if Egypt is to be granted new credits.

The military's new economic power and its close contacts with the middle class may present another obstacle on Mubarak's way towards more democratic conditions. On the other hand, the military's growing economic involvement may prove to be one of the right medicines to help cure the chronically ill Egyptian economy.

Failing Investment Company's Impact Felt on Muslim Student Election

45040125 Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
5 Dec 88 pp 14-17

[By Ibrahim Khalil et al]

[Text] This year, for the first time in many years, students of the religious groups, as they call themselves, have lost their complete control over the Egyptian universities' student unions, a control which they customarily exercised in past years.

This year, these students have not been able to gain control of all of the student union seats in all the colleges of the various universities. Rather, other students who declared their open political opposition to the students belonging to these groups and their rejection of these students' conduct and actions in the universities have wrenched a considerable number of seats from these groups.

In Cairo University, our biggest university, the religious groups' students (with all their various factions) have been able to gain full control of only three colleges, including the Dar al-'Ulum College, where these students assaulted their opponents and beat them severely, inflicting a variety of injuries, ranging from concussions to broken arms, on 26 male and female students.

Meanwhile, these students have completely lost control over the unions of numerous colleges which they had previously controlled, such as the Agriculture College, where al-Nashat [activity] students won an overwhelming majority, and the College of Veterinary Medicine where the independents have gained almost full control. The religious groups' students have also suffered evident setbacks in the election at the Economics and Political Science College, the Information College, the Law College, the Business College, the Archeology College and even the Nursing Institute.

This outcome, which has resulted in the retreat of the religious groups' students and in their loss of control over student unions, has recurred in numerous other universities.

It has also happened at 'Ayn Shams University, though by a lesser degree than at Cairo University, and at Hulwan University where the religious groups' students have lost control over the unions of four of the university's colleges, and at al-Azhar University where they suffered setbacks at two of its colleges. Even at the universities where the election was held in amazing calm and where the students were unaware of the climate of the election campaign, the religious groups' students have lost a number of their strongholds, the most significant of which is the Engineering College of al-Minufiyah University. However, the students in these groups have maintained their past control over most of the unions of Alexandria University's colleges and have been able to gain control over three of al-Mansurah University's colleges for the first time.

Despite this, these groups' students have suffered no small loss in this year's election, especially since they constantly achieved victory in past student elections.

Al-Rayyan's Role

In past years, they consistently won a sweeping victory. But this year, for the first time, the outcome has been different. They have retreated and they have lost numerous positions, including complete unions in a number of colleges.

The most prominent cause of this evident decline is al-Rayyan.

Even though neither al-Rayyan nor any of his brothers in the student unions ran [this year] for election at any of our colleges, these students considered al-Rayyan a symbol of the religious groups and they perhaps persuaded numerous other students of their view.

Al-Rayyan raises the same slogans raised by the religious groups' students. He alleges what they allege, loudly states what they loudly state and perhaps behaves as they do.

This is why Cairo, 'Ayn Shams and Alexandria Universities and others were inundated by posters saying:

"Al-Rayyan stole your money and his followers are stealing your votes."

"Beware, the mask has fallen off the imposters' face. Our union should be a student union free of principle peddlers."

Independent students belonging to the various political currents proceeded to besiege the religious groups' students and to ask them:

"Who has financed your advertisements (sorry, meaning your publications) which are arranged photographically and printed by the offset method on splendid print (costing thousands of pounds)? Was it al-Rayyan or was it the money of orphans and widows?"

The independent students also said:

"Let all know who they are talking with. Ahmad Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Fattah (al-Rayyan) was a student at Cairo University's College of Veterinary Medicine and a member of its Islamic group and student union. He did what you are doing and advocated what you are advocating. Now that the hidden has been exposed and that the mask has fallen, why don't we save time and why don't you, and your instigators, remove your false masks?"

Thus, al-Rayyan has actually contributed to the defeat of the religious groups' students in this year's student election and has cost them their complete control over the student unions for the first time in long years.

These groups' students have failed to persuade the male and female students whose families, relatives and acquaintances lost money they had deposited with al-Rayyan to vote for individuals who exploit religion as al-Rayyan exploited it to defraud depositors.

They have suffered a severe defeat despite all the means they used, including force, violence and beating opponents to the point of causing them concussions and other injuries, to seize control of the student unions.

Expected Failure

The students belonging to these groups became aware of this failure during the preparation for the election and before the election started. This is why they resorted to numerous means to contain their opponents and to reduce the size of their expected losses this year.

They tried to unite their ranks and to rally their numerous factions. Competition had intensified between these factions through the years because there was no competition from other currents or groups.

They also enlisted in this regard the help of other elements and forces from outside the university, especially when disagreement between the factions reached the point of their hurling charges of infidelity at each other, as happened at Cairo, 'Ayn Shams and Hulwan Universities where it became a familiar sight for students to see the amir of Jihad screaming in the face of the brotherhood's amir, or vice versa: I am not a Muslim? Just like that? Why do you declare us infidels?

The matter did not stop at exchanging the charges of infidelity but went further to clashes between these various religious factions, as happened at Alexandria University—inside the Engineering College mosque, to

be specific. The situation could have resulted in injuries had not Dr Muhammad Hathut, the alliance candidate in the 1984 People's Assembly election, intervened.

Intervention from outside the university was, of course, required to contain this disagreement between the religious groups, as happened in the city of Alexandria when Muslim Brotherhood leaders Yusuf al-Qardawi and Shaykh Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im summoned the student leaders of Jihad and of the brotherhood to 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab Mosque to persuade them to renounce their disagreements, at least during the election.

Use of Violence

The religious groups' students also spent generously on election propaganda in the form of splendid pamphlets printed on glossy paper costing thousands of pounds in an attempt to persuade the students to vote for them; in the form of free treatment tickets for students and their families in an endeavor to win them over; in the form of mimeographed study material printed and distributed freely; and in the form of non-symbolic gifts given to students to silence their opposition.

But this weapon misfired. The students accused these groups' members of receiving external financing for their election propaganda, expressing the belief that this is another confirmation of the groups' tie to the ill-reputed money investment companies. The students asked the groups' members openly, whether in processions or in the pamphlets the students distributed. Has al-Rayyan financed the propaganda with the money of orphans and widows?

Consequently, the students belonging to these groups which allege to be Islamic groups could find no means of seizing back the unions other than through the use of force and violence to prevent their opponents from gaining in the election or to falsify the election.

Initially, only threats to use force were made, as in the case of 'Ayn Shams University when students belonging to these groups gathered in front of al-Za'faran Palace and the university campus to pray while wearing their shoes, claiming that prayer while wearing shoes is commanded by God and His messenger. But in fact, those students were implying that force would be used to prevent the names of some of their representatives from being stricken from the candidate lists.

But the matter did not end at threats. These groups' members quickly turned to force and violence to confront their opponents, hurling stones and bottles at the students of Alexandria Education College and smashing the college's glass facade.

They resorted to (supporting) each other, as they did when two vehicles carrying students belonging to Asyut groups arrived to support the Cairo groups. Despite the security measures, they succeeded in sneaking into the university and took part in harassing and suppressing their opponents.

But the most prominent incident in which force was used by the religious groups is the incident which took place at Cairo University's Dar al-'Ulum College where 26 male and female students sustained serious injuries.

Dar al-'Ulum Incident

The incident began when the members of a group tried to storm the election office. The atmosphere became tense and some faculty members intervened to pacify the situation. But matters did not end well. On the following morning, the religious group members and a large number of students from the groups in the other colleges, armed with sticks, iron rods and (steel knuckles), gathered.

The election began at 1000. The students belonging to the religious groups lined up in front of the election committees' office, permitting only those students who will vote for them to pass. A supporter of the Student Families tried to enter but they stopped him. When he insisted on passing, they beat him. The atmosphere became tense again. There were skirmishes and slogans were shouted. But then all the members of the religious groups left the college and went to perform the "jihad prayer" in the square across the college entrance. Minutes later, one of those leading the prayers shouted: "God is great. Forward to the jihad. First army, advance."

In moments, the prayer congregation spread throughout all parts of the college and the beatings started. The college turned into a battlefield and numerous male and female students were injured. Ambulances were summoned to transport the injured to the student hospital in al-Jizah Square. The result was that 26 students, including five female students, were injured. The medical reports issued by the hospital said that the injured suffered wounds, concussions, broken bones, contusions and loss of consciousness.

Sahar Faruq, a noncandidate student, said: I thought that these groups' members would not attack women because they had done nothing of the sort before. But what happened is that a member of the Islamic groups hit me with a stick on my arm which had already been broken and put in a cast. I fell on the floor and was unable to move. I was taken to the hospital where my arm was put in a new cast and I was told that I had suffered a compounded fracture at the spot of the old fracture.

Student Sahar Mahir Fahmi was not only beaten, according to what she has said. They also stole her gold earrings.

This is how students belonging to the religious groups were able to seize all the student union seats. What is surprising, according to the injured students, is that the college administration approved the result of the election which was held under the threat of weapons and under beatings!

Negativism... Negativism, But

Despite all this, the religious groups lost for the first time in this year's election. Their loss, particularly in Cairo University which witnessed these attacks and the reinforcements coming from outside, has not been small.

This is the first time they have lost after long years during which they had a firm grip on the student unions, as they had on some labor unions.

The exposure of al-Rayyan and of the other money investment companies has helped expose these groups, especially since they banned student activity during their control of the student unions whose monies they have squandered on their propaganda.

Thus, the one who lost the university election this year is al-Rayyan, even though he did not run for election. He lost when those who don his garb in the university lost.

However, the loss has not been decisive even though it is, by numerous criteria, enormous. The negativism of the male and female student masses is, perhaps, what has diminished this loss and has prevented it from being decisive.

The negativism reached the point where the visitor to the university could not feel that it was engaged in any election, especially in the provincial universities. In al-Minufiyah University, there were no election pamphlets and no posters, not even a torn statement. Numerous elections ended with candidates winning unopposed and with nobody voting.

We asked the male and female students about the elections and they responded by talking about numerous other concerns, of which the election constituted no part. They talked about concerns such as transportation, the university town and book prices. As for the elections, they said: Are we to bother with them!

Generally, student interest in the election was as feeble this year as in past years. The interest is even smaller in the provincial universities of al-Minufiyah, Tanta, al-Zaqaziq and others.

Dr Salim Muhammad Salim, the vice president of Alexandria University, has said: "The negativism existing in the university is the cause of everything. More than 75 percent of the students do not take part in the election. I hold our children responsible for squandering their rights."

Thus, and despite the negativism, al-Rayyan has lost the student election. If the male and female student masses abandon their negativism, we should expect al-Rayyan's loss to be decisive next year and in all the years to follow.

IRAQ

Breaches of Amnesty Agreement for Dissidents Reported

44000314 Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL
in English 12 Jan 89 p 8

[Text] Tehran, Jan 11 (IRNA)—The number of political prisoners in Iraq has sharply increased recently with scores of inmates being hanged in southern Iraqi cities despite a general amnesty declared by Baghdad, according to the Iraqi Islamic opposition.

A top Iraqi Communist Party official who had returned from self-exile abroad was also arrested, it said.

The Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), said in a statement Wednesday that 72 Iraqis who had surrendered themselves formerly to the security officials after the amnesty declaration were executed in al-Diwaniyah.

Al-Diwaniyah is located 180 km south of Baghdad in al-Qadisiyah Province.

The regime also executed 37 army deserters in al-Nasiriyah, 350 km south of Baghdad, in Dhi Qar province, in recent weeks, the statement said.

"Some including top Communist Party official 'Abd-al-Salam Ibrahim, who had been deceived by Baghdad's so-called general amnesty call and returned home from Sweden were arrested and there is yet no report on their fates," it said.

Meanwhile, SAIRI spokesman Hojjat al-Eslam Muhammad Baqr Hakim in an interview published in the Tehran Times Wednesday described the amnesty as a "hoax".

"No political prisoners have yet been freed from Iraqi jails," he said.

Hakim said about 40 of his family members and relatives were now in the Iraqi regime's prisons.

Hakim also denied reports that SAIRI would move its headquarters to Damascus, however, he said the group is planning to set up an office there.

Steel Project Agreement Signed With Italian Company

44000305 Baghdad INA in Arabic 31 Jan 89

[Text] Iraq and the Italian company Danieli have recently signed an agreement on a special steel project, with an annual production capacity of 300,000 tons.

This was announced by Husayn Kamil Hasan, minister of industry and military industrialization, during his meeting today with Janiro Bandiditi [name as received], the company's general director. He said that the project will constitute the main basis for the implementation of Iraq's engineering industries in view of the high technology it enjoys, which makes it the biggest project in the region.

He added that the units designed to produce the steel blocks required for the project are currently being undertaken, with production expected to begin in the middle of 1990.

The meeting reviewed the new steel and iron projects that the ministry intends to implement on a competitive basis with Danieli and other international firms specialized in manufacturing the equipment for iron and steel factories.

ISRAEL

Territories Council Demanding Changes To End Intifadah

44000349 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Feb 89 p 3

[Text] The Council of Judeaea, Samaria, and Gaza is demanding the immediate establishment of a senior panel in the Office of the Prime Minister charged with dealing with the territories. It will operate above the minister of defense and will put an end to the intifadah [uprising]. The leaders of the Council of Judeaea, Samaria, and Gaza sent a letter to Shamir after ending their strike yesterday at noon outside his office.

In the letter the settlers' representatives are demanding that Palestinian newspapers be shut down, leading troublemakers be expelled, and those groups operating under the auspices of charitable organizations in East Jerusalem be declared illegal. The settlers are demanding that Jibril's former soldiers be expelled, expulsion procedures be made easier, and the flow of PLO funds be halted.

In a press conference which was held at the strike encampment before the tents were dismantled, the leaders of the Jewish councils said that as a result of the strike, more extreme measures were being taken against provocateurs in the territories.

It was announced yesterday in the Office of the Prime Minister that Shamir sent a letter to the finance minister asking for \$64 million to be allocated for setting up the eight new settlements in Judaea and Samaria that had been agreed upon when the coalition was formed.

IDF Deputy Chief Discusses 'Eastern Front,' Territories

44230040 Tel Aviv BAMAHAHE in Hebrew
7 Dec 88 p 5

[Article by Eldad Yaniv: "Brigadier General Ehud Baraq, IDF deputy chief of staff: 'The Eastern Fighting Front Is Likely To Converge Against Us in a Few Years'"]

[Text] The face of the Middle East and the threats: Throughout the last 8 years, we have adhered to a collection of basic assumptions: the Iran-Iraq war; peace with Egypt; and holding Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza with almost no effort. The conclusion that flowed from all these basic assumptions built a picture of the Middle East in which the chance was very slight that an Arab coalition for war would form on the eastern front.

In the past year, this picture of the situation has changed. The war in the Gulf is drawing to an end and creating the potential for an Arab force that joined in war against us in the past and could do so again in the future. The threat of ground-to-ground missiles and of chemical weapons against civilians also has grown and the Arab armies are continuing a massive conventional build-up.

Syria has engaged in large arms transactions, such as the acquisition of MiG-29 jets, and may also acquire in the future the Sukhoi-24. It also is strengthening its SA-5 missile system, its land-based system of modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery forces, and its navy.

Saudi Arabia has just completed a 10 year deal for about \$30 billion, at the center of which is the acquisition of dozens of Tornado jets that, together with the F-15 jets and the Tornados they already have, will bring its order of battle to some 300 of the most advanced warplanes. Likewise, it, too, is strengthening its ground forces' tanks and armored personnel carriers and its navy, and is building an infrastructure for a naval and air base.

Iraq, too, is taking steps to strengthen its Army following the war, particularly in equipping the armored and mechanized divisions and the Air Force.

All these facts point to a heightened threat, even if not immediate, of a nature that one cannot ignore. Some years from now, not tomorrow, the battle front facing us in the east could coalesce. The possibility exists that some day, Syria, Iraq and, given certain conditions,

perhaps Jordan as well, with a Saudi expeditionary force, will join together against us on the eastern front. For us, this is a working assumption and we then prepare a response to it.

At this stage, it appears that Syria is the only Arab body capable, on a short-term timetable of 2 to 3 years, of going to war against us. This confrontation is not impossible and certainly, for us, is not necessary, but since Syria is ruled by a single man and has been constantly preparing to take us on, it may find itself undertaking a war.

The uprising in the territories: During the year of the uprising, the balance, considering those carrying it out, is extremely problematical. There have been 301 killed, 3,640 wounded, and 5,500 imprisoned, of whom 1,500 are in administrative detention. Thousands of others have already been released. Some 140 houses have been destroyed. We have suffered eight dead—two soldiers and six civilians. The contest between the civil violence of the inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza and the security forces has been marked by a gradual advantage in operational capability, patience, and organization of the efforts of the security branches, even when they are acting within the limits of the law. The large demonstrations have almost completely faded away. Soldiers go about with the feeling that deterrence has returned. Anyone who raises a rifle to his shoulder puts an end to the activity facing him. The General Security Service is becoming more effective all the time and is seizing more and more bands of terrorists for legal proceedings. We have registered a decrease of 30 to 40 percent in the number of Molotov cocktails thrown in a week to about 10 or 12. The trend in stone throwing is similar. This of course is still far from the level that we seek to establish, and the task of bringing down the violence has not yet been fully accomplished, but there is a clear downward trend. There is no full separation from work in Israel and no disintegration in civilian-administrative activity.

After Jordan's severance from the territories, attention there turned to the decisions of the Palestine National Council. At its conclusion, it was possible to point to certain achievements, especially in the spheres of public relations and public opinion and at the political level, but despite this, the main goal for which the PLO has been striving, that is, creating an open and direct dialogue with the United States, was not achieved. What is more important, there appears no possibility of Israel relaxing its hold on the territories. Alongside a certain achievement, there is frustration and disappointment, and we see also the buds of internal dispute within the local authorities, between the religious streams and the PLO's leadership.

As for the future, there is fear that extremist factions will turn to using hand grenades or live ammunition, which is available now in the territories. From their point of view, it is clear that this would cause them damage in the

propaganda sphere, but for us this is a genuine danger, and the security and intelligence branches are actively preparing to deal with the problem.

Our central problem today is continued stone throwing. In the territories, there are still too many stones and when they land, they cause serious results. In the end, our continued activity in the territories will bring down the violence to below the level at which it exists now. This will take time, but the effort is necessary and the task can be carried out.

Israel cannot permit itself to give in to the Arab military power set against it for the 40 years of its existence, or to the threat of terror that has exacted a terrible price, and cannot submit to civilian violence even if it should continue on for months and, God forbid, claim further victims. What is needed is endurance, stubbornness, a variety of methods of action, and a significant degree of personal control. Eventually, this combination of traits will bring down the level of violence. This reduction is necessary so that, when the day comes, the government of Israel, in its own good time, free of external pressures and in accordance with the democratic process, will be able to weigh how to approach dealing with the political roots of this problem.

Irregularities: Soldiers have authority to use whatever force is necessary to clear an obstruction or to conduct any other lawful action assigned to them. If, on the way, they meet opposition, they can also deal blows. If the door to a house is locked, they can enter by the window, even breaking it, and if there is a television below the window and it falls as they pass over it, then it falls. In no way are they permitted, because they have not seized anyone, to select a number of houses by the flip of a coin, to enter them, and to break televisions or heads. Even the soldiers subjected to legal proceedings because of what happened at Qalandiyah did not contend that they did not know the rules or that they did not realize that they had violated them.

Since the start of the disturbances, 45 incidents of irregularities have been referred to the courts and hundreds have been brought to a disciplinary board.

In the past year, the IDF has recorded some 3.5 million work days in the activity of about 10,000 men each day in Judeaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. Clearly, when so many people run into delicate situations, some irregularities will occur. The true test of a system is the firmness and clarity with which it deals with these instances when they are brought to its knowledge. On the other hand, it is not the place of the system to deprive talented young men, who have erred and been punished, of their right to serve the country as commanders and officers.

We have conducted a number of investigations, with the commanders and with professionals, on the functioning of the soldiers in Judeaea, Samaria and Gaza. The investigations reveal two tendencies. There are those for whom

their service has inclined them to extremism by creating and emphasizing impulses latent within them. This is a very small group. By contrast, another group, also small, is impelled to shrink back from the actions. But in our experience, the vast majority of soldiers accept their service as an operational military assignment and understand that they have to make the best of it within the law. Some of them do not enjoy carrying out the assignment, but all of them execute it with dedication and to its completion.

Refusal to serve in the territories: Anyone who refuses to serve faces legal proceedings and, if found guilty, goes to jail. In our view, that is the only possible procedure. In a democratic state, citizens are bound to be called up and are mobilized as the need warrants, and they express their political views every 4 years at the polls. Any attempt to connect the political outlook of a soldier to his readiness to carry out tasks lawfully placed on him by his commander is a violation of the foundations of democracy.

We expect that a soldier who votes for a party of the left, when the time comes for him to carry out an assignment in Judeaea and Samaria, and receives an order to clear away an obstruction or to enter a house by force, will do it without hesitation whenever the order is lawful. Likewise, a soldier in the Regular Army or the reserves, who votes for a party at the extreme right of the political spectrum, who receives an assignment to clear settlers at the entrance to Jericho, is expected to stop them and to carry out the order completely. A soldier in uniform is a soldier of the State of Israel and not of his own philosophy.

Change in the legislation governing Judeaea and Samaria: It is legitimate for the Army to ask technical questions about the limits of the application of the law, use of plastic bullets, shooting at night, or demolition of houses. On the other hand, it is not reasonable, in my opinion, for the Army to undertake to change the legislation in order to make it easier for itself to carry out the assignment imposed upon it within the bounds of the law. Imagine, for example, if the Army had turned to the government it serves and requested removal of itself and its activities from the judicial oversight of the Supreme Court, the highest legal authority in the State of Israel; that would overstep the authority of the army in a democratic state and contest its absolute subordination to civilian political government and to the legitimacy of judicial authority. Nonetheless, it is clearly our duty to bring the problems we have encountered before the defense minister and the government, and if they decide to change the legislation, any new law passed by the Knesset will automatically become a part of the framework in which the IDF operates.

Al-Na'imah Operations Chief Discusses Mission Results

44230041 Tel Aviv BAMAHA in Hebrew
14 Dec 88 p 5

[Article by Eldad Yaniv]

[Text] General Doron Ruvin, chief of the training branch of the General Staff, was commander of the raid at al-Na'imah on behalf of the General Staff in his

capacity as officer in charge of special operations. At the time of the operation, Gen Ruvin was with the chief of staff and was commander of the Air Force.

[BAMAHANE] After the debriefings that you handled, is what happened on the ground already clear to you or are there still question marks?

[Ruvlin] The debriefings are not revealing anything new to us. The debriefing has given us more depth and the ability to study and understand what happened, which we knew right from the start, but the causes and circumstances were not completely clear to us. Thus, for example, the incident of the four soldiers cut off from the attack force. We investigated exactly when they were cut off, why, and whether it was possible to have avoided that. We also examined everything concerning the death of Lt Col Amir Mi-Tal. At the end of the investigation, it is necessary to draw conclusions and lessons, both for understanding what happened and for the future.

[BAMAHANE] Will the four soldiers who were cut off be punished?

[Ruvlin] No. There was nothing here bordering on fault flowing from carelessness or conduct that was not within our expectations and plans. There is a very gray area in which a commander finds himself cut off from contact, operates apparently according to the situation on the ground and continues to act as though everything is alright, when in fact everything is not alright, but he does not know that.

[BAMAHANE] Did you also look into the responsibility of the commander in the field for the unit that was cut off? Why wasn't their disappearance discovered earlier?

[Ruvlin] The responsibility of the commander of the cut-off unit, Lt Eli, is exactly as great as the responsibility of the main force. This is no one-sided matter. The senior commanders needed to undertake most of the efforts to locate it. It did not shirk its duty or flee.

[BAMAHANE] Is it now clear why, for 5 full hours, you could not make contact with them?

[Ruvlin] Certainly. During the critical moments of decision, there existed a "ledger": some of the information was known to everyone and the rest was known only to other parties. It is necessary to understand that, in such a situation, it is very difficult to gather all the data and to form a complete picture.

[BAMAHANE] Do you believe that, in another situation, it would have been possible to make contact sooner with the soldiers?

[Ruvlin] In my opinion, the command operated properly and had control of the situation. It is possible that they did not realize, as later came to light, how acutely they needed to turn around and that they had an urgent problem of four missing men.

[BAMAHANE] In the talks you conducted with the field troops, how did they accept the decision to call back the ground forces and to try to find their comrades with the help of the Air Force?

[Ruvlin] It is surprising how much they think that the decision was justified and should be accepted. And that is true from the unit commander on down to the soldiers themselves. What we felt badly about was that we did not know where the men were. This was not a situation in which we know where they are and then rescue them. We knew they were missing but not where they were. Despite that, we still felt that they were alright. Four men just do not vanish off the face of the earth. They were armed and knew their task and how to react to unforeseen circumstances. Not for a moment was there a feeling of confusion or helplessness.

[BAMAHANE] In your view, would the decision pass the test even if, God forbid, the soldiers had not been rescued?

[Ruvlin] I stand behind this courageous decision the chief of staff made. We did not deviate from the uncompromising policy of extracting them, but decided on a different means of doing it. In my opinion, we would have rescued them no matter what. If not in the morning, then in the afternoon, and if not in the afternoon, then in the evening. In the chain of command, there was no doubt that they would be rescued. Likewise, the unit commander, Lt Eli, said that he knew that the entire Army was behind him and would get them out in the end. This decision was completely logical internally, and clearly does not violate any value. It may be that it gave the unit a queasy feeling, and rightly so. At the unit level, this could be difficult for it, and it pains the men that not all the force left by the same means.

[BAMAHANE] Did you imagine beforehand that the soldiers could hide in such mountainous terrain?

[Ruvlin] Every elementary briefing in the IDF establishes insertion and extraction points for a force. So it was this time. Despite the difficult terrain, the distances were such that it was both possible and necessary to execute the plan without contact. We also carried out exercises showing what happens when communications are cut, and how to regain them.

[BAMAHANE] You carried out a complicated operation after a long period in which there were no such actions.

[Ruvim] I would not declare that this is the beginning of a new period and the end of another. One must examine specifically the conditions, objectives, and the intelligence, at the moment when it is necessary to place before all of us the assignment and the necessity to strike terrorists by any means or methods and in any place, without announcing the dawn of a new era. This is the sphere in which the army has taken action and is acting now in a controlled, clear-headed way, and it is constantly necessary to examine where opportunities for new operations are created, and to continue to use all means to strike terrorists.

[BAMAHANE] Have you already decided whether to award commendations, possibly to the pilots?

[Ruvim] So far, we have not considered that, but I assume that we will take it up. In my opinion, everyone acted properly and tried to carry out his assignment according to his ability and as he thought best. Whether there are commendations or not, the soldiers did their job extraordinarily well, with dedication, courage, and professionalism.

[BAMAHANE] In the past, did you personally take part in many actions, and did you command at more of a distance?

[Ruvim] There were moments that gave me butterflies. It is much more difficult to be responsible at a distance than to be close and in the middle of the operation. Nonetheless, I had full confidence in everyone, and I am proud of the fact that I was one of the commanders in this action. In no way was this action disappointing compared to actions carried out in the past, and it is an honorable and professional addition to the gallery of IDF operations. There are lessons and certainly we will dissect them with a keen professional blade in order to determine the good things that happened as well as the bad.

OMAN

Development of Weapons Industry Discussed

44040199 Muscat AL-WATAN in Arabic 21 Dec 88 p 3

[Article: "President of Arab Industrialization Organization in an Interview with Omani News Agency: 'We Are Prepared To Cooperate With Sultanate in Arms Development'"; in Cairo, date not given]

[Text] General Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Ghafur al-'Urabi, president of the Arab Industrialization Organization [AIO], said in a special interview with the Omani News Agency that research conducted by the organization recently achieved several important accomplishments in the arms industry development field, foremost of which was increasing the range of the "Hawk" missile by an average of 6 km and developing the RPG launcher by augmenting its armor-piercing capability by an average of 30 cm

and producing a new high explosive anti-personnel missile for it. He indicated that all these modifications have actually been accomplished.

He emphasized that the organization is ready to cooperate with the Sultanate in any of these fields and that the Arab nation possesses all the potentials for the establishment of a sophisticated arms industry, especially since a military industrial base is already in existence.

In his interview with the Omani News Agency, Gen Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Ghafur al-'Urabi, president of the AIO, underscored the fact that cooperation in arms production is a key strategic challenge facing the Arab countries, particularly that the need for it in times of peace is as critical as in times of war and is, indeed, greater because force is the most important element in preserving peace.

He pointed out that Egyptian and Iraqi rocket manufacturing capabilities can be utilized to produce a satellite-carrying rocket. He also indicated that the organization has the capacity to manufacture aircraft, but its production lines cannot be put into operation unless a minimum demand of 130 aircraft is secured.

Gen al-'Urabi emphasized that work at the organization has not stopped in the last 10 years in the wake of the Arab boycott of Egypt that caused Arab countries that participated with Egypt in setting up the organization to pull out, pointing out that its activities were highly developed during the latter period.

He explained that Egypt has put forth more than one proposal or formula for the Arab countries to rejoin the organization.

Gen al-'Urabi said: "The AIO in Egypt has kept up its activities and development and is making every effort within its capabilities to achieve the goal for which it was set up, namely, the establishment of an advanced Arab military production base."

He said that he gave Egypt credit for preserving the organization's existence and maintaining its entity and legal status, supporting it, and investing money in it, its economic situation notwithstanding. Otherwise, we would not be where we are today.

He said that the organization now has nine factories instead of four. Regarding cooperation between the AIO and Arab and foreign military industrialization organizations and establishments, he said:

"At the Arab level, there are several strong military industrialization establishments, in addition to some plants in some Arab countries. What concerns us, however, are the strong establishments led by the Egyptian National Organization for Military Production, Egypt's AIO, and the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Military Production with its massive military production plants."

About cooperation between the AIO and the Egyptian National Organization for Military Production, Gen al-'Urabi said; "Cooperation has reached the level of integration in certain products. With regard to Iraq, contacts are under way to discuss areas of cooperation and coordination between the AIO and the Iraqi military plants."

He explained that in order to have true cooperation and true integration among Arab arms production establishments, it is necessary to have a national vision of the role each organization can play in the manufacture of products required to achieve coordination in military industrialization.

Concerning cooperation with foreign establishments, Gen al-'Urabi said that it is still going on and is extremely good, that it has achieved excellent ordinary and technical results, and that it has been established with British and French factories.

He said: "Cooperation with foreign establishments has taken many forms, the most significant of which is a joint production contract, an agreement to furnish certain components or a request for technical aid for advanced training. Gen al-'Urabi emphasized that cooperation with foreign establishments is to the advantage of both sides. As far as the organization is concerned, in addition to the regular gain, it achieves technical gains by creating cadres able to assimilate modern technology. Nevertheless, the technical advantage remains the most significant.

In answer to a question about the possibility of setting up a comprehensive Arab arms industry, Gen al-'Urabi said: "The Arab potential is there and new capabilities under construction will support and supplement existing ones. We do have a general industrial base or a military industrial base, but what we lack in resolution, namely to agree on objectives and policy and on what we need to do. The problem, as I perceive it, can be settled when we arrive at the answers to the two aforementioned questions." He added: "I am using the Omani News Agency to direct my words to Arab military leaders who are called upon to decide what they want and thereupon comes the role of the AIO to discuss ways to meet these needs."

Gen al-'Urabi added: "There are many boundless ambitions, but the most modest is aimed at producing arms and basic equipment for the Arab armies. With regard to this level of ambition, I assure you that we will be very close to achieving it when we reach an agreement and define our goals. Some of these needs are actually under production, some can easily be produced, and some can be researched with a view to putting them into actual production."

Gen al-'Urabi named some of the weapons under production, as follows: "At the present time, all missiles, be they short- or long-range anti-tank missiles, artillery

shells, or tactical missiles such as al-Husayn and al-Faw, are under production. Ammunition, artillery, and small arms are also being produced." He emphasized that, with sustained development production will be more sophisticated and more diversified.

As for the airplane industry, Gen al-'Urabi said: "The airplane factories of the AIO were in existence many years before the organization was set up. In 1966, these factories manufactured the Cairo-300 and the Cairo-300 planes [as published]. The capability to manufacture airplanes is there and, moreover, the Arab nation has the ability to produce very advanced weapons not manufactured at present. This is possible because we have an industrial base and plenty of highly qualified engineers and technicians."

He said: "What is ultimately left for us to do is to make the decision or to turn to implementation while providing the necessary funds."

Asked to give examples of advanced military products that can be manufactured in the Arab region, Gen al-'Urabi said: "For example, Egyptian and Iraqi rocket manufacturing capabilities can be utilized now to produce two- and three-stage high-propulsion satellite-carrying rockets."

In answer to another question regarding the extent to which the AIO issue has forced itself on the list of priorities of Arab concerns, given the fact that military industrialization is a strategic challenge facing the Arab nation, Gen al-'Urabi emphatically said: "This issue has been placed at the top of the priority list to protect Arab national security now and for the strategic term. It is important that military production initiatives not be in the form of hasty reactions to counteract military product shortages. The fates of nations cannot be decided through a policy of reactions to certain situations a country may face. Indeed, advance strategic planning must be adopted whereby the Arab nation may be the doer and the mover of events. The policy of reaction must not be allowed to continue.

"We must not allow events to follow, one after the other, reacting only when we are faced with an unexpected dilemma. We must begin to think, plan and design advanced military products, thereafter manufacturing prototypes without going into large-scale production, perhaps, with a view to preparing ourselves for unexpected emergency situations whereby, if an Arab country is faced with a shortage of a certain military product, it can be supplied from within the Arab area and as promptly as possible."

Gen al-'Urabi emphasized that the manufacture of arms is a strategic challenge in the sense that it is a long-range challenge requiring study and implementation. For it is not easy for a military production authority to receive orders for the production of a specific missile, for instance, and to deliver it after a short period of time. It

takes 3 years at least to manufacture or develop a specific rocket, for example, hence work for the future should proceed on the basis of long-term policies and outlook, especially since the world around us is developing and achieving great strides. This does not conflict with the call to establish peace in the Arab region for force is the most important deterrent that can preserve peace maintain stability.

On the other hand, military industrialization initiatives have civilian benefits as well. For example, a successful satellite-carrying rocket provides civilian communications, meteorological, and other services in addition to its military contributions.

In answer to another question about the status of the AIO rocket and airplane production projects and about the organization's actual ability to manufacture airplanes, Gen al-'Urabi said: "Some of these projects, such as the Hawkeye missile, are in the quantitative production phase. The organization is actually manufacturing the family of Hawk 18, 20, and 30 missiles in addition to the various types of anti-tank missiles.

"With regard to airplane production, the organization undoubtedly has the technical know-how to manufacture airplanes. Implementation, however, requires an agreement on component production lines. It is not economically feasible to turn on these lines to manufacture 20 or 30 aircraft. The minimum manufacturing level must be no less than 120 planes and full production requires orders of 600 to 800 airplanes."

He emphasized that if the Arab countries agree to manufacture a specific plane, with a minimum order of 130, the organization is ready to begin production immediately.

Regarding the AIO's tendency to set up fairs in Arab countries, he said that planning is under way to participate in the Baghdad Fair next March.

Industry Fails Despite Government Help

44040186 Muscat AL-WATAN in Arabic 10 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by Majdi Abu-al-Majd: "An Important Question and A More Important Answer. Why Can't Some of Our Industries Compete Despite All That Is Provided to Them?"]

[Text] Those who contemplate the industrial investment conditions and climate in the Sultanate realize without a shadow of a doubt that industrial investors in the Sultanate are going through an era that at the least is an age of a confident surge toward the achievement of expected goals. The government of His Majesty Sultan Qabus Bin-Sa'id is doing everything it can to provide good investment opportunities in the industrial field, be it through the industrial incentive system or the legislative field or by offering various administrative and practical facilities. Of course, this interest did not spring from a vacuum but emanated from the awareness that industry

in today's world is important and represents the backbone of the economies of a large number of countries. It is the sector that mirrors the progress made in any country and is directly and organically linked to an important and vital subject known as the transfer and development of technology.

To give clear direction to this discussion and to circumscribe its main features and basic elements, it is necessary to mention the pivots around which government support and backing is centered.

Tremendous Sources of Financing

The rightly-guided government represented by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry focuses its key efforts in backing and supporting industry on several key pivots, the most significant of which are industrial loans. The private sector's financial aid law, issued by Royal Decree No 38/80, stipulates that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry shall grant interest-free bank loans for industrial projects.

From the time this royal decree was issued until now, loans in the amount of 21,099 million riyals have been granted for 60 industrial projects in the country.

If we add to the easy-term loans offered by the Oman Development Bank, we see that the rightly-guided government has offered unlimited financial support and backing to every economically feasible industrial project.

Protection and Exemptions

Moving on to another basic element of government support and backing for industry, we find that, through the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the government offers very good protection and customs exemptions to national industrial projects when they face unfair competition from rival foreign projects. In this regard, the government is studying requests submitted by existing factories and once the ministry is convinced that the industry or plant in question is facing unfair competition, it imposes additional customs duties on similar imported products, taking into consideration, of course, the interests of the producer and the consumer. At the same time, the ministry studies customs exemption requests submitted by factories which are granted exemptions for their imports, be they machinery, equipment, or production requirements.

Figures show that in 1979 the Ministry of Commerce and Industry approved 238 cases of protection and exemption.

Moreover, electric power rates have been lowered following the augmentation of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; 85 industrial facilities have actually been augmented and receive this privilege.

Modern Industrial Zones

The third basic element of government support and backing for industry is represented in making available industrial zones provided with the capabilities and requisites this industry needs.

Al-Rasil industrial zone is the best proof of that. It has been designed to the highest international standards and has gained the absolute admiration of all visitors from all over the globe.

New industrial zones patterned after and with the same capabilities as the al-Rasil industrial zone are under construction in Suhar, Raysut, Suwar, and Nazwa.

Opportunities Multiplying

This support and backing in all its shapes and forms is represented by a set of more than favorable industrial investment opportunities free of problems and obstacles. If we add to that the moral support and the great enthusiasm evinced by responsible agencies, we see that opportunities are multiplying quantitatively and qualitatively.

Why ?

In view of the above, which is only part of the whole picture, we find that Omani industry is really going through a golden age of opportunity. It is strange, however, that amid such opportunities national producers are facing stiff competition from foreign producers. Meanwhile, we find that the domestic—national—producers are at times unable to compete the way they should. This is notwithstanding the fact that, in addition to what has already been said, they have been producing for several years.

AL-WATAN put this important question to Dr al-Yaqzan Bin-Talib al-Hana'i, undersecretary for commerce and industry to get his point of view as an official about the reasons for this situation.

Factories Did Not Study Market Well

His excellency started by saying:

"I do not think that Omani factories, as investors, have conducted adequate market studies. One reason may be the lack of information in view of the fact that the country is still young and growing. Information is usually available to government institutions created for this purpose and the Sultanate has not reached the level of information-gathering that permits extensive coverage of all the country's sectors.

"With the creation of the Development Council, however, this obstacle is waning.

"The Development Council is actually putting out accurate statistics about many sectors in the Sultanate and all the Omani investor has to do is make use of it in conducting economic feasibility studies."

Nurturing Needs of New Population Segments

The second thing, according to his excellency, the undersecretary for commerce and industry, is that the Omani investor must be well aware that, in the wake of the blessed renaissance under the leadership of His Majesty Qabus Bin-Said and the massive health awakening in the country, the demographic constitution is leaning toward a relatively younger population.

In other words, the average age in Oman is falling because the 3 percent population growth in a country whose population is 2 million people at the most tends to produce such a result.

Consequently, the Omani investor ought to view such changes in the demographic constitution as a chance to service demographic segments, many of whom are of young.

This calls for the creation of industries to keep up with the demographic change and to nurture the needs of these new population segments.

His Excellency Dr al-Yaqzan Bin-Talib al-Niha'i gives the following example:

We notice, for example, that the baby food industry is almost nonexistent and certain medical and quasimedical (pharmaceutical) industries do not exist. A large percentage of the Omani population is under 10 years of age and this group is growing annually at a great rate.

Not Taking Advantage of Bulk Industries

We also notice that a large number of existing industries do not take advantage of the bulk industries, for their output is still way below capacity and, indeed, many of them are still producing below the break-even point.

In any industry in any country in the world, this brings about high production costs, and, consequently, high prices to cover the high costs, or reasonable prices and, therefore, continuous losses, something that cannot be endured. Hence, we find that, unless Omani industry is based on carefully-considered production policies, it will not have the ability to compete and its prices will remain high, another reason for its inability to compete.

Administration Spending Controls

We also notice that some Omani industries are not greatly concerned with administration. For example, the money these industries spend on certain indirect production requirements, such as administrative costs, exceeds the money allocated for actual production requirements.

His excellency goes on to say that if the national industries fail to take notice of this point and concentrate on administrative spending control and try to find production equations that strike a balance between machinery and labor, it will be difficult to derive economic benefits by lowering production costs.

He goes on to say: "We also notice that the government grants certain industries customs protection of up to 25 percent.

"Since the foreign producer has to pay shipping and distribution costs, the national economy enjoys customs protection of more than 25 percent.

"Nonetheless, some of these industries still have much higher prices than comparable imported products.

Consumers Have Rights

"Omani industry must realize that it owes it to the Omani consumer to provide commodities at reasonable prices in return for the protection they enjoy against comparable imports."

His excellency underscores this matter by saying: "Even in the absence of government support or customs protection, Omani industry still has a great opportunity to compete with foreign imports."

Even Without Support We Can Compete

I asked his excellency: "How can that be?"

He said, by way of explanation: "For example, let us suppose that an Omani industry is established with a total capital of 200,000 riyals, all it has to do is the following:

A.

1. The industry must establish itself as a joint stock company and must offer 25 percent of its share for subscription.

2. The industry must apply to the ministry for an industrial loan and the ministry will study the project's economic feasibility and grant a loan equal to the capital (100 percent).

3. This means that the company will raise 400,000 riyals even before going into production.

4. When production gets under way, the company will have a better chance of competing with the foreign producer because the foreign producer will have to pay 5 percent customs fees.

B. In exchange for the interest-free government loan, the company will have financial capability.

Suppose that industrial loans in foreign countries, save for the GCC states, cost a minimum of 4 percent interest. This means that the Omani company has a 9 percent advantage over the foreign producer before going into production, representing the cost of capital and customs fees.

It is noted that many of the Omani industries have not made good use of this 9 percent difference in production costs, as we have already pointed out.

Moreover, the ministry grants a grace period of up to 5 years for the loan.

Very Important Point

The point I would like to clarify is that a large number of Omani factories did not start with shareholders capital, but relied on bank loans with interest that has to be paid even before going into production. This tends to prevent them from taking advantage of the customs fees difference and interest-free government loans.

Six Basic Points

The upshot is that I would like to present the following points to every beginner in Omani industry:

1. Prepare an economic feasibility study before carrying out a project.

2. Make use of technical elements found in the ministry and seek their advice during or after the preparation of economic feasibility studies, pertaining to the project's financial structure in particular.

3. Make efforts to find free no-loan capital to be added to the government loan to avoid any financial burdens of bank interest on projects that are not started yet.

4. Work to put at least 25 percent of the project up for public subscription in preparation for receiving a government loan.

5. When preparing the economic feasibility study, the project must take into account demographic changes in the country to assure itself an initial market as a stepping stone for exportation in the future.

6. Omani factories must be well aware that they bear the responsibility of consumer education to promote their products. This may require advertisement campaigns for their products, demonstrating their merits and significance.

Environmental Health Program Under Way
44000300 Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English
26 Jan 89 pp 1, 3

[Article by Meena Ganjvr]

[Text] The Ministry of Health is to launch a National Environmental Health Programme soon covering about 1,500 villages all over the Sultanate.

"The new programme will place greater emphasis on developing an integrated national response to environmental health hazards," the Head of the Environmental Health Section, 'Ali Ibn Muhaminad Rashidi told the TIMES.

He said the need for national approach to environmental health problems had been felt for some time but had been delayed because of the rapid development of the country.

"When the section was first opened the environmental health situation in the Sultanate was not very good. So the section was busy co-operating with the municipalities in investigating and correcting environmental problems, particularly connected with bad food and contaminated drinking water."

But now with all round development, including that of the manpower both in the Environmental Health Section as well as in the municipalities, a need had been identified for the Ministry of Health to rationalise its approach and to complement rather than duplicate the work done by other Ministries in order to make the most effective use of the available material and manpower resources."

Under the plan the Environmental Health Section in Muscat will be responsible for planning, organising, monitoring and evaluating the programme and providing technical advice.

The National Programme, he said, will incorporate common administrative approaches and will give greater attention to the rural areas of Oman.

"In the past although we have been assisting in tackling environmental health problems in the region but we didn't really do the planning or the supervision."

Earlier the environmental health operations, Mr Rashidi said, were being carried out jointly by Public Health Compounds and Public Health Units, but the activities were not co-ordinated and there were no common methodologies and approaches.

"The integrated programme will introduce common approaches, technical standards, administrative approaches and training methods to ensure that similar levels of Environmental Health Services are provided to every village in the country.

Standards

Establishing common administrative and technical standards in practice, he said, would mean laying down common procedures for all the Public Health Compounds and Public Health Units in the country to follow, regarding examining, registering and testing water and food samples and for following up on remedial action.

Explaining this, he said, "when a unit forwards a water sample to Muscat for analysis, both the sending and the receiving unit will monitor similar registers so that full history of the sample will be recorded. For our purposes we will be able to determine if the water was contaminated and if suitable corrective actions were taken, because the system requires the regional forces to report back to the central office by a particular date on the progress made and when necessary to send another sample for testing to ensure that the water is no longer contaminated."

Regions

Under the programme, while the planning would be done by the Environmental Health Section, the detailed implementation of the activities will be decentralised to the regions with the six public health compounds in Batinah, Musandam, Dakhliyah, Dhahirah, Sharqiyah and Dhofar being responsible for managing and co-ordinating their regional programmes and for supervising the activities of the 58 public health units.

Technical supervision and assistance will be established, Mr. Rashidi said, as the section will gradually develop specialist expertise in water and sanitation, food safety, vector control and occupational health so that the section will be able to provide technical advice to regions.

Each region, he said, had its own organisational structure with the levels or responsibility and the chain of command clearly indicated.

Vital

He said a vital part of this whole programme would be to implement the activities at the village level and to be successful would have to include community participation so that the public health workers and the villagers together recognise environmental health hazards and join hands to remove them and thus gradually improve the environmental health conditions.

In a move to improve communication, he said, a health inspector was currently attending a three month course in health education in Sudan and on his return would train other health inspectors so they could carry the health education message on personal and community hygiene to the villagers.

"The new programme will not only tackle environmental health problems but also foresee a problem before it surfaces to take appropriate measures to prevent it," he explained.

The section is also organising a two-day workshop cum-seminar in Muscat next month for public health doctors and the environmental health heads in the Sultanate, to brief them about the programme and their assigned responsibilities.

The workshop will be followed by visits to each of the regions by Mr. Muhammad Rashidi and Mr. John C. B. Bradbury the WHO consultant and sanitary engineer at the Environmental Health Section.

"This new integrated programme will mean better environmental planning to ensure that no areas are overlooked and provide a better life for the people of Oman.

QATAR

Sea Line Between Iran, Qatar Scheduled
44000350 *Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic*
11 Feb 89 p 33

[Text] An Iranian-Qatari maritime company is scheduled to begin transporting trucks and possibly passengers between the Iranian seaport of Bushahr and the Qatari seaport of Doha.

An agreement was reached to establish the maritime line which will reduce the costs of shipping Iranian products to Doha by 30 percent.

At present Iran's exports to Qatar transit through Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates.

The most important Iranian exports to be transported by the new direct maritime line are be fruits, vegetables, and livestock.

SUDAN

AL-HADAF Publishes Text of Judges' Resignation
45040193B *Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic*
4 Jan 89 p 3

[Article: "AL-HADAF Publishes Text of Judges' Statement on Reasons for Their Collective Resignation; Government's Intervention in Judges' Affairs Is Clear Violation of Constitution; Judges Now Preoccupied With Injustice Done to Them Instead of Redressing Injustice to Others"]

[Text] Judges in Sudan delivered their collective resignations to the chief justice 2 days ago to protest the executive authority's intervention in the affairs of the

judiciary. These resignations are considered the first such resignations since the glorious 1985 March-April uprising scored its victory. Because of the importance and gravity of this event, which has a direct effect on the course of justice, AL-HADAF is publishing below the text of the statement issued by the judges on this matter. AL-HADAF is also publishing the text of this statement because of a fundamental principle of democracy: the independence of the courts as well as the principle of the sovereign rule of law.

" 'Allah commands you to hand back your trusts to their rightful owners, and to pass judgment upon men with fairness' [al-Nisa': 58]. Almighty God spoke the truth.

"The country is celebrating the 33d anniversary of its glorious independence. On this occasion we are assuring everyone that we are wholeheartedly protecting and absolutely supporting the democratic system, which is based on the principle of separation of powers and the sovereign rule of law. The preservation of both the substance and appearance of a democracy is a national obligation we are determined to meet. We will protect the democratic system against every risk, and we will keep it out of every conflict.

"In doing so we are following the historic model set by Sudan's judiciary in their fight against dictatorships. The judiciary's first such fight occurred in the glorious October Revolution, and the second coincided with the great April uprising. Sudan's record in this regard will continue to be a glorious one, written in gold. As the days go by, that record will become a beacon, lighting the road to freedom and justice, which constitute the foundation of a democracy based on the sovereign rule of law.

"We are still mindful of the heroic, active, and influential posture which Sudan's judges assumed throughout history in times of difficulty. Sudan's judges always remained neutral. They stayed away from politics: They did not interfere or meddle in political affairs, nor did they meddle in similar matters in which others may properly get involved.

"We have been watching with great interest repeated violations of the court's independence and the executive authority's numerous attempts to control the judicial authority. Since our first and foremost concern is to maintain in Sudan an independent court system that would protect the state's dignity and preserve citizens' freedom, dignity, security, and safety, we continued to resist these attempts and recurrent violations. Our resistance was deliberate and wise so that justice may prevail and everyone can receive that to which he is entitled. We did this because we believe that an honest and independent judiciary is the sole guarantee of democracy, freedom, and justice. It is for that purpose that we drafted several memoranda showing the various phases of these violations and the repeated attempts that were made to violate constitutional and legal provisions. Every time

we did that, we were driven by our concern for due process. We wanted to provide sufficient guarantees for the administration of justice among people.

"Unfortunately, however, these violations went too far and worsened. Not only did they infringe upon the independence of the judiciary, but they also denied justice to the judges who administer justice among people. Judges became preoccupied with the injustice that was being inflicted upon them. For the first time in the history of the judicial authority, the executive authority was interfering with financial appropriations for members of the judiciary. The Council of Ministers formed a committee to remove wage and salary discrepancies, and it approved the committee's recommendations, which included examining and reviewing the judicial authority's appropriations. We objected to that idea since its inception because it clearly violates constitutional and statutory provisions. We declared that to go too far in that direction would cause harm to the judiciary and would be a clear infringement on its independence.

"Article 126 of Sudan's 1985 Interim Constitution, as amended in April 1987, stipulates the establishment of a Supreme Court Council. Article 127 of the Constitution stipulates that the judicial authority is to be organized by a law that determines how it is to be managed, the conditions under which judges are to serve, and appropriations for the judges. Article 6 of the Judicial Authority Act defined among other things the responsibilities of the Supreme Court Council, one of which is approving the judicial authority's budget. Also, Article 8.3 of the Judicial Authority Act stipulated that the judicial authority's budget be independent. It is to be determined by decree issued by the head of state on the basis of a recommendation from the Supreme Court Council. The judicial authority's independent budget is also protected by the Constitution whose Article 103.2 stipulated that the judicial authority's budget was not subject to the Constituent Assembly's approval. The state budget is subject to the legislative authority's approval, but the judges' salaries and appropriations are exempted from that requirement.

"Article 33 of the Judicial Authority Act stipulates clearly that salaries and appropriations for judges be as follows: 'Salaries and appropriations for judges shall be disbursed in the amounts shown in the second schedule attached to this law. The head of state may amend that schedule when the council makes a recommendation to that effect, provided such an amendment does not hurt the judges.'

"This makes it clear that the constitutionally guaranteed protection for the judicial authority's finances and for judges' appropriations and salaries was intended to protect that authority from being compromised in any

manner which may affect its neutrality. This constitutional guarantee affirms the principle of separation of powers and preserves the independence of the courts so that a strong foundation for democracy can be built.

"When the Judicial Authority Act singled out the [Supreme] Court Council and gave it those privileges, it did so only because the nature of a judge's work requires it. A judge is entrusted with a heavy responsibility which would weigh heavily on other strong people. Because they are entrusted with the task of administering justice among people, judges were singled out so they can be guaranteed an honorable life which would make them immune to the perils of compromising their impartiality. Judges are required at all times to be fair, honorable, and decent. In all cases they are to abide by principles and practices which preserve their dignity and integrity and protect their reputation. Thus, every citizen can have confidence in them, and the courts' independent performance in administering justice can be extended to the management of the courts. Judges would then have confidence in themselves and in the independence of their positions.

"Since the recommendations made by the Committee on Wage Discrepancies covered the judicial authority and were approved by the Council of Ministers, a clear infringement and an unequivocal violation of the judiciary's independence did occur. This action completely ignored the Supreme Court Council's decrees. The executive authority acted beyond its authority and usurped the authorities of the head of state which are spelled out in the Interim Constitution. This repeated usurpation of power aroused angry and disparate reactions amongst judges, and that was reflected in their determination to preserve the courts' stature, independence, dignity and prestige. They were determined to keep the courts out of political and partisan haggling and to protect them from the executive authority's continuous domination and control. And that is why we submitted our collective resignations: We found ourselves in an untenable situation with no alternative but that of submitting these collective resignations.

"That was the difficult choice we had to make to preserve our dignity and the dignity of our profession. No one would have expected us to make any other choice but this difficult one. After all, we are the guardians of justice who are responsible for administering justice among people. How then can we accept injustice and inequity?

"We, the judges of Sudan, are presenting these facts to you, [the people of Sudan]. We are affirming to everyone that we make no claims for political positions, nor do we covet riches and great wealth. Instead, we are presenting these facts because our conscience demands that we state them for the record and for posterity. We are presenting these facts to lay the strong foundations of a democracy for which we will accept no alternative. We are presenting these facts to affirm what is right and fair, to apply

justice, and to lay the foundations for freedom. It is on the basis of all these principles that a democracy which is based on the sovereign rule of law can be built.

"We ask God to help us succeed and to guide us to do what is good for this nation.

"The Judges of Sudan. 2 January 1989."

Textile Factory Reopens After 5 Months
45040193A Khartoum AL-HADAF in Arabic
4 Jan 89 p 3

[Article: "Ministry of Finance Decides To Reopen Sudan's Textile Factory; General Labor Union Calls for Meeting of Factory's General Assembly"]

[Text] Sudan's textile factory in north Khartoum, which is considered one of the textile industry's leading factories [in that country], has been shut down since 4 August 1988 when Sudan was subjected to torrential rainfall and flooding. Since the country was subjected to this disaster last year, the destiny of more than 7,000 workers has remained in limbo. Finally, 2 days ago the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning sent a letter to the Ministry of Industry demanding that the necessary measures be taken to resume operations at the plant immediately.

When AL-HADAF inquired about the reasons the factory was shut down for over 5 months, Mr Mahmud 'Araki, president of the General Labor Union for the Workers of the Textile Factory, explained that management shut down the factory because the roads from the workers' homes to the factory were bad. Also, the factory was shut down because there was no power and there was no bread during that period, the disaster period.

Mr 'Araki said, "When life went back to normal and there was no longer any reason for the factory to remain shut down, the union held a meeting with management representatives, Dr Khalil 'Uthman, chairman of the board of directors, and Mr 'Isam al-Din al-Disuqi, deputy general manager. During that meeting we informed management that the problem, as we understood it, had to do with a lack of liquidity. The factory did not have the liquid cash it had to have after the Universal Gulf Organization in Kuwait decided not to subsidize factory operations." The president of the General Labor Union added, "The board of directors in Kuwait had suggested to Dr Khalil 'Uthman the possibility of a partnership with Sudan's Government. In light of that suggestion contacts were made, and the government expressed its approval for such a partnership."

In his conversation with AL-HADAF Mr 'Araki indicated that during the meeting with management, the deputy general manager told them that if the government does not accept the partnership proposal, management will have to liquidate the factory and give workers that to which they are entitled.

Mr Mahmud 'Araki said that after the first meeting with management, the general union sent a memorandum to the Council of Ministers. "In that memorandum we asked the government to become a partner in the factory." Mr 'Araki went on to say, "The Council of Ministers forwarded our memorandum and another memorandum to the Economic Ministers' Committee, and that committee examined the situation and on 30 October 1988 decided on the following:"

1. Government was to become a partner in the factory.
2. The factory was to be refurbished.
3. Salaries were to be paid by the Ministry of Finance until measures are completed.
4. New management for the factory was to be found.

The president of the General Union affirmed that the factory had to be reopened this month. He said the union has called for a meeting of the factory's general assembly to be held on 10 January 1988 at the Workers' Club in north Khartoum.

It has been decided that an important meeting of trade union members who are workers at Sudan's textile factory be held on Saturday, 7 January 1989.

In the next few days Dr al-Tijani al-Tayyib, minister of state at the Ministry of Finance, is expected to travel to Kuwait to sign the agreement which makes the Government of Sudan a partner in the factory with the Universal Gulf Organization.

On a related matter the General Union informed the General Federation of Labor Unions about all the measures which have so far been taken, and the federation affirmed its support for the factory workers' demands.

TUNISIA

Authorities Reportedly Censor REALITES Magazine Editorial

Lack of Justice Criticized

45190031 Tunis REALITES in French
16-22 Dec 88 p 4-5

[Editorial by Hichem Jait: "Dark Areas"]

[Text] All those who participate in politics or who write about it, think about it, or are interested in it, together with the majority of the Tunisian people, gave their support to the "change" that took place on 7 November, as well as to the myriad reforms that have been introduced since then.

The current government clearly bases its legitimacy on democracy, just as the preceding one based its own on the heroic struggle for independence. There is a major difference in these two types of legitimacy. One is a

matter of history and the past, of something that can be read and reread in a thousand ways but which remains in the domain of past action. The other is a matter of real present and future action, of a plan that must be sustained in actual practice. Were that practice to slip from its course, backslide, or even make an about-face, the government would itself undermine the ideology on which it is founded. Democracy would become an empty slogan, an official catchword in which nobody believed, just as the national legend of Bourguiba became an obsessive, meaningless, empty, almost mad refrain.

The fact that we have given our critical support to steps taken by the current regime to promote democracy and human rights makes it our duty to act as watchdogs and to warn of any anti-democratic actions. The independent press has pointed to a few such actions, which are indeed disquieting. Rather than discuss these further, I will instead delve more deeply into those aspects of this regime's behavior that have, from the beginning, pointed to a deeply rooted anti-democratic tendency existing side by side with a no-less-deeply rooted desire for freedom and democracy.

The first, like a gaping wound in the Tunisian conscience—and the Arab conscience in general—is that tremendous evil, fear of truth; a poor relationship with the truth which is the source not only of our political ills but also of the sickness of our culture and our civilization. Equivocal and twisted speech, unabashed lies, half truths, falsifications—these are not only contrary to the spirit of democracy, which demands bright light, but are also a disease of the mind. They are, to quote Nietzsche, the evidence of a "slave" mentality, or the grave psychological deficiency of "dominated man."

We are a people that does not know how to say either yes or no and which can, therefore, have no notion of honesty towards itself or the world.

What we hoped for, and believed we detected, was a new spirit, a spirit that could be seen in a thousand decisions. However, a certain authoritarian mentality and, in particular, certain problematic practices undoubtedly remain. Why, at the very outset, ban the RA'Y—for an article that I found to be delightful, intelligent, and humorous, and which also demonstrated what an admirable degree of maturity some of us have obtained.

That was already a bad sign. As a result, RA'Y shut down, and a sort of self-imposed censorship took hold of the independent press. There was, they say, constitutional reform. It was, in fact, simply a return to the old status quo and a re-establishment of normality with regard to the Presidency for Life and automatic succession. The thought occurred to me that real reform would have consisted of limiting presidential powers, which are exorbitant. But, on careful reflection, in a country as underdeveloped as ours, it is not bad to have a strong executive, a single leader at the summit of the state, provided that such power can be checked. In the absence

of any institutional checks, there remains only domestic and international opinion. But public opinion cannot prevent excesses such as those that occurred under Bourguiba. We are reduced to hoping simply that they will not happen again. That is all. During Bourguiba's illness, a de facto dyarchy was established, particularly with Nouria. This division of power is perhaps no longer necessary, and so, we are told, the president is once more the head of government. We are told that this is a presidential democracy. That is false, for a presidential democracy, as it functions in the United States, presupposes an all-powerful Congress to counterbalance the authority of the President. As such is not the case here, there will be no real change in the way our institutions work, whether or not the opposition is represented in the Chamber of Deputies.

I would mention another problem: that of the law and the will of the Prince. We feel that our law is repressive, hard, and inflexible, and that only through the president can it be circumvented or surpassed. Normally, unauthorized parties are forbidden by law; they cannot meet, maintain an office, or engage in any public activity. Only by the will of the president do they exist at all. This is unhealthy, because it can give rise of dialectic subtleties that augur ill for the clear light of democracy. The citizen must not sense a sword of Damocles suspended over his head that may strike or threaten to strike, as the case may be. Let it be said a thousand times: Democracy is an ethical code, and politics is not clever reasoning.

Again and again we are told that the judiciary is now sovereign and independent. I am in no way convinced that this is so. Worse, it investigates and judges political cases deviously, from the mean side of the issue. How our Bourguiban heritage holds us! Mzalli was sentenced for trivialities, for reasons unworthy of a civilized state; Belkhodja for a matter of receptions and fancy cakes. Ahmed Ben Salah's sentence has been commuted, but his civil rights have not been restored, and he is being harassed over petty matters involving a car.

I say this because, at times, I feel humiliated to be Tunisian and because I have too high an opinion of my country and of the state as a guide, structurer, and leader of the people to accept the continuation of such practices. Democracy is above all a mentality. I know that it is acquired slowly and that it requires education. I also know that we are prey to anarchy, that we need stability and rigor, and that the state must be respected and...sometimes feared.

But for that there is no need of petty maneuvering. The higher the head of state rises over trivialities, the greater his strength. The greater and broader his vision, the more unanimous the esteem in which he is held. I repeat: We must have a minimum of fair play, generosity, and faith in values to build our democracy. We need that democracy more than any other country, and we need it because we are a small people. Max Weber once said that the scholar is moral from conviction, while the politician

is moral from responsibility—which, moreover, is a great thing. A little conviction and good faith will never hinder a true political project, the project of the long-distance runner, the man of vision.

Paper Explains Censorship

45190031 Tunis *REALITES* in French
30 Dec 88-5 Jan 89 p 4-5

[Editorial: "A Lesson From Censorship"]

[Text] Many of our readers were unable to read *REALITES*' 12 December 1988 issue (No 175). It was seized a few hours after distribution to the newsstands. The reason given was an article by Hichem Jait entitled "Dark Areas," which was judged defamatory. The independence of the judiciary was supposedly questioned. The author of the offending article and the director of the magazine will answer this accusation in court on 31 December 1988.

Since *REALITES* reopened last December, it has been among the most concerned by the change of 7 November. We suffered too much under the preceding regime not to welcome the new era as we did. We identified with it, in our own way—as much as our high regard for professional ethics would allow. Our support for the president was consonant with the ideals he proclaimed on the morning of 7 November. We have paid a heavy tribute for those ideals: four suspensions and numerous seizures, not to mention fines.

In making the final tally, some of our detractors today, alas the proteges of yesterday's regime, should remember this. Had they not spoken, we would have spoken for them—better than they did themselves—in defense of a government that we were the first to support. There was no need, at the close of this unparalleled year, to awaken the old demons of the past. Let us state, less for them than for our readers: The Declaration of 7 November was and remains for us both our charter and our spur to our action.

It is in times of social detente, relaxation, and calm that criticism is born and develops. Democracy is the forge of contestation, and it is entirely to its credit that separate, distinguishable voices call out to be heard.

Questioning flourishes when least justified. Such is the law of democracy. The president of the Republic has in every instance demonstrated his high regard for the state by never dallying over remarks he knows to be inevitable. He has deliberately chosen the democratic way, and he knows its duties and responsibilities. The fact that Tunisians of all political persuasions now dare to say what they think honors him as much as it commits them.

Hichem Jait's article was not intended to endanger greater political freedom. Rather than to attack the author, it would have been better to answer his questions. Ben Ali's government has some real pluses and can bring serious arguments to bear. The criticism of weapons can never replace the weapon of criticism.

Readers of *REALITES* can console themselves on finding it back on the newsstands after a week's forced absence. Nevertheless, they did go without their magazine—a difficult ordeal for them and for us. Seizing a magazine rarely produces the desired effect, and even less so when done a posteriori. In the case in point, *REALITES*' readership is up. Yet some of our readers were upset and irritated by Hichem Jait's article. They would have liked to have written about it and discussed it. Censorship has skewed the game. Of the two evils, they have chosen to decry the worst. We understand their deep disapproval and their bitterness.

REALITES did not appear the following week, not on government order, but because of an error on the part of the printing company, which failed to detect and repair a technical problem in time—a very selective problem at that. This type of occurrence is the stuff of another era and another country. We have as many friends at the RCD [expansion unknown] as anywhere else. How sad that such highly educated people should allow themselves to be surprised and bested by a technical problem whose financial consequences are more serious for us than for them.

Today *REALITES* is back in print and available to its readers and friends, who have given us more sympathy and support than we could have hoped. It is back to provide them, as always, with the type of reporting they expect from us: level-headed, free, fearless, straightforward, and without ulterior motives.

Seven November was a great wager for democracy. Speaking through our president, our country gave itself at last a grand national destiny worthy of its ambitions. We followed its lead unreservedly, unhesitatingly, uncalculatingly, and without indulgence.

Each week was for us a new opportunity to renew our contract with it, with respect and dignity—a difficult task. It takes time to temper the impatience of scholars and to combat the zeal of those who are frightened by the demands of democracy. The last throes of an order long in dying do not shake our convictions or unsettle our choices. That is the cost of the struggle for democracy. We will lead it to the end.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Government Adviser Discusses Customs Duties, Trade Figures

44000311 Dubayy *GULF NEWS* in English
13 Jan 89 p 11

[Article by Arun Solomon]

[Text] No immediate revision of prevalent customs tariffs is being contemplated by Dubayy.

The Financial Adviser to Dubayy government, W. R. Duff, explained yesterday, "Our official position is still that the tariff is the declared four per cent, there are of course variations in certain cases. Dubayy customs have not yet been informed officially of any change in the situation."

Duff added that the proposed hikes in customs tariff on tobacco would, however, be implemented as the decision has been agreed to by the Customs Council.

A recent decision by the UAE Supreme Council reiterated that the uniform four per cent customs tariff would be applicable to all ports of entry in the country. The need for the reiteration came as over the past two years approximately, individual emirates have lowered the customs tariff in many instances.

The lowering of the tariff came in the wake of attempts to attract imports by individual emirates. According to market estimates, most of the emirates have been losing nearly 50 per cent of revenues and some have lost as much as 75 per cent.

Despite the reduction in the customs tariff there has been no noticeable change in the proportion of UAE-bound trade captured by individual emirates.

Duff told GULF NEWS that the apparent trade war had not benefited anyone. But he declined to speculate on what would happen in the near future. It is possible that each emirate would continue with its present practise, afraid that the other may begin to offer across the board exemptions, thus continuing the import trade war.

In Dubayy the import volume during the first nine months of 1988 increased 15 per cent in value compared with the corresponding period in 1987. The value of exports also registered an increase of 28 per cent, while re-exports fell 7.0 per cent.

Dubayy's imports between January and September 1988 were valued at Dh 16,200,213,370, while in 1987 for the same period they were Dh 14,075,456,673. Exports in 1988 were valued at Dh 1,228,576,399 while in 1987 the figure stood at Dh 958,926,923. Re-exports last year in the same period totalled Dh 3,720,949,944, while in 1987 they stood at Dh 4,001,058,609.

However, in terms of volume Dubayy imports fell sharply. This was due to the fact that Dubayy imported much less fuel oil last year. Fuel oil imports were reduced by 246,500 tonnes as the emirate began using natural gas for power generation and industrial use. The increase in value was attributable to increased imports of jewellery and ornaments, garments and motor vehicles.

The value term increase in exports from Dubayy was due to the escalation in prices of aluminium, the emirate's major export item.

The last quarter of 1988 did not register any significant trend and the expectation is that in the final tally, the nine-month figures give a fair indication.

Talking about the outlook for 1989, Duff said he expected trading levels to continue on the pattern of the past year. The fall in re-exports is generally attributed to a halt in food imports by Iran.

Duff, however, cautioned that dramatic increases in imports and re-exports would be possible if Iran and Iraq suddenly decided to open up. Presently the chances of big import orders from either appear dim as Duff explained. "The key is money and both presently lack it." Dubayy will continue to trade steadily during 1989, Duff said.

Sources Discuss Garment Industry, New Government Initiatives

44000310 Dubayy GULF NEWS in English
25 Jan 89 p 11

[Article by Kumar Raj: "Unregistered Garment Units To Get Another Chance"]

[Text] Garment units not registered with the Ministry of Finance and Industry in the UAE before May 1988 might get another chance to obtain registration soon.

According to industry sources, a team of officials from the ministry started visiting garment factories in al-Shariqah and 'Ajman from Sunday to inspect those who have applied earlier for registration.

The indications are that if everything is in place, conforming to the claims made in the applications and if it meets the ministry's requirements, there will be no problem to get registration now, said a garment manufacturer.

It was in the last week of November 1988 that a ministry order restricted further registration of garment units with the Ministry of Finance and Industry and made the order effective May 1988.

Rough estimates placed the number of garment units which went into production by then, since May 1988, at 60 and about 35 of them have applied for registration. About a dozen cases were appraised and passed by the concerned inspecting officials.

The resumption of inspection after a gap of over two months has been considered as a positive indication allowing all to have a fair chance to comply with the requirements of the law.

Earlier, the only special benefit enjoyed by these registered units was to get total import duty exemption for raw materials imported for value added export purpose.

But now they require the registration to get garment export visa for U.S. They also fear that the future quota allocation will also be made only to these registered units.

"It will be a great relief to get registration because unregistered units are finding it difficult to obtain visa even for non-quota items at present," said a garment manufacturer.

Even a few banks have now started insisting on the production of the industrial registration document when negotiating documents for U.S., apart from the mandatory visa requirement, said one exporter.

The worst is that a few unregistered garment exporters yesterday failed to obtain certificate of origin in one of the Emirates. In a hurry to ship goods tomorrow in the first vessel to leave that Emirate since visa system was introduced, they tried to pressurise Chamber officials to help obtain the visa.

They were politely told that until the position of visa issue for the unregistered units is clarified, there would not be any certificate of origin issued for them, said an industry source.

When many garment manufacturers are entangled in the complex issue of registration-visa-certificate of origin, for some, the situation is still worse.

The main problem for them is to get the clearance of goods arrived at U.S. ports after the trade embargo is made by U.S. authorities on quota items.

According to one estimate, a minimum of 250,000 dozen pieces valued at \$12 million (Dh. 44 million) are awaiting clearance at various U.S. ports. Some of these consignments are over a couple of months old.

Even though a vast majority of them have already negotiated their documents with bankers here and obtained their payments, the complete transaction formalities are not fully over for all.

Not all U.S. importers have retired their documents and settled dues through their banks. Therefore, many banks who negotiated the documents earlier are yet to get their settlement from their counterparts, according to industry sources.

It is learned that a few of them have also shipped goods without a confirmed letter of credit. Their condition is much worse. In some cases even the documents with confirmed LCs were not honoured.

"Nobody knows the fate of the goods. The pressure is now building from the importers enquiring the action taken from this side to clear the goods," said an affected manufacturer-cum-exporter.

The situation is getting worse and worse. Cash flows have also been affected for many. "Banks have now stopped all facilities. They are trying to recover the money they paid since some importers are left with no option but not to honour the documents," said one exporter.

"The worst is that we are losing our credibility with our buyers. The government must take quick action with U.S. authorities to find a solution soon. Otherwise nobody will believe us," said another exporter.

In his opinion, the banks do not have to panic when negotiating the documents with confirmed LCs. "Importers will have to pay. But it is the question of maintaining the credibility as reliable suppliers. So government must act," he added.

However, another exporter said that banks are not only double cautious and asking for documents not relevant. They are holding back funds received from elsewhere to compensate for earlier payments on quota items which are not settled by the importer, he said.

Meanwhile, the question of resolving the dispute over the size of the quota on embargoed items is not yet clear. According to industry circles, the U.S. authorities are yet to confirm the invitation for the scheduled meeting in February to discuss quota.

The affected parties believe that the problem of releasing the held-up consignments at U.S. ports must be solved, without any loss of time, for them to remain in business.

Their only suggestion for immediate solution is to clear them under a condition to debit that volume against the quota to be fixed in future.

But the others, who do not have any held-up cargo at U.S. on quota items at present, believe that this would affect their business in future since the actual size of the quota would be that much smaller.

Trends in Electrical Power Consumption Described

44000309 *Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES (Supplement)*
in English 23 Jan 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qudus: "Sharp Rise in Power Use Reflects All-Round Progress"]

[Text] The consumption of electricity in the UAE has increased nearly 30 times over 1972 reflecting the all-round rapid development in the fields of industry, commerce and housing facilities in urban as well as rural areas.

The demand for electricity rose dramatically in the seventies after the first oil boom. Initially, this was mainly from the consumer sector caused by a rapidly

growing population and equally rapidly improving standards of living. The consequent boom in the manufacturing industries also placed additional burden on the supply of electric energy.

Investments in Plants

Substantial investments were, therefore, made into the development of power plants in the country. Electricity production grew steadily reflecting an average growth of 18.93 percent per annum between 1978 and 1985.

The development of the electricity sector has taken place with the combined efforts of the individual emirates and the federal ministry of electricity and water. The urgency was such that the individual emirates, specially the larger ones, found it prudent to go ahead with their individual plants even before the federal system for this purpose could be evolved, according to a report by the Emirates Industrial Bank.

The Dubayy Electricity Company, for instance, was formed before the foundation of the UAE as a federal state. This historical development has now led to a division of efforts for the purpose of overall electrification in the country.

Currently, the UAE is capable of producing 4214.42 megawatts of electricity. The greater part of this capacity belongs to the individual emirates. The remainder is produced by generators belonging to the ministry which owns a large number of smaller capacity power plants with emphasis on the smaller emirates and rural electrification, the EIB report said.

The largest capacity is in the Abu Dhabi emirate. This is followed by Dubayy and al-Sharqah and to a smaller extent by Ras al-Khaymah. There are 14 power plants belonging to the federal ministry. The largest of these is in 'Ajman emirate. The remaining being in New Qidfa', al-Dhayd, Galilah, Umm al-Qaywayn emirate, al-Nakhil, Old Qidfa', Diba, al-Fujayrah emirate, Masfut, Falaj al-Mu'alla, Manamah, Idhn and Masafi.

Clearly, the emirates and federal division also highlights the urban-rural distribution strategy in the UAE. The individual emirates have concentrated on providing a large load in similar urban areas, whereas the federal ministry has created supply points feeding load centres at some distance.

The ministry is now carrying out all normal maintenance work of the power plants with its own staff. The services of foreign consultants are utilised only in serious cases. The plants have also been extensively insured. Last year, the ministry established a central maintenance workshop for all equipment located at the central stores in al-Sharqah.

Projects Implemented

According to the annual report of the ministry for 1988, the projects implemented in the Western Region last year at a cost of Dh6 million included improvement in the al-Juhd network 11KF; low tension network in Umm al-Qaywayn, 'Ajman and Falaj al-Mu'aila; and supply of electricity connections to a variety of buildings and establishments.

In the Central Region, the ministry repaired the transformers and power stations damaged by heavy rains early last year. It also connected Masfut to Hatta network to solve the power shortage problem in Masfut. In addition, it improved some networks and connected others. The installation of transformers at the power station in Sayh al-Mahb at a cost of Dh8 million is scheduled to be completed by January, 1989.

The ministry carried out improvement, maintenance and supply of electricity connections in the Eastern Region as well last year.

According to a report by the ministry on the generation, transmission and distribution of power in the country, there has been a rapid growth of the installed generation capacity which has increased nearly 20 times since 1972. In more recent years, the capacity has more than doubled from 2039.1 mw in 1972 to 4214.42 mw in 1988. The combined maximum of the country's load demand as a whole has jumped from 120 mw in 1972 to 3038.6 mw in 1988.

As per conservative forecasts by the ministry, the power plant installed capacities in the year 2000 shall be more than double from the present level of 4000 mw.

Power generation in the country has increased from 3754.49 million kwh in 1978 to 13529.71 million kwh in 1987, according to the annual report.

The per capita consumption of electricity in the UAE has grown steadily. Although per capita gross domestic product, which indicates the economic wealth of the people, has been relatively constant in recent years, kwh per capita per annum has increased at an accelerating pace from 1,320 kwh in 1972 to 6,995 kwh in 1986 and 8,150 kwh in 1987. Earlier studies had forecast a per capita consumption of 8,000 kwh in 2000. This has, however, been reached much earlier.

Various power zones in the UAE are not yet interconnected and the country is divided into several regional grids. The interconnecting ties, wherever they exist, are of restricted capacities and so a free flow of power from one system to the other is not available. This situation not only increases the reserve generation capacity requirement but also affects plant maintenance scheduling, thus resulting in an overall uneconomical outlay of capital. So creation of a UAE national grid is being given active consideration by the government.

In the initial phase of development, power generation had been mainly from diesel engines. Their share later decreased to less than 10 percent of the total installed capacity, the share of gas turbines being about 40 percent and the remaining being steam turbines. Frequent maintenance problems have led to the phasing out of diesel engines and they are now used only in remote unconnected areas for small power requirements, according to the EIB.

Loading pattern of the power station is characterised by the fact that there are sharp variations in seasonal maximum demands. Maximum demand usually peaks in the period between June to September and drops within 25 to 30 percent during the winter periods. Daily load variations are, however less severe, the daily minimum load demand being around 60 to 70 percent of the maximum demand.

Industrial loads will grow with the development of industry. Thus extreme changes in load demand will be gradually narrowed down with the result that load factors will be improved and installed plant capacities will be better utilised.

The UAE Ministry of Electricity and Water is now using the technical forms standardised for application within the AGCC countries for monitoring and evaluation of plant technical data. For quick exchange of information and ready reference to the performance data of the stations, a computerised telemonitoring system with video display units has been installed by the ministry with the central monitoring unit located in the Dubayy office and local processing units in all important power stations. The efficient computerised system is being operated at 'Ajman, al-Fujayrah and Umm al-Qaywayn for monitoring the distribution of electricity by the ministry.

Three Kinds of Generators

In the absence of any major river systems, hydro-power is absent in the country. Reliance is entirely on gas and fuel which are the most abundant and economical source of electric power in the region. There are three kinds of generators in the UAE, viz, gas turbines, steam turbines and diesel generators. The most important and dominating generators are gas turbines accounting for almost half of the entire capacity. This is followed by a significant number of steam generators (also propelled by fuel/gas), and the smallest capacity belongs to the diesel generators.

Solar power, though not yet economical on a large scale, is climatically bound to have a large potential in the

UAE. Currently its application is limited to remote areas where connection to a traditional system is difficult. The UAE does not intend to build nuclear power plants as they do not suit the country's requirements.

With the use of gas as fuel, the production cost of electricity is decreased by 28 to 32 percent while the life of the units is increased by 50 percent, leading to overall savings for the country, according to the ministry.

It is envisaged that by 1990 most of the country's regions will be interconnected at 132/220kv voltage level with availability of flow of power from one area to the other. This will increase the flexibility of plant operation and maintenance and reduce the overall reserve capacity to nearly half of the present figure.

In fact, the AGCC envisages a power grid across the entire region. Four members have already decided to go ahead with plans for a grid covering the 1,200km between Kuwait and Oman. Costing \$2 billion, this system allows the responsibility for generation, transfer and distribution to rest with the individual country rather than the central control.

On a wider level, 13 Arab states have held talks in Kuwait in September last year on ways to link their national grids.

Desalination Plants

The UAE's choice of further generating units will be affected by requirement of and types of desalination plants to be installed for producing clean drinking water. Combined cycle plants are sometimes favoured in combination of multistage flash type desalination plants. These plants combine gas turbines exhaust gas heat in a waste heat boiler which produces steam which is used to generate power as well as desalinate water.

Gas turbine plants, though simplest of the lot requiring minimum erection time and low capital investment, are low in efficiency unless exhaust gas heat is recovered. So these types of unit may invariably be procured with possibility of waste heat recovery boiler connection.

Steam plants with condensing turbines involve longer procurement/erection period and higher capital cost, but lower fuel costs. To be effectively economical such plants should be able to work at a good load factor and as base load station, in which case they become ultimately more economical than the gas turbine plant. This effect is more marked for large capacity steam units.

Installed Generation Capacity in M.W.

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
M.E.W.	134.0	156.10	190.7	206.3	455.1	534.0	525.42	525.42	525.42	515.42	515.42
Abu Dhabi	631.4	1000.4	1000.4	1180.0	1104.0	1243.4	1496.0	1517.0	1696.0	1941.3	1903.8
Dubayy	414.0	478.7	709.0	690.0	740.0	752.5	976.6	976.6	976.6	976.6	976.6
Al-Sharqah	254.3	287.3	287.3	364.6	437.3	512.3	512.3	662.3	662.3	706.0	706.0
Ras al-Khaymah	116.6	116.6	117.2	117.2	73.0	83.4	83.4	92.6	92.6	92.6	112.6
Total	1550.3	2039.1	2304.6	2558.1	2810.40	3125.6	3593.72	3773.72	3952.92	4231.92	4214.42

Local Demand in M.W.

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
M.E.W.	65.82	77.60	100.4	129.96	332.86	351.46	365.5	412.00	402.00	451.42	469.00
Abu Dhabi	381.8	500.5	629.7	741.70	852.40	978.6	983.00	1117.80	1234.5	1213.0	1301.0
Dubayy	289.7	352.5	426.7	479.0	550.0	645.0	670.0	710.0	728.0	774.0	850.0
Al-Sharqah	146.5	160.0	206.5	210.0	275.0	282.0	280.0	329.3	337.5	390.2	418.6
Ras al-Khaymah	57.2	77.1	95.0	117.0				—Clubbed with MEW—			
Total	1941.02	1167.7	1357.9	1677.66	1991.86	2257.06	2298.30	2569.30	2702.20	2828.62	3038.60

Generated Energy in Million K.W.H.

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
M.E.W.	190.80	230.50	320.5	409.90	1089.4	1157.45	1267.87	1679.76	1920.46	1947.31	—
Abu Dhabi	1670.0	2210.8	2818.7	3394.50	4041.9	4506.6	4860.4	5293.2	5843.7	6095.8	—
Dubayy	1132.0	1620.0	1936.3	2166.3	2542.6	3020.7	3089.0	3508.3	3747.3	3787.7	—
Al-Sharqah	558.09	670.4	856.5	961.2	1083.86	1256.55	1321.06	1412.33	1576.97	1798.9	—
Ras al-Khaymah	203.6	255.1	436.4	331.2				—Clubbed with MEW—			
Total	3754.49	4991.8	6368.4	9263.26	8757.76	9941.30	10538.33	11893.59	13088.43	13529.71	—

Source: Ministry of Electricity and Water (MEW)

Distinct Advantages

Combined cycle plants are complicated in arrangement but they have some distinct advantages such as high fuel efficiency (better than the other two types of plant) and greater flexibility in load management and less chance of outage of the complete unit. Hence this may be given due consideration while selecting the type of power plant.

Among the projects being implemented in the UAE is a large thermal power station at Taweelah where ultimate installed capacity would go up to 2000mw. Consultants have been invited to participate in the second phase of the project which is estimated to cost Dh3 billion. The first phase, costing Dh1.7 billion, is scheduled to produce power from June this year at 255mw a day.

Ground Lighting

The al-'Ayn International Airport power supply and ground lighting project costing Dh135.9 million is scheduled for

completion in 30 months. The project was won by Rapco Building in joint venture with a Zurich firm, ABB, in August last year. The project includes an 11kw main power station and a series of standby units in addition to a two-year maintenance contract. A UK firm is the consultant to the project.

Other projects in Abu Dhabi include laying of high tension and low tension lines in villages and some islands of the emirate. Two schemes call for expansion of 132kv cable network at a cost of Dh60 million and the installation of transformers at a substation at a cost of Dh25 million.

The al-Wajan substation switchgear project in al-'Ayn is to connect with 80km of 220kv double circuit overhead line to be installed between Zakhir and al-Wajan. The cost of the project is Dh40.8 million.

1988 Water Supply Statistics Given
44000308 Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English
26 Jan 89 p 26

[Text] The number of villages getting drinking water through a network of pipeline rose from 311 in 1987 to 326 last year. Similarly, the water supplied last year reached 34 million gallons as against 26 million gallons in the preceding year according to figures released by the water department of the Ministry of Water and Electricity recently.

The water supplied to these villages is pumped from water wells and water desalination plants. The storing capacity of water reservoirs also increased to eight million gallons and the number of reservoirs to 144.

Pipelines

In 1987, the department had laid water pipelines covering a 40-km area. Pipelines laid between 1972 and 1988 covered 1,285-km area. The department has now started implementing a programme under which self-sufficiency is expected to be achieved in pumping water from newly-discovered water resources in al-Bardi area near Ham Valley. The government is also planning to extend the water pipeline to al-Dhayd city.

A project for a water desalination plant in Fujayrah has been approved. It is expected to produce one million gallons of water which will be enough to meet the needs of the emirate. A water reservoir to store 5,000 gallons of water was built at Subaygah and another of 20,000 gallon capacity at Sayh al-Jurf. The number of new water wells totalled 13. Each of these wells has a depth of 3,500 feet. Another 43 wells were further deepened to increase the volume of supply.

AFGHANISTAN

New Major Generals

46000107b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
23 Jan 89 p 1

[Text] Kabul, Jan 22, (BIA)—As per a decree of Najibullah, President of the Republic of Afghanistan, Assadullah Payam, head of the Political Department of the Ministry of Interior and Gul Hassan Zurmati, Commander of the Tsarandoy Academy were promoted to a rank of Major General.

Commentary Says Pakistan's Intentions 'Hostile'

46000107a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
20 Jan 89 pp 1, 2

[Text] According to credible international sources, the sensitive moments of the political settlement of the issues around Afghanistan is nearing, the extent of dialogue is being widened among various Afghan interested parties and the Afghans get more united for safeguarding the people, the country and the state power. In such a condition, the extremists and Pakistan have raised deceitful propaganda for confusing the Afghan people and diverting their attention from the gravity and urgency of a political settlement. They encourage the continuation of war in Afghanistan and raise, among other machinations, the idea of dismemberment of Afghanistan. They thus endeavour in vain to disintegrate some areas in the country to be controlled by the most belligerent extremist factions. Based upon such an analysis, Louis Dupree, a famous U.S. researcher on Afghanistan who has an important role in determining the U.S. policy towards Afghanistan some time back noted that Afghanistan is a total of areas under the influence of separate tribes. It is interesting that the propaganda on the dismemberment of Afghanistan are given a linkage with the position of the people's power in the Republic of Afghanistan. This is the right method used in the colonial hostile propaganda which used to link the anti-national designs to most honest patriots and heroic defenders of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

The state of the Republic of Afghanistan has been strengthening further the steadfast resistance of all the national and patriotic forces for defending the country's territorial integrity, state power and independence. In this connection, the first article of the constitution states: "The Republic of Afghanistan is an independent, unitary and indivisible state having sovereignty over the whole of its territory. National sovereignty in the Republic of Afghanistan belongs to the people. The people exercise national sovereignty through Loya Jirgah, National Assembly and local councils." This fact is particularly vital nowadays when the danger of dismemberment of the country imposed by Pakistan and the United States is felt more.

The state of the Republic of Afghanistan has directed all its efforts towards this historically important reality that with the termination of war, the danger of dismemberment of Afghanistan imposed by Pakistan and the extremist forces is also removed and peace returns to the country. The proposal on the neutrality and demilitarization of Afghanistan emphasizes that Afghanistan is willing to refer to the Security Council of the United Nations asking the latter to examine the danger faced to the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the RA on the part of Pakistan. There do exist in Afghanistan genuinely patriotic forces, the forces who heroically toe the path of their forefathers in defending the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of the country. The chance will by no means be given to the elements such as Gulbuddin and others to provide for the realization of the plots hatched by strangers to dismember Afghanistan.

As reaffirmed by the international sources, the intensification of the 10-year long war and the delivery of weapons by Pakistan to the extremists is the main cause of threat to the Afghanistan's national independence. These sources have also revealed that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, is a veteran official of Pakistan CID and that his personal security guard has been formed from the Pak CID elements.

A few days before his death, Zia-ul-Haq put at the disposal of Gulbuddin an 8-member guard for special operations. Gulbuddin has declared that as the basic guideline in his policy, he would remove the state borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and would enter a convention with the latter, if he comes to power. Such a shameful statement is openly for arcifying Afghanistan from its independence and for dismembering and changing Afghanistan into a Pakistani colony. This is exactly the aim which the British could not attain during the 15 years of war against Afghan people.

Sebghatullah Mujadeddi unveiled some horrible realities after he withdrew from the alliance of seven one year ago. He said that most of the opposition organizations are only a tool in the hand of Pakistani intelligence services and exposed the linkage between Gulbuddin with Gen Gul Khan, head of the CID department for distribution of arms. He added that Pakistani CID acted unjustly in distribution of weapons. Right some time back, Mujadeddi once again complained that the CID interferes, more that the extent it is empowered, in the affairs of the organizations. A question arises as to what aim this interference follows. In his address to the Parliament, Zia-ul-Haq had openly stated that Afghanistan fought for Pakistan. Such is the reality of the source from where the threat stems against the integrity of our country. It shows who seeks for the dismemberment of Afghanistan. This is only for this aim, that the extremists persist on the continuation of war.

The recent intrusion by Pak military into the territory of our country removes every doubt that the most reactionary quarters in Pakistan are out, in collaboration of the extremists, to intervene against Afghanistan.

It is clear that Afghanistan, our hero country, is traversing hard days. The Afghans have proven along the history, that they do not allow any force to pose any threat and danger against our united homeland.

Peace will prevail in Afghanistan. The termination war and establishment of peace means the consolidation of revolutionary power in the country. Those who are strongly for the end to the war and return of peace here can claim to be the real defenders of the country's revolutionary ideas.

IRAN

Officials Assess 10 Years of Islamic Revolution

Khamene'i Interviewed

46400057a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Pers.an
6 Feb 89 p 6

[Interview with President Khamene'i; date and place not given]

[Text] "The Fajr Memorial Volume," in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, has been published by the Fajr 10th Anniversary Staff, edited by brothers Mohammad Javad Mozaffar and Mohsen Shams. In this book interviews have been held with several prominent personalities, and as we promised on this page yesterday, we plan gradually to present the interviews from the book on this page for our dear readers. The first of these interviews, an interview between Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, president of the Islamic Republic of Iran and brother Mohammad Javad Mozaffar, appears today:

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Every revolution and change is a human achievement and an experiment for the future. Based on this, if we were to assume that the experiences of 10 years of the revolution are preserved in everyone and if we could turn back the clock, what steps would we be willing to take again, and which ones would we prevent?

['Ali Khamene'i]: This experiment could be useful for similar revolutions as well as for our country. It is therefore good that we do such an assessment. However, I am not able at this time to list the things we did that we should not have done, because we cannot yet make a very clear evaluation of all the major and basic measures that have had important effects. There is still time for us to evaluate these measures. However, there are some things that were not done in the early days, or more precisely in the first 2 or 3 years, that I wish had been done. Of course, some of them were undertaken later when it was late. If I were starting over now and if we were in the same circumstances again, one thing I certainly would do would be to establish a facility to train managers or to detect good managers. This is one of

the first things that should be done in every revolution, and we did not pay that much attention to this. Something else that should have been done in the early days, was the strengthening of the universities and the creation of a true capability there. If this had been done, today we would have had two or three generations of revolutionary graduates. Of course, this is one of the things that was done later, but a bit of an opportunity was lost.

Among the other things we should have done, was the creation of a strong educational center for designing methods and a curriculum, and we still have not done this. Relatively good educational centers exist now, but the education of a large revolutionary country such as ours, if it is to have the necessary growth and progress, undoubtedly needs a center headed by the best educators with very high and fine minds, which would use all resources to organize educational work, as well as to devise educational methods. Most important and above all, if we were to begin anew, would be to bring about greater centralization in the nation's executive management. These are some of the things that I feel should have been done but were not done.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Before the triumph of the Islamic revolution, the world had seen changes and revolutions. After many years, if we want really to look at these revolutions, what they have in common is that they have not lived up to their initial ideals and slogans. Doesn't our experience of the last 10 years show that the Islamic Revolution has gone the same way? Can it not be implicitly stated that the world has become small and interconnected, and that our great technological achievements require us to think in terms of reform rather than revolution?

['Ali Khamene'i] Regarding the revolutions of the past it is necessary to note that one cannot sit at a distance and render a negative judgement or call unsuccessful the great revolutions which took place and took a heavy toll on their people and that did many things in their own time. Thus, my first comment is that this commonality that you have found among revolutions is not correct. Perhaps we can say that the decisive common element among all revolutions is relative success in achieving some of their goals. This is exactly the opposite of your point. If you look at each of these revolutions, you will see that to the extent of the state of the art of revolution, they were successful. In the French revolution for example, a deeply rooted royal dynasty of several hundred years which had brought with it into society tens of unchangeable laws and had fiercely maintained these laws, was destroyed, and other principles and types were established, so that even later when the monarchy returned to France it was no longer the monarchy of Louis XVI and his predecessors. It was something else. There was a constitution, there were reforms. If you look at 19th century French history you will see that even after the return of the monarchy, even in the period of Emperor Napoleon I, the situation in France and the situation of the people had changed completely from

what it had been before. This is the art of the revolution. Thus revolution, to the extent that it is a revolution, and in the sense that we understand revolution, which is a violent change in the basic foundations of society, and which is mostly directed at incorrect foundations, is quite successful.

The same applies to the October Revolution and to other revolutions of the 20th century. However, there are insufficiencies where we are looking, meaning that the basic slogans of the revolution were not fully achieved. There are two defects. One of them is selfishness, which does not allow the complete achievement of those goals, the other is ideological weakness and deficiency. Since revolution comes about based on ideology, that ideology makes an image of a world. It also outlines and proposes a mechanism for creating that world. Very well, if the ideology is wrong, it starts a wrong movement. Society is changed and transformed based on that ideology, or that ideology does not take shape in the desired way, or if it does, it does not take effect. This happens because the ideology is wrong. Here is a sin of thought and orthodoxy. Just as we have seen in the revolutions based on Marxist thought, the revolution took place with its own foundations and it had sweet and good results and effects, but it did not achieve that ideal life of the Marxist vision. Why? Because that idea was based at its root on a wrong foundation. This is one factor in the ultimate deficiencies and lack of success in realizing slogans.

Another factor in the failure of revolutions is the weakness, deviation and betrayal of leaders and officials. If you give the best ideology to someone who is weak or young and lacks the necessary decisiveness, and if he gives great importance to his own interests and his personal enjoyment and puts that ahead of the interest of the revolution and society, certainly the desired results will not be obtained. This is the second factor that exists in many of these revolutions. You can see that in the first 15 years of chaos of the great French revolution there is weakness in the leadership.

Likewise, in the Napoleonic era we see another type of leadership weakness. Napoleon was not weak in the sense of backing down in war or political conflict, but he was weak in the face of his personal desires and passions. He did not act like a devout revolutionary, but followed the path of seeking power. Revolution in the sense of change and transformation, which arises from the ideals and the will of the people and the generally loyal and sympathetic leadership, and the violent change which usually comes about, is not guilty of anything opens the path. Continuing on this path, however, the fuel for this machine runs low because of the shortage and weakness of ideology, and the driver either errs or shirks his duty. His will weakens and he does not continue the way and therefore does not achieve the goal.

This is true of most revolutions. Concerning the Islamic revolution of Iran, however, it is absolutely not the case that in these 10 years we have not been successful and

that the fate of the revolution is the same as that of other revolutions. I absolutely do not accept this. This is not out of prejudice and partisanship for something that I care about, but out of fairness and observation of reality. If you look at Iran during at least the last two centuries with the wave of foreign policies and the policies that it carried out, you will see that Iran's political apparatus took positions of reactive submission or submission out of the anger of compulsion or helplessness or submission out of treason, bad character or bad habits. You will see a nation whose political destiny for 200 years was controlled by the policies of Russia, England, for a short time France, and finally America. They brought the government in and removed it. They brought in a shah and appointed the prime minister, even in the time of the strongest shahs. During the reign of Nasereddin Shah, they removed a prime minister who had served, closed the paths to knowledge and literacy and opened the way to corruption, prostitution, laziness, weakness and addiction. Iran was like a listless and limp sick person who had fallen and whatever they wanted from their own culture they injected into him with a syringe, and whatever they did not want, they did not even permit. They became an obstacle to his technological progress. They obstructed his agricultural progress. Countries who were at the same level, made progress and countries that were more backward, like many of today's European countries, advanced far ahead of it. A nation with an ancient and profound culture, which, at least in this area, has no parallel in terms of depth and clarity, was transformed to a nation looking at others, awaiting the judgment of others, in love with a synthetic and substituted foreign culture and annoyed by its own genuine and true culture, and cut off from spirituality. They abandoned it in the swamps and mud flats of ethical corruption. Very well, 200 years of history is not a myth. Anyone who doesn't know this should go and study history.

This revolution came and transformed this nation to a nation that is demanding repayment from everyone who oppressed it, a nation demanding compensation from all those who damaged it, demanding its own share of human life, a nation that has returned to its own personality. It feels independence and life. It feels it has remained behind and strives to move ahead. It does not accept any of the world's policies of domination and force and does not submit to them. It deeply respects its own spirituality and culture and it is outraged and concerned about what it has lost. It has a sense of loss. In the face of the harsh and severe reactions of the world of imperialism, in the face of the frowns of this world, the rudeness of this world, this world's contemptuous indifference, this world's rough presumption and this world's economic pressures, this nation has not frowned and is standing. It does not fear and is willing to continue on its own path. It has decided not to submit to the world.

Now that 10 years have passed, if our revolution has achieved nothing but change the morale of our nation by bringing it out mud and washed it and brought it out of

darkness and thirst and other kinds of deadly addictions and has made it aware of itself, it is the greatest achievement to date. This state has improved day by day and has not declined. It may be that today our people do not have the revolutionary fervor of the years 1357 [21 March 1978-20 March 1979] and 1358 [21 March 1979-20 March 1980], but they have deep revolutionary feelings with greater insight. Moreover the same revolutionary fervor that I was discussing is mentioned by people who come from the outside and see our nation. Just recently several of the purest revolutionaries who are accepted in the world today by the revolutionary nations as revolutionaries came here and met with me. One of these purest persons and revolutionary figures said to me, we see the same revolutionary spirit now in your country and the same people who sent me into a dream when I saw them 10 years ago and filled me with spiritual ecstasy. It is difficult to believe that we are feeling the same thing first hand today. We have gotten used to certain things, and we thought the people did not have that revolutionary zeal. No; it is not this way. Just this last month of Mordad [23 July-22 August] when both friend and foe thought that the people had abandoned the field of battle, you saw how they suddenly swarmed the battlefield and the front with an extensive assault, and the officials told me that we had never had such a victory. After 8 years of war and almost 10 years since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, the fervor of the people remains. Thus these revolutionary feelings of the people are the same feelings which existed at the beginning. This is a new identity that our people have found. Moreover, we can see many practical effects in society. The government and the political system consisted of an oppressive, elitist, dependent, nonpopulist, selfish and self-supporting government, indifferent to the problems of the people, indifferent to the spiritual concerns, demands and thoughts of the people, and today the government is populist. In it, the president, the prime minister, the ministers, the Majles deputies and other persons inside this country's executive system are from the ranks of the people. They are people that no one ever imagined would reach political office. They have arisen from the body of the people and have never prepared themselves for holding power and monarchy, and they even dislike the rule of power and monarchy. They live like the people. They are in contact with the pain of the people. They feel the feelings of the people within themselves. They struggle for the people. For them nothing exists other than the interests of the people. They are not concerned with their own personal interests. I am the president of this government. My life is as it was before the revolution—even as it was in the time of deprivation before the revolution. During part of the period before the revolution I lived a better life. I now impose things on myself that I did not consider necessary then. Well, this is something that has no place in the mentality of the people of today's world. Know that if you said this in the world no one would accept or believe it. The situation is so strange and so unfamiliar that no one accepts it. The prime minister is like me. A great many of the nation's ministers and officials are also

like us, living ordinary lives, sometimes lower than ordinary lives or perhaps quite average. They work for the people, they do not recognize time. We go to work early in the morning. For example yesterday the Council of Ministers met here. Several of the gentlemen came at sunrise. Several other persons had also come, the sun had been up perhaps no more than ½ hour when the meeting of the Council of Ministers came to order. Early in the morning at 6 am, some times 5 or 5:30 am, the officials are at work, until late evening. This is our government system, instead of the former government system. If a revolution achieves nothing other than removing a handful of profiteers who dominated the people and governed without any academic, spiritual or intellectual qualifications and calls to power the people, if it does nothing other than this, it has still done a great service. Another dimension is the economic problems. You can see of course that now we remain halfway down the road to Islamic justice in economic areas, and a great deal remains before we uproot poverty from society and bring about full equality. However, today in our society there is no longer any sign of enormous wealth. There is no longer any sign of those people who owned 100 or 150 villages, who had several enormous buildings in and around the cities and several large factories with thousands of people working for them, and who freely did whatever they wanted to do with that money and no one stopped them, who exerted influence in the institutions of power, and who oppressed the people, pressured them and closed the window to life for them. This is one reality. It is true that we have not achieved our aim. We may even say we are not yet halfway there, but we have gone 20 or 30 percent of the way. This of course depends on how people evaluate, but how can we avoid seeing such a great reality?

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Do you think this revolution is now invincible?

[ʿAli Khameneʿi]: Absolutely. Fortunately you have summarized and shortened the subject, or I would have said it myself. Therefore, this revolution is now absolutely invincible. I must tell those who would say that this revolution has not been successful that they have not understood it properly, and have not seen it first-hand. It would be better for them to come and see it up close, to go around and study and not listen to the words of its detractors or uninformed people, and to see that, no, it was not an unsuccessful revolution.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] What is Your Excellency's view on the previous question concerning reform versus revolution?

[ʿAli Khameneʿi] That conclusion is automatically rejected. Reform is practical when there are no obstacles to reform. The obstacles to reform are the world's powers and bullies. These people always obstruct reform, because corruption comes from bullies. You must either fight and defeat these bullies, and this is revolution, or you don't defeat them and then they remain and do not

allow reform to the extent that it hurts their own interests, thus remaining bullies. Therefore, reform has no meaning. In a place where there is no possibility for revolution, neither does anyone attempt reform. This is another discussion. I do not accept the Marxist idea that vehemently rejects every type of reform. However, in places where the bullies place huge obstacles in the way of reform and no reform is possible there, there is no way but revolution.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Some experts believe that revolutionary Iran, by resorting to categories such as the Expediency Discernment Council and accepting Resolution 598 and the like has shown that no movement in the world is actually woven with separate fibers, and, as the saying goes, everyone is in the same boat and follows the same laws. What is your view of this?

[ʿAli Khameneʿi] There is no doubt that all of mankind and all groups follow the same laws, but revolution is also a law, and the methods of mankind for adopting the correct paths are also governed by law. But this remark must not be interpreted to mean that incidents such as the acceptance of the resolution and the formation of the Expediency Discernment Council and the like are indications of the failure of the Islamic Revolution, because in a proper social movement, the leadership of that society must always bear two things in mind, one the breaking of deadlocks to keep the social movement from reaching a dead end, and likewise, to break deadlocks or get through dead ends, he must have methods up his sleeve to implement whenever necessary. The second responsibility of the leadership of society is to protect the interests of society using various maneuvers. Now that you have used the term 'boat', let me use the metaphor of a boat and a ship.

The leadership and management of a nation, relying on the management and ideology that it has, is under the command of a captain who raises the sails in the midst of various kinds of waves. He gathers the sails and changes their direction. In the manner of ancient ships, he constantly moves the rudder this way and that, or increases and decreases the speed of the motor. In one place he drops the anchor, elsewhere he goes fast, and these things are necessary for proper leadership.

The acceptance of Resolution 598 was in no way an error. It was a necessary opportunity. With our revolution, rightfully, we have given no guarantees that we will overcome all the difficulties of life in the way that we hope. Sometimes one must endure and suffer the difficulties. The important thing is that we not turn back. If a large problem is imposed on us and requires us to make a special movement or maneuver, we will do it, but we do not lose our sense of direction, just like what a commander does on the field of battle. Sometimes he orders a retreat. Retreat is one maneuver, just like advance. They are no different. Just as advancing is one stage, retreat is an opportunity in its own right. He never reprimands a commander because he has his forces

retreat at a certain required time and place. Of course if he advances at the wrong time he deserves a reprimand. Likewise if he retreats at the wrong time he deserves a reprimand.

The acceptance of Resolution 598 was a move and a maneuver for us that occurred in its own place and was the right thing to do. Had we not accepted, we would surely have suffered losses. The Expediency Discernment Council is also one of those measures to break a deadlock. Of course today this measure is not a concern that is higher than preserving the Constitution, which although it does contain an error, it is better to preserve the error than to destroy that framework. It is possible that the Imam may not wish or does not decide to establish the Expediency Discernment Council as a permanent body, and he may designate a time period and a function for it. Undoubtedly, however, this organization in and of itself is advisable and necessary, because it is possible that a difference of opinion will arise between the Council of Guardians and the Majles. We cannot say that this may not happen. If it does arise, what is the government to do, having sent the bill to the Majles and waited for it to be enacted so that it can solve a problem? What is its obligation?

Is this not a deadlock? The leadership must break this deadlock. What better solution than to have a number of reasonable people, people who are involved in executive affairs and aware of intellectual issues and the foundations of the revolution and society, sit together and undo this knot, to solve the problem in the Majles or impose something on the Council of Guardians? What could have been better than if this issue had been foreseen in the Constitution? When it was not foreseen in the Constitution, which is not an indication of weakness, rather, it shows that we are still on a revolutionary path, naturally the Imam looked into it.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] In view of the nation's expanding population, especially 10 years after the revolution, don't you think that the young generation is threatened with being cut off from history? Don't you think that this separation is a serious danger to the continuation of the revolution?

To clarify, let me say that in the opinion of the current young generation, I'd like to say that the young generation, even the ones of university age, not only may not know a great many of our prominent people, such as the late Motehari, the Martyr Beheshti, the late Taleqani, and others; indeed for them even the Imam is a historic figure as leader of the revolution, and not as the leader of the Islamic Republic. This matter needs serious attention.

[ʿAli Khameneʿi] It is true that the young generation is not properly informed of the nation's prerevolutionary past, and they do not know where it came from and where it has gone. This must be cured, such a thing naturally exists. It is necessary to think about the cure.

The cure is for honest and aware reporters to give the people true reports on the course of society, not only in the form of books, but also as articles, writings, in films, poetry, and artistic works. They must repeat the past and the present regularly and connect the young generation to the past, not only with their eyes and their feelings, but in their minds and thoughts. I will complain and lament right here that the artistic works portraying the issues prior to the revolution and during its early period, from the standpoint of principles and technique are deficient, stupid, weak and usually erroneous. There are films that show the satanic rule of the SAVAK and the shah's security apparatus. Those of us who were in that situation for 15 years and felt it with our flesh, our skin and our bones know that it was not usually that way and is not. What was was much more biting than that being depicted. At the same time some of the things naively demonstrated in the plays and speeches attempting to outline the status of idolatrous relations in that time are done in very erroneous ways and sometimes at a low level, while it is not evident how those basic levels took shape and acted in that governmental apparatus. How did they make decisions and carry them out? Then who were the wealthy of society, and how did they obtain and spend their money? How were the nation's culture and education planned, and in what direction did they send the people? How were they guided? How did society's intellectuals think? In what atmosphere did they live, and what did they feel? What were the various weaknesses and shortcomings they had, the ugly and pitiful dependencies, what was the situation for clergymen in that day and time for all the clergymen that existed then? The genuine revolutionary processes and the other processes which existed among the clergy, the people and the poor, should have been shown, and there really is no sign of this. I saw a relatively good [as published] story about life in the villages. As it happens, the village was from a region where I am familiar with the cities, the villages and the people there. The image the writer gave of the village is completely wrong, far from reality and was provocative. I say there ought to be a wise and high-level educational center with a profound and fine mentality because these defects must be overcome. Unfortunately we still do not have this, and I fear, if asked 10 years from now what I would do if I went back to the beginning of the revolution, I will say the same thing.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] If we want to express our general understanding of the Islamic Revolution, we must say that the slogans of the revolution called for justice, freedom and spirituality. That is, apart from the strategic slogans, we wanted to say that we aspired to justice, freedom and spirituality for the people. In Your Excellency's view, which of these goals have we achieved?

[Ali Khamene'i] I can say we have made good progress along all three lines. In all three paths, we have removed the great obstacle, which is the former regime, and along with that regime we have removed many traditions and laws. We have moved, and in a fairness I believe it has

been a good step forward. Perhaps, as I said in answer to the first question, the evaluation of that is difficult for many of our contemporaries who are living in the midst of the process, but one will be able to understand it much better from a distance. With care and comparison with the past, also it will be possible to understand very well that we have advanced in all three lines and we have made progress. I cannot say that we have achieved definitive results in all three directions. For example, with regard to justice we still have a long way to go before we reach the justice sought and promised by Islam. We have made more progress towards freedom. First of all, however, as for spiritual freedom, meaning human freedom from carnal desires, passions and lust, that which is the foundation of the freedoms of a society, we have not made much progress. Concerning the social and political freedoms in a country with a dictatorial background, we can say we have had good movement. However, we cannot claim that we have achieved the freedoms envisioned in Islam. The same applies to spirituality. Much progress has been made. Human beings have been transformed. Spiritual values have been brought to life, many false values have been destroyed. In this regard also I must say we have come a long way.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Don't you think that along with these, wickedness such as lying, theft, bribery, flattery, two-faced behavior, hypocrisy and the like have also grown?

[Ali Khamene'i] In my view these things have not grown. With regard to lying or backbiting, I have no specific assessment about whether they have increased or decreased. They have always existed and have not yet been uprooted. However, bribery and flattery have been greatly reduced. Compare the flattery that was bestowed upon the heads of state and the government in the past and what is being said now. Now even the highest officials are criticized and protested against, in their presence. No one even asks why. Not a single person asks why. At that time there was no sign of such action. When a police man entered a residential area, everyone was respectful to him. They said sir, sir, and brought him tea. Now not even one percent or one thousandth of that exists. Lately many people have been stressing flattery and the like. I also heard them say today on the radio: Flattery is on the increase; it must be eliminated. I did not understand who they were talking about and where these flatterers are. These people have forgotten what used to happen in the past. Today most of the praise of the nation's officials is done by the people, a respect that never existed in that time. In a large gathering of the people, when one of the nation's officials enters the people stand up and cheer. They chant slogans and prayers and whatever else they can to express their feelings. These are the people. Are the people flatterers? Sometimes, in criticism, they do not even allow a level of moderation and fairness. Think, for example, that I am the president and in that position, I am obliged to have dignity and fatherly quality and I am not required to answer every protester who is from such and such

platform, that gathering, and this writing, whatever they say, whether true or false, distorting and lying when explaining matters. In fact, not only flattery has not grown, but criticism, brashness and rudeness, even with regard to officials about whom no one has any misgivings, have grown. Concerning the bribery you mention, yes, I cannot say that bribery has been uprooted, but the important thing is that bribery at its heaviest and ugliest levels, that is bribery at high levels, has completely disappeared, meaning it does not exist. In the past everyone took bribes, from the shah and the prime ministers to the ministers and on down to the managers, and they were enormous bribes. Now these high-level officials are fighting bribery. Of course, it is possible that a manager or a second, third or fourth level employee may take a bribe, just as it has been seen recently. Of course there are also people who tell lies to their peers in the marketplace, they are in the alleys and streets, they tell lies to their associates. They are also in the offices, they oppress their clients. However, in general, compared to the past, we can say that they are fewer in number and have not increased. In some sectors they have completely disappeared. At the same time I will repeat the same thing. With respect to spiritual freedom, meaning freedom from the chains of personal passions, we have a long way to go and this is the longest road for mankind.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] After the acceptance of Resolution 598 it appears that the most necessary task is a truthful and unflinching assessment of the past 10 years of Islamic revolution, in order to be able to get through the present phase by eliminating the errors of the past. Doesn't Your Excellency think that unfortunately the same viewpoints and achievements that led us to the acceptance of the resolution are still at work in public life? Meaning there has been no self-criticism?

[Ali Khamene'i] The resolution was not logical for the revolution, but rather for the war. To put it more precisely, it was an incident in the course of our military struggle more than it was something at the root of the revolution. Yes, it might have been good if we had sat down very naturally after the resolution and studied 8 years of the war. You know that 8 years of war and the incidents which ended in the acceptance of the resolution are mostly secret and cannot be disclosed. The unauthorized ears of the enemy must not hear it. Undoubtedly if we had come after accepting the resolution and analyzed and summarized the war during its last 3 or 4 years—and not just in general—we would have had to reveal a great many of our military and national secrets to the enemy. Of course, of necessity those secrets are not negative and bad points, and indeed very often they are good and positive points throughout, but in any case they cannot be disclosed. It was therefore, necessary that this review be done with a more precise and calculated view, but it was not the time, it was too early. However, we have time for this retrospective. It is not easy, but it is good that we always do it, and concerning a retrospective of the revolution, rather than of the war, I believe that it is a

good thing. It is necessary, at least at the level of the officials themselves, that they should sit and see what they have really lost and what they have really gained. Which measures were errors and which ones were right? This is something that unfortunately is not done in our group. Perhaps it is because most officials are very busy and they seldom think of intellectual tasks of this nature. This is also one of our organizational weaknesses. Our organizations have not been able to give officials the opportunity to do such things. This also goes back to the same basic weakness, meaning lack of centralization in executive management.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] From the public talks, writings, and the positions of the various factions, it is felt that there is a missing link in solving the country's most difficult problems. What is this missing link, in Your Excellency's view? For example, is it lack of a centralized power? Is it lack of a clear and specific theory of the revolution or the failure to truly install the institution of democracy?

[Ali Khamene'i] In my opinion the missing link is this very matter of management. Otherwise, concerning a potential theory, we lack nothing. If we see that there is no separate organization of theoreticians apart from the government in our country, to sit like nobility and look at social issues and plan pure projects for the revolution, it is because we are subject to weakness and inexperience with regard to governmental organizations, and this certainly must be corrected. Once I told one of the nation's high officials, you and I are very close in our thoughts and intellectually, it would be good if we could work together. We know the country, we know the problems, we know the officials. We went and studied the theoretical issues of revolution a bit, and that brother also completely agreed. Well, unfortunately now such a thing truly does not exist. If we had centralized management and strong and specific executive management, a great deal of this duplicated effort and interference in the work of others would disappear and the way would be open for people to make proposals and similar suggestions.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] In the study and criticism of the revolutions of the contemporary world, we find views concerning governing methods which follows each revolution. A number of people believe that to manage a society that has arisen from a revolution one needs revolutionary and decisive methods, and the speed of society cannot be regulated in the framework of a constitution. The Islamic Revolution claimed that it could do this. After 10 years, however, we came and formed various supreme councils. At the same time, perhaps one can say that we have not implemented a significant part of the principles of the Constitution. Don't you think that we have proven the claims of the first group to be right?

[Ali Khamene'i] No, it is absolutely not this way. That first idea is borrowed from what has been done elsewhere. You look at those places now. Look how much change they have made in 10 years, and how much change we have made. You will see that our path has been a continuous and constant one compared to theirs, while there sometimes strange changes and transformations have taken place. Mankind is imperfect, and even if human beings sit together and make decisions as a group of revolutionaries, they are imperfect, because their decisions are not perfect. Today they make decisions, tomorrow they feel that they are mistakes. Tomorrow they will decide the opposite. Then again the next day they will feel they have made a mistake and will make another decision. Therefore, why should we sit and rewrite the constitution from the beginning or make a regulation for the long term? This will ultimately contain mistakes as well. However, finding mistakes the second time is easier, because there is a framework in which, after a time, one can see where there is a flaw and will not be astonished or disturbed. Secondly, the need for change and reform will be postponed, even though this need will eventually arise. Concerning the first type, however, sometimes a decision must be made every day. Every hour something has to be said that is sometimes 180 degrees opposite of what was said before. We have done no harm by having a constitution, and supplements have sometimes been made. We have done no harm. These supplements are also part of the path of the Constitution's evolution.

Rafsanjani Interviewed

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[Interview with Hashemi Rafsanjani by Mohammad Javad Mozaffar; date and place not given]

[Text] Continuing the publication of the series of interviews by brother Mohammad Javad Mozaffar, general manager of the Foreign Publications Office of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, with officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the achievements made in 10 years of the Islamic Revolution, in this issue we present an interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin Hashemi Rafsanjani, acting commander-in-chief and speaker of the Majles. We note that this interview is taken from the "Fajr Memorial Volume," edited by brothers Mohammad Javad Mozaffar and Mohsen Shams and published by the Fajr 10th Anniversary Memorial Staff.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] With your permission, let us begin with this question. Every revolution and change is a human achievement and is naturally an experiment for those who will follow. If we could turn back the clock now and retain the experiences of the period of the

revolution, and if you could be at the beginning of the revolution again, which measures would you take and which ones would you not take?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] This is a very general question and it is certainly difficult to give a general answer to the question of what we would and would not do. Of the thousands of measures taken, it is difficult for us to say which ones were useful and which ones were harmful. An answer cannot be given to these issues so easily in an interview. If one wants to do this, one must sit and review everything that has been done and discuss it in a group situation. This task cannot be completed as the answer to a single question. However, in certain instances, it may be said that some things were not done properly and could have been done differently. I will begin with one of the more important examples. For example, when we began hastily writing the Constitution, we did not yet have the administrative experience to manage a revolutionary country. Some of us were revolutionaries who had lived with revolutionary ideals, and we put on paper the same ideals we had held outside the world of public affairs and made them into a Constitution. Most of the people who were influential in the approval of the Constitution and who voted for this law had no experience in the executive management of a country. Therefore, if we were to write a constitution today, we would write a more comprehensive constitution. Of course, there are a great many positive points in the constitution. Even with our present perspective, if one reads it based on the experiences which we have gained up to now, we cannot be unfair and say that none of these articles are good. In our opinion, the weak points are very few and there are many more strong points. The fact that some of the issues of those days, which were in the minds of the framers of the Constitution, are reflected in it, is interesting to us. Of course, another good aspect was that if we were to write the Constitution today, it is not clear that we would be able to write this progressive a Constitution, without the necessary revolutionary spirit.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Yes, the Constitution was completely influenced by the revolutionary atmosphere and was the outcome of the revolution.

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] If we were to do this now, it certainly would be done conservatively and the revolutionary hue would not be so bright. It might be more efficient from an administrative standpoint. However, the revolutionary problems and the ideals of the revolution were naturally much greater for everyone in the early days. Even bringing the Constitution to a vote was like that. The people who voted for it have now become very knowledgeable and there are differences of opinion among the people over various issues. Therefore, it is not easy to write a constitution 10 or 15 years after the revolution and expect all the people to accept it and be loyal to it. Therefore, I say that it cannot be absolutely stated as to what we would do, if we were to do this

again. Perhaps, in a sense, that haste was useful. In summary, I would say that in view of the fact that the Constitution could be amended at any time, this was the right thing to do.

I'll give another example. Consider the war. If we were to begin the revolution with what we know today, we might try to keep the war from starting. When we saw that there were consequences of clashes and that they were about to impose a war on us, we would have made greater efforts to keep the war from starting. Of course, when the war began, there was no path to take but the one we took. We had to defend ourselves and we did gain many benefits from the war while it lasted, although we also sustained much loss of life and property. In general, however, if they had not imposed the war on us and we had begun reconstruction with Iran's resources at that time, the nation's economic situation might be much better today. However, it is also possible, that we might have lost something in terms of the revolutionary spirit and morale, meaning what we gained from the war such as war experience and the constructive effects of martyrdom and sacrifice. However, in general, with today's experience, we might have been able to prevent the war from happening. Of course, this is not a definitive judgement, because the people who started the war held the initiative in their own hands. We did not want the war to start, nor did we have the means to fight a war. They did not yet know us, however, and they thought this war would quickly stop our revolution. If after 8 years, we saw that we could end the war within 2 weeks after deciding to do so, it is not clear that we could have done this then, because the enemy did not believe us at that time. The enemy thought he could destroy the revolution with the war. Even if we had wanted to stop then, the burden would have been on us and they would have imposed restrictions on us. This is why I say that a definitive judgement is not possible. Concerning the formation of revolutionary organizations, let me say that we began our task with the legacy we brought from the former regime. Although the administrative and executive system of the past was in our hands, naturally the country could not have been administered with those tools. We were forced to seek new parallel organizations, in order to administer the country in military, police, education, administrative, and even development affairs, and it was a very good experience. Unlike the revolutionary Marxist regimes, we did not undertake the task of purging others. We put the cost on society, brought revolutionary forces into the fray, administered the country with their help and got through that difficult early period. Well, now that everything has calmed down, there is a great load on the nation's shoulders. In this regard it appears that what was done originally was necessary and had to be done. Concerning the quality of the work, however, it must be said that we are more knowledgeable now, and if we want to form a revolutionary organization now, we know how to do it, and how, gradually, reach a point where everything there is centralized. However, this could not have been done then, and there are many examples like this.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Naturally this assumption is not realistic and we cannot go back in time, but this is necessary as a critique for those who will follow, and this is a quality of yours that everyone sees. We see that in every period you critique the measures that have been taken, you enumerate the most interesting incidents, and this critique is truly something important for the next generation. With your permission, let me put the next question in this way:

Before the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, the world had seen many revolutions and changes, and after many years, if we put it bluntly, perhaps the one thing they all have in common is that they have not quite realized their initial ideals, or they have not been successful in achieving those ideals. Don't you think that the experience of the last 10 years of the Islamic revolution has shown that we have gone the same way as well? Doesn't the question implicitly arise that in a world so tightly interconnected and with today's great technological advancements, which have certainly made the world smaller, we must re-examine the concept of the revolution?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] No, I don't think this way. You have a point with respect to other revolutions and even somewhat with respect to ours. One might say that this is the case in general. People who start a revolution are usually people who are not part of the executive and the government structure. They are outside the former government and act on the basis of their ideals. They are usually somewhat removed from the realities of managing a country. They want many things, but when they enter the scene of activities, they realize that there are some things they cannot do. Those who are somewhat closer to the government think more in terms of reform. People who are involved in management and think in terms of reform do not become revolutionaries. A revolutionary must be outside the former government. Therefore, the fact that some ideals are not attainable in practice is acceptable logically and that is fine. However, I do not think that one could say that the substance of the revolution is lost and that there is nothing to call a revolution. Of course, today, we do not have the opportunity to study other revolutions, but concerning our own revolution we think that so far this revolution has remained faithful to most of its own ideals. These ideals are considered practical and are pursued. Of course, it is possible that matters will gradually arise in the revolution, new points will appear in the course of it and that there will even be defeats. Look at what we wanted from the beginning. I was one of the Imam's close pupils from the beginning, and there are many like me. We were in direct service to the Imam, we knew his thoughts from the very first moments and we had our ideas. This religious revolution which began in Iran in this period was victorious. We were there from the first moment, with the first slogans, at the pinnacle of the revolution, involved in its work, always with the same Imam and his students. In general what did we want? The slogans which arose late in the movement: independence, freedom, Islamic Republic, crystallized a great deal of it.

Today, we really ought to look to see if we are independent or not. This issue should be studied from various perspectives. Politically, I don't think there is anyone who would say that Iran is politically dependent. Even our most vehement opponents cannot claim that we are dependent on anyone for the political management of the country. No one in the world could impose anything on us politically. We are also independent with regard to economic decisions. However, with regard to carrying out economic matters and whether our industries are completely selfsufficient, we must say, perhaps this has not been achieved yet. However, we have not yet given up this ideal. That is, we still chant the same slogan from the early days of the revolution: independence, freedom, Islamic Republic. In the early days we thought this could be achieved rapidly. In practice, however, we realized that this is a long process, and especially since we were involved in the war....

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Especially the war prolonged it....

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] ...Prolonged it, because if we had used the resources we spent on the war for fundamental economic investments, perhaps many of our current dependencies would have disappeared. We consider this completely practical. We know that if we endure a bit of discipline, maintain our revolutionary spirit and in many cases avoid haste, we will achieve specific results. We must not think that we can quickly bring the standard of living of the people to the level of those nations who have exploited and plundered the world for years and have stored the proceeds in their own country. If we want to bring ourselves to their level, such as our streets, our railroads, our buildings, our industries and our people's health and welfare facilities, it will take a very long time. We have laid the foundation for this task, and this is where our scientific and educational independence comes into play. In fairness, we have made great progress with respect to management and knowledgeable manpower, and with respect to people who can achieve this economic independence. We have also made much progress in the area of work methods, but our technical tools are not sufficient, we are being subjected to an economic boycott. If a spare part is needed, they don't give it to us, or they do so with difficulty, or we have to procure it at a high price. If we need a specific technology, they do not place it at our disposal easily. We are moving in the direction of independence. Thus, the ideal of the revolution has been postponed, but we have not forgotten it. We have everything in our university today, and we are not worried that someone will come from abroad and fill the heads of our youth with ideas. We have little, but what we have is our own. We are running our major industries ourselves now. Our oil industry is now run solely by domestic manpower, and we ourselves manage entirely those believing forces in our military industries, which have grown greatly. We ourselves manage the industries, from the foundries to the chemical plants and mines. In general our industries, even the difficult tasks, such as the management of the metro,

which was thought to be completely dependent on foreigners and which has a complex design, is chiefly carried out by our own people. Within the country, we have provided the resources for true independence in every dimension. We only lack the tools to put them into operation, that is we do not have the machinery. I think, therefore, that we have kept our independence in all dimensions, including in the political and educational areas. We have not yet reached our economic goals, but we are on the way. Among issues, let me mention freedom. Freedom, in the true sense of the word, exists in Iran. Of course, if by freedom one means something that exists in the West, well, this was never part of our slogans. We have never looked to the West and wanted freedom in the Western sense for our people, meaning a freedom without commitment with debauchery and all those things which are now going on. If freedom means that the people are free to choose their own fate, it would be unfair for someone to say that the people in Iran are not allowed to make their own decisions. We formed the Majles in the first year of the revolution. The people really came out and elected their representatives, and in the election of representatives we have even progressed to the point where the Imam has forbidden the rule of a party as a fulcrum for propaganda and guidance. The Friday Imams are forbidden to use their rostrum as a propaganda platform. No person from one city is to interfere in the affairs of another city, so that the people from that city will be able to elect their own representative. If we approach this fairly, there is absolutely no other place in the world with such elections. For example, it is possible that when they bring up the names of candidates, the Council of Guardians will not accept some of them. This is based on certain principles. Our revolution was to be for an Islamic republic from the beginning. Therefore, if someone is against Islam and against its ideals, naturally we will not give him permission to be elected. If we did, we would be turning away from our revolution. Therefore, an almost total majority of the people in our country are people who can take part in public affairs, and they have a free hand in the election of their representatives. You can also see that the Majles is the freest parliament in the world, such that it can remove the president from office. The power of the Majles is such that no minister can take office without its approval. Of course, there are other managers who are appointed by the ministers. The Majles approves and interpellates the government. The president proposes the government and the Majles approves. Both choose the government, and one does not have any more power other than that, and the free participation in other dimensions is the same way. No one forces the people to hold jobs. No one forces them to take a specific path. Even in war, we fight chiefly with volunteers. Where did you hear of a war where not even some soldiers are forced to fight? The people who fight are by definition those who come to the front by their own decision and will and with the knowledge of their parents. The same is true of the mobilization and the revolutionary guards.

Our police forces are also by definition based on volunteers. It is the most unjust thing for someone to say that there is no freedom in the Islamic Republic.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Do you have the same views regarding writing and expression of opinion?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] I definitely have the same opinion. I say that if the newspapers decide on their own not to write something, it does not matter to us. Even if they do not write anything, or consider something not appropriate to publish, their managers and the people who work there are revolutionaries. The best example of this, is the Majles. The Majles is thousand times more effective than newspapers and the like. It is connected to the radio, and the whole world listens to the radio. I myself have directly witnessed the deputies here saying whatever they think necessary to say at the rostrum, in no uncertain terms, and no one censors them. Anyone can avail himself of this right. Any organization can do so. Sometimes you may say that there are some people who censor themselves. If this is what you mean, well, this is proper so that the people and members of organizations can grow and not say what is not advisable. This is not against freedom. The election of the councils has begun and the councils have been elected in many places. We have [illegible] councils, and the people are thus involved. We have sometimes encountered libertinism in the administrative offices. The Islamic societies themselves governed the offices and had eliminated the management for a time. We see freedom in the proper sense in the country, but of course giving gloss and color to it is a different matter. Perhaps if someone wants to make the claim of being a revolutionary, it would be better to give color and gloss to this issue. It needs skill and expertise, and we have not yet acquired this.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Do you believe that comparing the Islamic Revolution with other revolutions may be premature and therefore, disappointing, and that this disappointment is not right?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] I definitely agree, and this is what was said in the slogans of the revolution.

Things have now appeared in the midst of things which have given rise to these questions. For example, the slogan "War, War Until Victory" was not a slogan of the revolution, but nor did we start the war. The war started and we had to defend ourselves. We said we would fight until we defeated the enemy. The Imam said this. That is, the Imam said we would fight this way. The people also confirmed this, and then the time came when we saw that it would be best to end this war. To have decided otherwise would not have been revolutionary, it would have been tenacity, prejudice and stubbornness, as if to say, I have spoken and I will see my words through until the end. Military victory was never an ideal of the revolution. It was only nationalistic and revolutionary zeal that told us that an enemy who so rudely attacked us must be punished. We did punish the enemy,

but we also punished not only Iraq but the entire area and imperialism in such a way that they will not fight with the Islamic Republic. The proof of that is that when we announced that we do not want to fight, everyone threw up their hands and accepted it easily. If they had not been bloodied the same as us, they would not have accepted so easily. They would have said no, you have been saying "War, War Until Victory" for 7 or 8 years, and this is proof of our success. Or, for example, you know that we cut relations with some countries in the course of the revolution. Well, it was never a slogan of ours to cut our relations with other countries. When did we ever chant such a slogan, before or after the revolution? Yes, of course we always said that about Israel and South Africa, because they are absolutely illegitimate. Our ideals do not allow us to accept them. It was after the revolution that the severing of relations occurred. America severed relations, so did France and Saudi Arabia and several other countries. However, we did not take the initiative in any of these instances. It is strange that even in the case of America it was they who took the initiative. Our basic policy is not to sever relations, but when they wanted to do so, we accepted and gave a revolutionary hue to that very thing. With our great revolutionary spirit we were able to say that we did not respond to the overtures of a power from whom we needed things. We said no. We will deal on equal terms. They insulted our embassy employee. We responded in kind. They took in the shah. Here our youth made hostages of them. That is, we did not back down, and when the furor subsided, again it was they who came and pleaded to establish relations. England and France succeeded, America has acquired a special status.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Could you deal with this as the answer to a separate question elsewhere?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] It is appropriate that I say it right here. America has its own special status. There has been a long period of hostility with America since the beginning of the revolution. It is therefore difficult for us to accept relations with America, even though they are very insistent and have taken to pleading. Other countries are not this way, however. Those who are now saying things must realize that these things were never part of our revolution. When did we ever have the ideal and slogan of severing relations? We said we wanted relations so we could have a dialogue. We have a message for the world. We are not isolationists, and we do not want to stay within ourselves.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Some thinkers and experts have said that revolutionary Iran in questioning the reason for the formation of the Expediency discernment Council and by accepting Resolution 598, in reality (if we say so ourselves) has shown that it is not a "cloth made of different fibers," and that in short, all of mankind is in the same boat, all follow similar laws. What is Your Excellency's view concerning this?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] Some of what you say is a repetition of what has been said before, and is nothing new. Of course, one cannot deny legislation. The laws of nature or humanity are not such that revolutionaries should be defeated. The law says that revolutions must be realistic and that they must see reality. The revolution is not meant to move contrary to reality. One can change many things. Legislation is not the constant domain of foreigners, imperialism, the capitalists, the corrupt etc. Nor does our revolution seek to destroy the laws of the world. The laws of society can put a human being on the proper and correct path. Concerning the acceptance of the revolution, I must say that we never promised to continue the war even if it was not in our interest. This sort of thing is not even in the laws of the world. Yes, during the war we talked this way and this is the truth. When one is fighting a war, one cannot tell a soldier to fight for one more year. Even if we had intended to end the war on a certain date, as long as we kept fighting, we would have had to chant the same slogans. After making the decision, it might have taken us a month or two to think about it and make preparations in order to bring an end to the war. Well, if you tell a soldier we will fight until tomorrow, he will stop fighting and will not be prepared. Therefore, our acceptance of the resolution indicates nothing, except that a wise man is someone who acts on what he sees in the interest of his nation and his government, even if he is mistaken. When he decides, he must act, what is the alternative?

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] The Expediency Discernment Council....

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] The Expediency Discernment Council is also discussed in a strange and unfair manner. What country have you seen that ran a war with all its democratic processes in place? The nature of a society at war is different from that of a society at peace. The expectation was that from the first day of the war we would shut down all of these organizations and create a centralized management, yet now when we want to make a legal decision we must take the plan to the Majles. At the Majles, it is broadcast from the public rostrum, and our arch enemy learns what we are doing. If we try to have a secret session, first of all it is against the law and secondly the very secrecy of it awakens the curiosity of the enemy and that creates problems. Furthermore, in a group of 270 people and the employees surrounding the Majles, it is almost impossible for top secret matters to remain secret. Therefore, for us to establish a body, for the duration of the war, where exceptional and quick decisions could be made, is the most natural thing that could be done in wartime. That is, while retaining the nation's usual organizations, to establish centers which could also make instantaneous decisions. Some people might say that the Imam could make these decisions, but the Imam does not want to make decisions alone. The Imam appoints a group. This is also one of our legal rights. That is, our leader, under the Constitution, has the right to make such decisions. Very well, according to the Constitution, leadership and the decisions by the

chief theologian are above these issues. Therefore, he appoints a group. For example, at one time, in the Supreme Council for War Support, if there were a problem which arose in the Constitution, we made decisions about the war. We return to your first question. The Majles passes some things and the Council of Guardians rejects them. There is no way to correct this. The Majles does not accept the views of the Council of Guardians. Neither do they accept our views. Very well, the leadership must resolve these matters. This is why the Expediency Discernment Council came into being, and the same applies to other issues. Therefore, this not only confirms what has been said before, but we must also say that it is the nature of a society at war, where a body should exist which could make quick and sometimes secret decisions. The Imam has also said that we made these decisions because of the war. When the war ends we will return to the Constitution.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] In view of the population expansion since the revolution and the passage of 10 years in the life of the revolution, don't you think that the younger generation, which is the majority of Iranian society, is threatened by the danger of being cut off from history? Don't you think this will be followed by a serious danger to the movement?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] This question has two sides. It cannot be judged from only one perspective. On the one hand, it is certainly true that those who were born after the revolution or at the time of the revolution were very small, for example the people who were 2 or 3 years old, do not remember many things. The children who are 15 years old now, know almost nothing about the issues before the revolution. There are also many of them, and in the future this country will belong to them. They do not know what befell the people in the past and what issues existed in society. They had no contact with these problems, and history has not yet recorded them. It is too soon to write the history of the revolution. They, therefore, have a very narrow view of history. The see a piece of history and cannot judge on the principle of history. They may be subject to one-dimensional thinking. Of course, this is one side of the issue. The other side of the issue is that these children have breathed in the atmosphere of the revolution, have grown with the literature of the revolution, their thoughts have been formed by the propaganda of the revolution, and they are a few steps ahead of us. When we were growing up, in the schools, in society, and everywhere, even in our minds, there were a lot of empty ideas in circulation. They formed our personalities. We had problems getting used to a lot of issues, especially those who were a part of the system. Great many people went abroad. The people who remained and who have not been drawn by the revolution, are that way because of their prerevolutionary way of thinking. Therefore, regarding your concern that we should sense danger lest our young people become one dimensional, on the one hand we must acquaint them with the the past. This task is the responsibility of the media. However, the positive aspect of this matter is that

these young people are the product of our present society. Of course, it is possible, that they have many expectations. Of course, if the society's circumstances were normal, it would be possible to meet some of their expectations. These people must be made aware of the situation. In any case, we have few certainties. We are always a mixture of problems and possibilities.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] If we are to express the full concept of the Islamic Revolution, we must say that the Islamic revolution is a call for justice, freedom and spirituality. In Your Excellency's view, which of these ideals has been successfully realized?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] Of course justice and independence were a part of our slogans. In reality, that concept is a summation of what is meant by independence. Ultimately perhaps what we were aiming at was a just society, whether in our own terms, at the international level or domestically. Of course, this is one way of putting it. Concerning independence, it must be said that one of our worst pains in the past was that we were under the domination of foreigners. Of course, you could place this problem under the heading of freedom, in the sense of freedom from foreigners....

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] The Imam also generally uses the word freedom in this way.

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] As I said before, in terms of independence, we are satisfied, meaning we have achieved part of it. In other areas we are on the way to reaching it. In terms of justice we have also made much progress, but this is not enough. In the past, those who utilized a large portion of the country's resources were from the ruling and capitalist classes. Very well, most of them were uprooted during the time of the revolution and their assets were confiscated. We took their factories, their land, their real estate and their resources, and thus the misappropriated grandeur and respect they had fashioned for themselves was taken away. The people took over. Young children from poor and middle and lower-class families took over. Very well, many things changed. That is, to a great extent they were procured with many laws that were enacted. We laid the foundation for the transfer of resources. But once again new persons turned up who are committing abuses. A type of discrimination is still evident in dealing with resources. In the past only a few cities other than Tehran were prosperous. No one had any expectations, the villages had no expectations. We never thought there would be electricity or running water in our villages, that we would have refrigerators or things that the city dwellers had, such as certain fruits and a lot of traffic. We were willing to continue transporting ourselves with donkeys, horses, or mules. The villages did not expect to have the same kind of merchandise as in urban areas. Since the revolution, however, it has not been that way, actually, we have distributed a great part of our resources fairly. Whatever exists is distributed throughout the country. Ration coupons are given to everyone. If something is

not in Tehran, it is not in the villages either. Of course, some people get what they want. However, the lot of the common people is the same everywhere. In any case, justice has been brought about to a great extent. Even in the companies and in the government it is this way to a great extent, but we are still a long way from reaching our goals. There is no comparison, however, between the spirituality of today and that of 10 years ago. At that time, you saw what was going on in this country, what the radio and the television were like and what the newspapers were like. What were the streets, the cabarets, the cafes, the liquor stores, and the dens of corruption like? These beaches everywhere were different from the way they are now. Our young generation has changed, our children have changed.

Expectations are high, now when you see portion of a woman's hair is showing, the Hezbollahis become angry and say we have gone back to the old ways. At that time women wore short skirts, clothing that left them almost half naked, and that was considered normal for them. Concerning freedom, we said before that in fairness we are free. We have come very close to our ideals. Many people may not have thought that in such a short time we would be able to achieve these things. Realistic people never think this way, however. Realism has now increased. We must show great patience and do more work.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] ...Concerning spirituality however I must note that truly the things that are put forward in our society as moral virtues have been undermined in some cases because of some malfunctions. What is your opinion regarding this matter?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] For example?

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] For example lying, flattery, two-facedness, hypocrisy, plotting and other things which are seen in society and are actually considered moral wickedness.

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] I think all these things are much less prevalent than before. If you go back and look at that time, the customary ways were nothing but flattery and the like. Now that these things do not exist, our revolutionary youth no longer pay ransom to the sky. They speak their own minds. They go their own way and put their own thoughts into practice. They live are happy and they do not sell their lives and their human and Islamic honor. However, exceptions are found here and there. In general, I believe that progress has been made in the management of society and in certain important areas. Of course, in the end, mankind is mankind. We are no exception in that regard. Ultimately we have the Satan as well. We all have our passions, and the shortages and problems of life disappoint some people and tire others. They run out of patience and they begin grasping

at straws. These things do happen, but there is no comparison between our present society and the past, and someone coming here from outside can tell what has happened.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] After the acceptance of Resolution 598 it appears that the most necessary task is a true and unflinching summation of the issues of the Islamic Revolution so that we will be able to get through the current phase and move into the future, eliminating the mistakes of the past. Don't you think that unfortunately in this phase also, the same viewpoints and achievements that led us to accepting Resolution 598 are active? That is, the same viewpoints and achievements are still active in public affairs, and that in reality there has been no critique or elimination of mistakes?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] Of course I don't think that the general direction which society has taken is erroneous, we shouldn't think that acceptance of Resolution 598 means we have to change everything. The acceptance of the resolution was of a different quality. The war had a direction. The way it was going, the life of the war would be long, and this is what persuaded us to stop the war. We made a military and economic study. We saw that if we wanted to get somewhere we would have to fight at least 5 or 6 more years. We didn't think it was advisable to keep two countries in this state for several more years. This does not mean that we ought to change everything, or that our overall perspective should be changed. When we accepted peace, this is no reason for us to be hostile to our neighbor and do damage. We got a result from the hostility we had with our neighbors. Our oil was always controlled by foreigners. They make it cheap whenever they want to and make it expensive whenever they want to. We had no partner in the region and this was really a problem during the war. Since our neighbors thought that the very issue of oil was leverage to bring pressure on us, we were not able to do anything. We could not do anything with the people who were giving money, buying bombs and dropping them on our heads. Afterwards, however, an area for cooperation appeared and we therefore showed some flexibility here. We said come let us talk and solve the problems. We more or less solved the OPEC problems. Many countries concluded that we plan to overthrow Iraq and that with the fall of Iraq all their interests in the area would disappear. There was absolutely no way to compromise with them, of course, they were not ready for that. They wanted to punish us. When this resolution was accepted areas appeared where we could come and solve problems in the interest of society, the nation and our revolution and in relation to our own foreign policy. Therefore, you can see that the trends of the past are not being continued. If we had called upon the people in wartime to produce and invest, they would have feared its destruction the following day. War did not give wealthy persons the opportunity to invest and produce continuously, and calling upon them to do so would have been fruitless. After that we came and gave greater attention to the private sector, and we are now putting our confidence in them. We have

changed some of our import policies and given them some room. The Imam ordered that this be done and we began. We intend to plan in the future so as to guide the people to use this huge amount of currency that they have in circulation, which has heated up the black market, and guide them to production, job creation, and good work. Very well, this is reconsideration, or at least if we do not call it a reconsideration, it is a new direction. Moreover, we still do not see the war as ended. We are now living in a limbo between war and peace. Iraq is now making excuses and thinks it can get concessions, while we are resolved not to grant concessions. We will probably be entangled again and we will have to make another decision. You may therefore feel amazed that this arises from the issues I have discussed. Moreover, we have now brought the 5-Year Plan to the Majles. This plan is being compiled. A large number of experts are working on it. When this plan is completed and presented to the Majles and when directions for the future have been established, this will show that much work has been done in this very period, and more work must certainly be done for the future.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Your view is that this criticism has been given naturally, and that this movement for reexamination and correcting probable mistakes have taken place naturally?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] If you are talking about us sitting down and creating a council to sit and discuss what we did in the past that was erroneous and what we should do now, we have nothing comprehensive in that form, because we do not think that everything that was done was a mistake to require a general reconsideration. For example in our armed forces we are not happy with the existing system of two armed forces in this form, at least for peacetime, and we are working on this. This is also a lengthy task. Or in our very economic policy, since there were problems, officials are working to reflect this in the 5-Year Plan. The same applies to the educational policy. Much pressure has been brought to bear on education and training. Our children now have a suitable atmosphere for studying. A small amount of resources exists. Work for these things and for the welfare of the people must be done. During the war we were unable to get to the welfare of the people. We are now thinking of procuring the basic goods needed for the welfare of the people, or comparable work. For example, each sector is doing its own work, and these things will be presented in the same 5-Year Plan.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] From public encounters, speeches, writings in the press and positions taken, one feels that there is a missing link in the solution of the nation's difficult problems. What is this missing link, in Your Excellency's view? For example is it the lack of a central power? Is it the lack of a clear and specific theory of the revolution, or the failure to truly establish a democratic organization?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] I answered all of these things you are saying in your first question as well. Meaning that if we wanted to write a constitution now, we would know how to write it so that the problem you are talking about would not exist. This feeling is correct, that is we ourselves understand this. The Majles now does its own work, the government does its own work, the president does his own work, and the judicial apparatus does its own work. All of them are involved in public affairs. The Imam is involved as well. The Imam is above everyone. However, just as you say, something is missing. The formation of general policy gives the country its direction. Of course, these things are under the heading of leadership, meaning the leader must designate these general directions in every government. Every government has its own special leader. For example in a country where a party is the ruling leader, it begins by sitting and setting general policies, and it gives these policies to its members.

Now if the Imam didn't give any guidance, the government would do its work like a machine and it would have to wait for the Imam to say something, then go and plan on the basis of that. There certainly ought to be something somewhere that gives general guide lines to the Majles, that gives the government general guide lines to do these things, or at least it ought to be specified in the Constitution who sets these general directions. Should the Majles do these things? Of course, the Majles is free to make laws and policy, but this responsibility has not been given to the Majles. If the Majles did not do it, what should be done? If the Majles did not designate the issues, who would answer to this problem? The government carries out the policies set by the Majles. Again, such a thing is not the duty of the president. Therefore, it appears that the missing link you are talking about exists, and perhaps it is that very centralization. This kind of centralization is not incompatible with democracy. Nowhere, not even in the world's freest countries, do you see such a thing. In every country, there is ultimately one person who tells the parliament what it should do, but such a thing does not exist in our country in the form of a duty. Of course, the Imam is above all of us. If he wishes, he speaks, if he does not wish, he does not speak. If he wishes to do so, he turns a matter over to us. Sometimes he intervenes, sometimes he does not. This is a weak point within the system.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] although you have discussed this question in various ways in answer to previous questions, in any case, I will frame it as a separate question. In the criticism and study of the revolutions of the world, there are opinions regarding the way a government should be run. Some people believe that a society arising from a revolution needs revolutionary and decisive methods, and they cannot be quickly codified in the framework of a concept called a Constitution. The Islamic Revolution claimed that it would be able to compile and implement a Constitution quickly. Now after 10 years and the formation of councils at the supreme level, don't you think that the viewpoint of the first group has been proven?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] No, I do not think so. Just as I said, this is not absolute. There are advantages to that method and advantages to this one. Had it not been for the war we might not have come to these councils and other things, and, with the continuation of the same situation, we might have done our own work. We should be satisfied at having formed all the official government organizations, because society calmed down and a normal course began. We also caused damage, which we discussed. The Constitution has flaws. We were hasty with some affairs and decisions. I myself have not yet reached a specific conclusion. First of all, I have not done a comprehensive evaluation. This is not a one person task. If we want such a judgement to be made, a group must be formed to sit and evaluate the questions and study their probable effects. For example they could determine whether this or that method is better. I have no doubt that with an active, fast-moving revolutionary center, some of our nation's problems would be solved. Of course, in that event we would also lose some things. I was involved in two processes at the same time. When I worked on the Revolutionary Council, we made decisions immediately. Every night when we met we made seven or eight important decisions. Now when we want to make the same decisions in the Majles it takes months. At that time, I felt that we were making decisions hastily. If the thoughts of the people had reached us through their representatives who are familiar with their regions and experienced and seasoned, and if they had talked with us, things might have gotten done in a better and more profound way. We lost some things in the Revolutionary Council. Of course we now losses in the Majles. For a final assessment and judgement a group must sit and make up an agenda. These agendas should present the pros and cons of various issues and thus, one can judge properly.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Ten years after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, some observers and analysts of international politics believe that in the confrontations between the Islamic revolution and America it has been America that has succeeded in imposing its policies and goals on the Islamic Revolution, the region and the world. How do you react to this view?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] I completely disagree. The principal loser in this process was America. It lost Iran. Iran was an island of stability for America, and America completely lost Iran. Then, with its stupid policies, it took things to the point that our people, who are willing to establish relations with all countries, are not even willing to talk with America. All the schemes America had in order to defeat the revolution have failed. From the very beginning America wanted to rot the revolution from within through liberalization. It would have brought a special group here to do the same things which were done in the past. When this failed, it thought of imposing the war on us, and what America wanted the war to accomplish, was also seriously defeated. Moreover, we achieved new results from the war: military

victory, the defeat of Iraq, and completely ousting America from the region. This was something in addition to the revolution which occurred because of America's mistake. In this area we bit off a large bite and made no secret of it. We said what we had to say. Of course, there were errors in our methods of propaganda and foreign policy, otherwise America would have no victory here. If America had not wanted a war to occur here, it would not have started one in the beginning. It wanted the war. It really wanted the war to continue, and it wanted us to be defeated in the war, but it did not achieve its goal. When it came into the area, it was its last shot and it saw that nothing would solve the problem unless it became naked and come into the fray. This was really America's defeat, to bring 70 or 80 warships here. Of course, despite its claim of neutrality and its pretense of supporting shipping, the shipping came and went in some way both before and after the coming of America, and always some of the ships were hit, it made no difference. America was thus unable to impose anything on the area. It wanted to defeat the revolution, which did not happen. It wanted to plunder the revolution, which did not happen. It wanted to come back in through a window, which did not happen, and even now America wants to establish relations with us. So what has America obtained in the area? Yes, there was one thing that we wanted which did not happen, and that was military victory, and even that might not have been too far away if we had planned more carefully. I will say no more about this now in this period. If the war ends someday and there is peace, I will critique the strategies of the war, the issues of foreign policy, all of the measures we took, and other options we could have taken. I myself of course know what happened, but I cannot repeat it now. In any case America has achieved nothing, and we began a slogan in the middle of the war which has not been achieved. Now perhaps another problem will appear.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Another question we have is that according to the views of some political observers, Iran has concluded that it must solve its problems by getting close to the West. In view of the fact that we now see such a thing occurring in the communist camp (China and the Soviet Union), doesn't this help confirm the view that Western domination is inescapable?

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] No. Domination, no. There is a great difference between relationship and domination. From the beginning we knew we had no intention of cutting relations with the West. In any case, the reality existed that this country was dependent on the West in terms of industries and many of the needs of the people. It is not easy to cut this dependency. It is not something easy that can be done in a day. It is a lengthy task. What we were able to do was to cut off their political domination of this nation, and this we did. What you see happening recently is the establishment of relations with England and France! Well, this was 2 or 3 years ago. Why didn't this discussion come up 2 years ago? Two years ago when we were at war none of you thought to ask why we have relations with France. Even the day that France

declared that they were not very happy, none of our revolutionaries were very happy either, but it happened. Therefore, such judgment is in no way correct. We fully believe that our revolutionary society can continue on its way without foreign domination. Domination differs from relations. Other revolutions, coming out from under one domination, have usually been such that they would go under the domination of another bloc. Well, we did not do this. It is clear that we did not. What I want to stress is that our people and especially our intellectuals must make a distinction between relations and domination. Equal relations are correct. Today's world cannot live without equal relations. Even large countries like America who live on their own continent and have everything, would suffocate if they walled themselves in.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Your emphasis and sensitivity to the matter of domination is absolutely appropriate, because this is your conclusion from the question. However, the essence of the question is really whether or not the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has decided to solve its problems by getting close to the West.

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] No. Of course, I did say that life is such that we cannot live without relations. The world is like this. That is, if relations are cut, problems arise. Let's look at where the problems originate. When you have for example 50 factories in Iran whose spare parts you must import from England or France, or suppose you are going to buy your raw materials there, if you don't have relations with them, you cannot do this. For example, if we still must take our sick people there for treatment and we still don't have the means for treating every type of illness within the country, and we even have to take our war wounded there for treatment, then it is useful to have relations. It creates problems for us if we cut relations. I don't mean to say that these relations are not useful for them, no. These are equal relations. You see we sell oil to them and they sell factories to us. Can they live without oil? No, and we cannot live without factories. Of course, factories are not found in only one place. They are in England, France, Spain, and also Japan. Oil is the same way, it is in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. In any case there are many industries. We want to export our carpets. We want to export pistachios. Ultimately, they are the market that buys these exports. We in turn buy products from them. The world is interconnected. Since the world has become interconnected, certainly our society must separate the issue of relations from the issue of domination.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] I thank Your Excellency for your patience. As the final question and as a summary of the previous questions, we would be happy to have your views concerning the future of the Islamic Revolution and its position in the region and the world. It is the tenth anniversary of the revolution, and this summary coming from someone like Your Excellency will be very interesting.

[Hashemi Rafsanjani] I am very optimistic. I think we have done the preliminary work of the revolution. We have passed the real and serious dangers. We have learned the ways and formalities of managing a revolutionary society. The world now, in a realistic mood rather than a state of idealism or astonishment, has become used to the realities of the Islamic Republic. At one time it was thought that the Islamic Revolution was like a tidal wave that would inundate all the governments of the world and the region. Perhaps these were not realistic visions, but a reasonable and wise movement has now begun in the world, and these areas will be studied and criticized. In any case this revolution has begun, and with all the pressures it has seen from the world, it has passed through its childhood and is now passing into maturity. Society has solved its main problems. It has put the war, terrorism, and plots behind it. It has distinguished itself manfully under the weight of a truly back-breaking mass of the world's propaganda and has stood with dignity in the world. We understand that Iran has dignity in the world. Those who are thinkers and educated people respect this revolution. There are also resources within the country. Ideas with a bit of realism have become customary. Of course, we still have problems, but we think these problems will be solved. Some people do not want this revolution to go in the direction of calmness, but I am entirely hopeful that this revolution will begin its evolutionary path and that it will become an exemplary revolutionary society in another dimension which also is not backward economically. It is not a correct to think that most people are resigned to their way of life. This is a mistake. Those who were in the thick of the revolution, those youths who are now 36 years old for example, are willing to show every kind of patience. However, neither the old men nor the young people who are now growing up are like that. The majority of society, in any case, wants to survive. They want homes, transportation, water, electricity. Some want entertainment and amusement, some want to take vacations with their wives and children. The young people want work. For example the young person who finally graduates from the university wants a job. If he does not enter the university, he wants a job. We cannot tell them to remain unemployed. He wants a program of study, and we must provide these things. If we move wisely, we can provide for the welfare of society. Iran is a rich nation, and it even has credit. Some things can be done with its credit. We must also maintain our freedom, we must always reject domination. We must seriously pursue justice and distance ourselves from racism. Racism is very bad. Racism is an imperialist phenomenon. Of course, while rejecting racism, we must not forget that spirit of initiative and the interests of individuals. There is nothing else left. If we move in this way we can become a model for the world, others will come, and, God willing, this revolution will have a good future. It only needs patience and determination.

Musavi-Ardebili Interviewed

46400057c Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian
8 Feb 89 p 6

[Interview with Musavi-Ardebili; date and place not given]

[Text] The 10-year achievements of the Islamic Revolution are the subject of an interview that our brother Mohammad Javad Mozaffar, general manager of the Foreign Press

Office of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, held with His Holiness Ayatollah Musavi-Ardebili, president of the Supreme Judicial Council

This interview, which we selected from the "Fajr Memorial Volume," published by the Fajr Anniversary Commemoration Staff for the 10th anniversary of the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, is presented below.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Every revolution and change is a human achievement and is naturally an experiment for those who will follow and the people today. If we could turn back the clock 10 years now and if Your Excellency could retain the experiences of the period of the revolution, which measures would you take and which ones would you not take?

[Musavi-Ardebili] Ten years of our revolution have passed. We have done many things in these 10 years. Even if we wanted to take a general look at these things, it might take a long time. I think we would at least have to have daily notes and review them, because certainly now we do not have the information about all of these completed tasks in our minds in order to be able to judge them and see which ones gave us good results and which ones in that form did not produce good results or produced negative results. Your question can be justified for someone who has the opportunity to study the answer, or who can refer to notes.

Of course among these memories we have, there are perhaps no more than a few very important memories which could be discussed and something said about them. It is quite difficult to say something about everything that has been done, however. But since you did ask, I'll speak about the war, for example. You know that we have two groups. One group believes that having taken the war as far as we did, we should have continued it. I am one of those who wish that we had stopped the war at the victory of Khorramshahr. If, as you say, we could turn back the clock and if opinions were elicited, I am one of those who would say that if we stopped the war right where I said, it would be better. Then, concerning the spies nest, I believe it would have been better if we had taken the correct position concerning those incidents, while in fact the matter continued for so long that it reached the Majles. I mention both of those matters because if those circumstances should arise again and it were up to me, or if they asked my opinion, this would have been my view. As for the reason we continued at that time, it was because at that time we did not have this experience. Now, if we forget this experience and such a thing happens again, we will do the same thing. I was able to give you those two examples, but of course there are others.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Of course, if you remember other important issues, we would be happy if you would discuss them, because, as I said, what you say will be a message to the next generation.

[Musavi-Ardebili] An important issue I can discuss is economic fluctuations and the decisions we made on economic issues. During the war we were in exceptional circumstances. Therefore, we sometimes made decisions which were contradictory. We benefitted from some of them and were hurt by others. If you take me back to the beginning of the year 1358 [21 March 1979] with this same experience, I will take the right stand in those circumstances.

Before the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, the world had seen many revolutions and changes. After many years, if we want to look at all these movements, we see that the one thing they all have in common is that almost all of them have not quite realized their initial desires and slogans, or they have not been successful in achieving those desires and ideals. Don't you think that the experience of the last 10 years of the Islamic Revolution has shown that we have gone the same way as well? Doesn't the question implicitly arise that in a world so tightly interconnected and with today's great technological advancements, and the people of the world coming close together—and in the view of some experts, the world becoming smaller—we must reconsider the concept of revolution?

[Musavi-Ardebili] No, I think it is exactly the opposite. I think the revolution taught us that one must make revolution, and make it rapidly. One of the things that we learned was that we remained silent and endured the hardships too long, since it was within our capability to change this situation. I believe that this revolution achieved good results. If there were deficiencies, they were due to our inexperience. There is a difference between something that arises from the essence of the revolution and the ancillary problems that sometimes come with a revolution. Therefore, I believe it taught us that one must make revolution and also to have greater self-confidence. The idea that man is the captive of technology must be purged.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Some thinkers and experts, in their recent comments, have said that revolutionary Iran, by resorting to such measures as forming the Expediency Discernment Council and by accepting Resolution 598 and other matters, has shown that no movement in the world, not even an Islamic Revolution, is made of anything different, that in reality all of mankind is in the same boat, and that all revolutionary movements follow similar laws. What is your view concerning this?

[Musavi-Ardebili] This question must be expanded a little. In the overall view of history, there are two kinds of conditions governing human beings. One can call general conditions, the other specific conditions. If you are asking about general conditions, yes, in general conditions everyone is subject to a series of issues without exception. They come and pass and change everything according to their nature, and if there is resistance they break it. These are general conditions.

However, every being who is involved with other beings in general conditions has specific conditions of his own, and these separate him from the others. If we did not have general and specific conditions, all conditions would be alike and all events would occur in the same way. Thus all conditions and factors are not alike. Everything has its special and general condition. We cannot say that this incident is like that one. Someone who says this, is looking at an issue very superficially.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] What is your view concerning the examples put forward by the proponents of this view, such as the formation of the Expediency Discernment Council, Resolution 598 and the like? They say it is not true in any case that Iran does things only on the basis of what it said in the beginning, and that Iran is ultimately obliged to act within the general framework. Do you think those who hold this view are correct?

[Musavi-Ardebili] No, I do not think they are right. They have not seen the issue as it must be seen. They do not know the Expediency Discernment Council. How much of the essence of the Expediency Discernment Council have they perceived? When we wrote the Constitution in the Assembly of Experts, we thought the Majles deputies would be the nation's best people and that the Council of Guardians would be 12 of the best legal and theological thinkers, and that the best representatives of the people would study problems and make decisions. Every issue has its expert on the social and specific aspects of it, and in order to give special attention to the legal issues from the beginning, it was necessary that legal and theological experts expressed their views. However, it is different in practice. Sometimes the thinking is not correct, and sometimes problems are also encountered in implementation. You cannot attribute bad implementation to bad thinking. We have also encountered problems in implementation. Unforeseeable conditions such as the war, the economic embargo and other matters led to the formation of the Expediency Discernment Council.

Concerning the acceptance of Resolution 598, it must be said that its acceptance was a military action, or the sequel to a military action. There is no doubt that when everyone enters the field they are subject to similar conditions. We knew that the world would not tolerate us. East and West would completely dispense with their own differences, stand together against us, and bring all their experiences into play. At every phase they said the world will not allow you to win militarily. We weighed and calculated our own resources, but we saw that America was willing to bring its Navy into the Persian Gulf, and that it would bring the world along with it. They even shot down a jet airliner publicly and in broad daylight. Then they dispensed with everything. We had not counted on this, and with good reason, because we can anticipate a series of likely obstacles, but there were unforeseen obstacles.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] In view of the population expansion since the revolution and the passage of 10 years in the life of the revolution, don't you feel that our

younger generation is threatened by the danger of being cut off from history, since the present generation does not have that much of a relationship with the past?

[Musavi-Ardebili] This question must be expanded. What are our youth cut off from? From the culture of the past, from the traditions of the past, or what else? If you mean that they are cut off from the culture of the past, this may be something we want to a degree, because in the past our culture was a Western culture, and we pray to God that this culture will be worn away and that this culture which was imported from the West would disappear. For 50 years, they promoted this imported culture here. If it goes away now, what problems will we have? If you are talking about being cut off from traditions, it must be said that traditions will not disappear this quickly. The experience of various nations shows that traditions do not disappear this quickly. It needs time. Events now taking place in the Soviet Union in the Caucasus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan bring us to the reality that there are still problems over the issue of nationality in these areas and that with all the investments they have made they have not been able to remove these problems since the October Revolution. Therefore, the young generation will not be cut off from these aspects of their traditions. Of course, yes, since a system of import-practices has not yet taken hold or rooted itself, it is not unlikely that part of that will disappear, and in this case we will not be very sorry.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar:] I'll explain this matter a bit more. The reality is that the generation whose work resulted in the 22 Bahman [11 February] revolution is the generation that made the revolution. However, the question concerns the generation that is now coming up, the generation that did not make the revolution and has calmly grown up since the revolution. The estrangement I was referring to is the condition of being cut off from the origin of the revolution.

[Musavi-Ardebili] Are you talking about the history of the Revolution?

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] What I'm saying is that for example some of our prominent people—even the Imam himself as the leader of the revolution rather than the leader of the Islamic Republic—is a historical figure for some of the younger generation. He is not a contemporary figure.

[Musavi-Ardebili] You are talking about being cut off from history, but I believe that our current generation is not cut off from history. Brief experiences have established this point. Many of these children are still with mothers who remember marching in demonstrations. They still live in rooms decorated with mementoes of the revolution, and they learn about the issues of the revolution in schools, homes, and even in public programs. Those who were 10, 12, or 15 years old during the

revolution are now 20, 22, or 25 years old. This generation, if we can preserve it, is a pure generation. Of course, this is only one factor.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] If we are to express the full concept of the Islamic Revolution, we must say that the Islamic Revolution is a call for justice, freedom and spirituality. In your view, which of these concepts has succeeded?

[Musavi-Ardebili] Of all the slogans we have chanted since the beginning of the revolution, we have been 100 percent successful in realizing some of them, 50 percent successful for some, and we have had negative growth for others. One of our slogans, for example, was for independence. I believe we have been 100 percent successful with regard to political independence. The warp and weft of our nation was foreign policies, and following them. Even our domestic policy was all for imports, and we quickly cut all these ties and obligations and truly took our fate into our own hands. If we were unable to do it, it was our own fault, we cannot say that America did not allow it. I'm not talking about outside the country, but domestically we have been very successful. Another problem of ours was sending the message of Islam to the world. The world believed that Islam was a dead phenomenon with no message or mission. It was something from ancient times, 1,400 years ago. However we saw that this Islam came and grew in various parts of the world. It had a message and it brought the world to life. We were not successful with some of these slogans. We had promised the people that we would take care of their worldly needs, but we could not. A great deal of this was due to the war and other such problems. Of course if we are fair, perhaps a portion of it was our fault in that we could not make decisions properly and on time. Of course, it is debatable what percentage is due to this and what percentage is due to that, but we did not succeed in this. We promised that we would cure the problems in education and training, that we would provide these primary needs to everyone. Well, we were not able to do these things. In some places there were very good successes, and in some places there was no significant growth.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Specifically with regard to justice, freedom and spirituality, in your view how successful have we been?

[Musavi-Ardebili] Concerning justice, I believe that our success has been relatively good. I can bear witness to this. We have not done badly with freedom either, but the war disrupted our situation because in wartime information and security become more active. When the need for information and security became more active, naturally the freedom the people want is subject to control, and some people may feel that freedom has disappeared. Of course, no one wants the freedom of the people to disappear, but they are being monitored. The role of monitoring is to create security and information. However, monitoring is such that it seems that if one is

sitting in a room and one of God's own is regularly glancing at him, well, the person becomes uncomfortable. When the fellow looks sometimes at his collar and sometimes at his buttons, finally it is naturally that he should ask, why are you looking so much?

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] What is your view concerning spirituality?

[Musavi-Ardebili] I have a lot to say about this. What is meant by spirituality? If it means getting closer to God and further away from a series of earthly passions such as lust and the like, despite the fact that its roots are sensitive, whether emotional or intellectual, our position has been very good. Our evidence is the martyrs, the brave fighters, the families of martyrs and group after group of young people who took part in the mobilization and the revolutionary guards and who committed suicide and participated in martyrdom-seeking tasks. We did not import these young people from abroad. These people suddenly became self-sacrificing and brave. Legacies remain from these young people. The things they left behind for their families are good examples. If we were to form statistics, we would see that these people gave no small amount from their lives. For example, they were newly married people who donated their only marriage memento to the front and the war. These are indications of deep spiritual feeling, joy and love and we were good in those matters. I said this before. We were able to Islamize the battlefield. If we could not do this in the market place or in the offices, if we were not very successful in the university, well, our battlefield was Islamic.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Yes, but another expectation which has in the light of spirituality in an Islamic government, is preventing the growth of bad moral characteristics such as lying, two-faced behavior, hypocrisy, opportunism, plotting and the like. What is your view of this matter?

[Musavi-Ardebili] Look, if we want to have an effect on some office worker, merchant or vendor, we know that most of these people are not denizens of the fronts and the war and cultural work must be done on them. This cultural work has not been done. That progress and growth of which I spoke was a natural effect of the atmosphere of the war, not cultural work. Unfortunately, we are weak in cultural work.

We must admit that our cultural work, like some other matters, still has neither a specific goal nor a specific direction, and it is quite low-key as well. We still haven't understood where this culture is taking us.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] After the acceptance of Resolution 598, it appears that the most necessary task is a true and unflinching, open review of the 10 years of the Islamic Revolution, in order to be able to continue the way, in eliminating the mistakes of the past. Don't you

think that unfortunately in this phase also, the same viewpoints and achievements that led us to accepting Resolution 598 are still active? That is, no self criticism has taken place?

[Musavi-Ardebili] Here I must acknowledge the bitter truth that unfortunately selfishness does not allow us to see ourselves and notice mistakes. We are still at a stage where we make efforts and each person blames others for the sins, and this is somewhat bitter for me. We must also pass this phase and I hope God will help us with this. If we do not, it will be damaging. An example comes to mind, of course it is not a good example. It is like a group of people who set a house on fire and instead of feeling sorry and helping each other to put out the fire, they fight with each other, blame each other, and finally the house burns down. Unfortunately, I see such a situation. Of course, I may be pessimistic.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] From the public talks, writings, and the positions of various factions, it is felt that there is a link in solving the country's most difficult problems. What is this missing link, in Your Excellency's view? For example, is it the lack of a centralized power? Is it the lack of a clear and specific theory of the revolution or could the missing link be seen as the failure to install the institution of democracy?

[Musavi-Ardebili] There are various interpretations, and it would take a long time for us to reconcile them. The speed of history has kept us from reconciling them.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] If possible, we would like to have your own view.

[Musavi-Ardebili] I don't think the missing link is in the areas you mention. In my view it is that each person has interpretations, ideas, an intellectual background, and it is with this mentality that he approaches every phenomenon. This is where the problems lie. Countries that have parties, party training correct their thinking beforehand and have a specific viewpoint. A party deals with matters in one way. If various people in various circumstances, of different ages, cultures and mentalities are to give views on an event, you must compile these views, because each person develops his own point of view from a different angle and differences arise this way.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] In the study and criticism of the revolutions of the contemporary world, we find views concerning the manner of managing the government after the revolution. A number of people believe that a society having arisen from a revolution needs revolutionary and decisive methods, and that it cannot be organized quickly in the framework of a concept called a constitution. The Islamic Revolution, however, claimed that it could have a constitution very quickly and guide its organization very rapidly in the framework of a constitution. Now, 10 years after the triumph of the

Islamic Revolution and the formation of various supreme councils to solve the country's difficult problems, haven't we shown that the first group was right?

[Musavi-Ardebili] No, we have seen that the second group was right. That the Constitution which was written quickly at that time needs amending, but only a few articles. Even if you had written the Constitution a few years later, it would still have needed amending. You must realize that revolution is a severe jolt. If one tries to preserve society with that same severe jolt, that would mean killing and arresting everyone without reason. If something happened in the midst of that, what would happen? If we were not to have a constitution and have the revolution continue the process, and if the leader, whom God has blessed and we have had him for 10 years, God forbid, would have passed away in the second year of the revolution, then what would have happened to the revolution? Who would have guided it? Everything would have been lost right then, because in our revolution everything depends on the existence of a leader. The person who was more insistent that anyone else that the Constitution be written as soon as possible and that the nation's organizations must be installed as soon as possible was the Imam. Of course, he did not explain anywhere, but my interpretation was precisely that he was worried in this regard.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] To be more precise, the question was, is forming supreme councils to solve difficult problems—because we said that the Constitution is not the answer—useful or not?

[Musavi-Ardebili] No, it is not this way, we only have the Expediency Discernment Council, the Revolutionary Council and two or three others such as the Cultural Revolution Council and the Economic Council. The first time we tried a council, the results were not positive. Of course, the words of the councils were interesting to everyone. I wanted to do everything in councils, but I realized that councils are not right for executive work, rather they are right for staff work. We must admit that we learned this by experience and that this was one of our difficulties.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Ten years after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, some observers and analysts of international politics believe that in the confrontations between the Islamic Revolution and America it has been America that succeeded in imposing its policies on the Islamic Revolution, the region and the world. What is Your Excellency's view?

[Musavi-Ardebili] We must look at reality and see if this is the way it was or not. For example did America want to leave Iran? This happened. Did America want Iran to be managed out of its sight for 10 years? This happened. Did America want its policies not to be implemented in Iran? One must give examples. Sometimes they say that Iran in the war....

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Yes, perhaps the issue has more to do with this.

[Musavi-Ardebili] They do not say that America was victorious in this. Moreover, if it is victorious, it is a war victory and not a political victory. America still has problems establishing normal relations with Iran. How did America win? I see no evidence of this, unless we look at the issues pessimistically or close our eyes and say America won.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Some political observers believe that Iran has concluded that it must solve its problems by getting close to the West. In view of the fact that we now see this happening in the communist camp (China and the Soviet Union), doesn't this help confirm the view that Western domination is inescapable?

[Musavi-Ardebili] These matters need clarification. We cannot survive without technology and techniques. If this is what they mean, yes, it is true. We ourselves do not have advanced technology and we need equipment. If they want to say that we have needs, it is true. However, if they want to say that we are therefore going under Western domination, here a delicate point must be clarified. If they are saying that the West will not give its technology without imposing its policies, and that if it imposes its policies, then we will be dependent, then one must ask if this is true, or if not, is there a way of getting around it. We believe that we want to bring in technology, for we cannot survive without it. However, when we are like the Third World and there are cartels managing us or merchants and investors directing our agriculture, buying our raw materials, giving us industrial materials, with our money and banks under their control. At one time this was true, even though we did not realize it and were afraid of their shadow. We believe that it is possible to buy or import technology from a country without going under the yoke of imperialism. This is one claim. However, there are those who say this is not possible. This is yet another claim. We give them the right to express their views. They must give us that right also. Let history record this.

[Mohammad Javad Mozaffar] Your Excellency, how do you see the future of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the region and the world?

[Musavi-Ardebili] If you are asking whether the Islamic revolution has the ability to endure or not, I think the revolution has the necessary conditions to endure. However, if you are asking whether we are qualified to preserve it or not, I must say that I don't know.

I see no defects in the revolution itself, it has charisma, a message and a mission. It is both alive and working. We can see that socialism is defeated. The West has appeal for materialists and those who seek comfort. We hope that God will give us the grace to succeed.

NEPAL

Government Assists Newspaper Publishers
46000109a Kathmandu *THE MOTHERLAND*
in English 17 Feb 89 pp 1, 4

[Text] His Majesty's Government has given 3.8 million rupees for procurement of a complete offset press to The Commoner, an English language daily published from Kathmandu, it is reliably learnt.

The publisher and Editor-in-Chief of the daily is Gopal Das Shrestha.

Likewise, Gokarna Dev Pandey is also given 2.8 million rupees by HMG for purchase of an offset press.

Pandey is known to be the Publisher and Editor of vernacular weekly *THE PRATIBANDHA* which has stopped coming out for quite a long time because of some disputes and the daily *THE DHARATAL*, which it is said, comes out once in a while.

Another vernacular weekly *The Pratidhoni* which Pandey is reportedly owning is now being edited by Yogendra Aryal.

These two editors are learnt to have assured the government to set an example for developing press into a viable industry.

Press Council Asked To Play Active Role
46000109b Kathmandu *THE MOTHERLAND*
in English 15 Feb 89 p 3

[Text] The press must ask the newly constituted Press Council to play a more assertive role in the development of the Nepali press. Granted that the government need neither have the will nor the vision to develop an effective media in the constructive sense of the term. But the Press Council which has a stake in promoting the role of the media and seeing that its rights are properly preserved must play a role that contributes to the development of media effect.

Periodic changes in Press Council membership will hardly be of much significance if it continues to play the largely inactive role it has chosen for itself since its existence. An annual report on the state of the press hardly carries much weight unless its members chose to press its recommendations. The very reason behind the inclusion of the judiciary in its body is the need to safeguard its independent status. And the fact that it is constituted almost exclusively of journalists makes it obvious that the body is better capable of gauging what is right and wrong for the press.

Given that the media has yet to develop an environment where investments suit this independence and the institutional development of the fourth estate, recommendations in this direction have been long overdue. Also,

abrupt political actions which continue to deter investments in the media have yet to draw the Council's attention. The judiciary as an effective deterrent to administrative wrath could have been further encouraged with active Council participation. In so many ways thus the Council is not doing what it could. Perhaps the new Council members who should be congratulated for the appointment could do what need be done now.

Editorial Supports Laws Against Religious Conversion

46000109c Kathmandu *THE MOTHERLAND*
in English 10 Feb 89 p 3

[Text] The international community and even Amnesty International are at times incensed by occasional reports of imprisonment in Nepal on charges of religious conversion. A democracy, it would seem, must have guarantees for religious freedom. Here we have laws that not only restrict choice of religion but call for internment of those converting oneself or others to another religion.

This argument is not without value and those enforcing and enacting laws on proselytisation would do well to keep this fundamental choice in mind. On the other hand, those critics of our legal system would do well to note some salient points. Conversion in our society has been one of choice. If discarding religious practice is accepted, ridiculing discarded beliefs as false while others consider them true is something that does not happen in our religious belief. It is thus that various religious beliefs and practices have existed in peace together in the country. Another outstanding difference in religious concept has also to do with conversions. Since our society does not conceive another's religion as false, the compulsion to convert others to our religion is negated at the very outset. This is in stark contrast to religions which see the devil in every other religion and piety and opened gates to heaven in conversions. It is such religious outlook that backs a missionary culture, one that can be advantaged by funds and other facilities to convert section of open societies. The proselytisation laws thus must seek to prevent exploitation of the sort and, side by side, the society must develop the inner strength to resist this onslaught with the finesse, wisdom and awareness necessary to match organized and advantages and unsought for competition.

PAKISTAN

Editorial Opposes Ban on 'Satanic Verses'
46000100e Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 25 Jan 89 p 4

[Article: "To Ban or Not To Ban"]

[Text] Since the publication of Salman Rushdie's 'Satanic Verses' last autumn, the book has, understandably, aroused indignation from Muslims the world over. The novel, which Rushdie claims to be "an attempt to write about religion and revelation from the point of

view of a secular person," was considered by Muslims to be a vicious and malignant attack on the Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him). As soon as *Satanic Verses*, which won the author the Whitebread prize for literature and had him short-listed for the prestigious Booker award, entered the market, demands were voiced by Muslims that it be removed.

Satanic Verses was first banned in India, Rushdie's native country, where his previous books *'Midnight's Children'* and *'Shame'* had been best-sellers. Several Muslim countries, including Pakistan, followed suit. More recently, pressure by Muslims in England has led to the book being removed from bookshops in Bradford, where there is a large Muslim population. Rallies were held in the city to protest against the novel, many copies of which were ceremoniously burnt by local Muslim leaders.

Here we are not concerned with the reasons for *Satanic Verses* being offensive to Muslims. The question is: is it worth banning? By burning copies of the book in public and parading in the streets to give vent to their disapproval of the book, are Muslims not simulating interest in the very object of their disapproval? Protests and demonstrations against Rushdie's book have reached such an intense pitch over the last few months that one wonders whether they are designed to suppress *Satanic Verses* or to boost its sales.

There was widespread indignation at the banning of *Satanic Verses* in India. The move was considered contrary to India's secular democratic traditions. It turned out to be extremely counterproductive, in that it unleashed an outpour of articles in the Indian press, some demanding the banning of Islamic books, which allegedly caused offence to other communities. A similar outcry has been provoked in England, following demonstrations by Muslims against *Satanic Verses*.

Would it not have been a more suitable and effective form of protest if Muslims had put across their objections to *Satanic Verses* in a rational, articulated manner? In the age in which we live, people generally like to see two sides of an argument and form opinions of their own; attempts by one side to suppress the arguments of another tend to have an adverse effect for they create an impression that these tactics are being resorted to due to inability to offer any reasoned response.

If *Satanic Verses* does amount to a malicious and blasphemous vilification of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him)—we will take the word of the worldwide Muslim community for that though we have not been given access to the book in order to form our own judgement—then there is also a wealth of historical evidence that testifies to the Prophet's unrivalled greatness. Would it not have been a more fitting service to Islam to have cited that evidence, instead of banning the book and burning it? Whereas the latter course of action

has alienated millions, a more reasoned approach would have won many over to an appreciation of Islam and the services of its Prophet for the cause of humanity.

Editorials Attack U.S. Stance on Nuclear Program

Cited as Proof of 'Tenuous' Relationship Between Countries

46000099 Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 89 p 7

[Article: "The Nuclear Bogey Again"]

[Text] The United States has been remarkable for showing a very selective concern about Pakistan's nuclear programme. Despite repeated assurances at the highest level that this programme was geared entirely to peaceful purposes, the U.S. has not been able to cast aside all its misgivings. There is something discriminatory in this since it reserves for Pakistan the passionate concern the U.S. has never shown towards the Israeli or Indian nuclear programmes. Pakistan could of course choose to disregard this application of double standards except that there is a close linkage between this issue and the smooth continuation of American aid to Pakistan. Under current Congressional arrangements governing this aid, the U.S. President has to certify every year that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device. If he does not, a suspension of American aid would automatically ensue. It is this aspect of the matter which has come to the fore with the leak in THE WASHINGTON POST that the Reagan Administration had told Congress that the U.S. would be unlikely to give the requisite guarantees regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme during the current year. This report has caused understandable anxiety in Islamabad because it only adds to the pile of problems the new Government is having to contend with.

The Government has reiterated Pakistan's well-known position on this issue and the State Department in Washington, in a quick display of generosity, has welcomed this disclaimer hoping at the same time that Islamabad would "take concrete steps to demonstrate its commitment not to acquire" a nuclear device. Well and good for the time being, one might say, but the question remains as to what exactly Pakistan, short of surrendering a slice of its sovereignty, must do to assuage American concerns on the subject. It is a bit unsettling for this country to have to address this question every three months or so and to tackle the scepticism with which its protestations are met. Pakistan has offered to open its nuclear facilities to international inspection if India would do the same. It has suggested turning South Asia into a nuclear free zone only to have this proposal too shot down by India. This is besides Pakistan's sincere protestations that it is not making a nuclear device, its programme being geared solely to the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

If Pakistan's detractors could present concrete proof of its misdemeanours in the nuclear field, then that of course would be a different matter making Pakistan liable to be impugned at the bar of world opinion. But with evidence that would settle the matter one way or the other hard to come by, various quarters try to make do with slur and innuendo. This is unfair and no way to treat a close ally. Pakistan and the United States have worked closely to undo the consequences of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan in the process having run a host of risks. It was always said by critics of Pakistan's Afghan policy that once the Afghan problem was settled, American interest in Pakistan would diminish. But it might have been supposed that even if that were to happen it would take some time before it became obvious, but THE WASHINGTON POST news report would suggest that the marks of weariness have begun to set in sooner than most people in this country would have expected. After the positive response of the State Department to the Government of Pakistan's statement, hopefully this particular episode has come to an end. But it has gone some way to show the tenuous nature of the present relationship between Pakistan and the United States and the ease with which, in certain circumstances, it could unravel.

U.S. 'Doublespeak' Said Proverbial
46000099 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
31 Jan 89 p 4

[Article: "Arm Twisting, Again?"]

[Text] In a wonderfully timed leak, THE WASHINGTON POST has revealed that the Reagan Administration had informed Congress that the U.S. may not certify that Pakistan's nuclear programme is peaceful, because it was close to acquiring capability to build a bomb. Once again, the nuclear issue has re-surfaced, triggering the usual kind of speculation about whether the US aid package to Pakistan can survive the issue. The timing of the newsleak, however, is interesting and suggestive. It can be construed as a not-so-subtle attempt at putting the new government in Pakistan on notice over the issue. It's underlying message can similarly be interpreted as yet another effort to wave the accusing finger at Islamabad in the hope of weakening its stand on the nuclear question. In plain language this amounts to arm twisting—you assure us of your nuclear innocence and then you will be entitled to American goodies, in the form of the military and economic aid package.

Washington ought to understand by now that no country is willing—whatever the price—to abdicate its sovereign right over the nuclear option. Nor can a sovereign state, hand over a 'spare key,' as it were, to its nuclear installations, in order to assuage doubting Congressional members. The new American Administration should also by now appreciate Pakistan's long-standing position on the issue. For non-proliferation to work, there has to be a regional approach. Countries like Pakistan cannot

be selectively singled out to meet criterion set by Washington. The doublespeak long practised by the US on this issue has become proverbial. India, Israel, South Africa whose nuclear programmes are known to be far more advanced than Pakistan's somehow conveniently escape the American concern for non-proliferation. Strident noises are, it seems, only made about Pakistan's alleged nuclear ambition. This is clearly unacceptable. If the purpose behind the newsleak is to keep Pakistan on a short leash and pressure a government, struggling not just to establish itself but also a system of democracy in the country, then it is an unfortunate way to deal with an ally. This approach never worked in the past. It is not likely to do so now.

Commentary Urges Nonaligned Stance
46000100d Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 25 Jan 89 p 4

[Article by Ikramullah: "Benazir's Glasnost"]

[Text] Benazir Bhutto has taken over the reins of Pakistan at a crucial moment of history. Within four weeks of her prime ministership, destiny has knocked at her door for making decisions that may affect Pakistan's role in South Asia on the eve of the 21st Century. As if by a strange coincidence, SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] Summit, bilateral discussions with Rajiv Gandhi and Yuli Voronstov's peace mission to Islamabad followed each other. For more than one reason, each one of these events was momentous by itself.

The reorientation of inter-state relations with India, the Soviet Union and indeed, other countries in the region and beyond, is a grave and fateful responsibility, which has suddenly been thrust upon the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. She has already had a brief Umra trip to Saudi Arabia proving her an opportunity of initial first-hand contacts with King Fahd. She is now embarking on her first diplomatic tour abroad—the China visit scheduled in mid-February. This period coincides with the hopefully total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The recent SAARC Summit sparked off new hopes of a rapprochement with India as a result of signing some agreements that have broken the long frozen ice, benumbing the relationship between the two neighbours. Rajiv Gandhi's recent visit to China indicates India's awareness of the future contingencies in Asia and her readiness to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.

Do we in Pakistan, have a perception about the winds of change that are sweeping the region? I do not mean the foreign office alone. Perhaps they have piled up a mountain of studies which they keep on dusting off and on, with each change of regime at Islamabad. Unfortunately, the very nature of our rulers, overwhelmed by the instinct of their own survival, has robbed our foreign policy of the type of political direction which emerges out of a national consensus. For almost forty years, we

have lived from moment to moment, locked in internal political strife and looking beyond our boundaries for external aid to hold out and subsist, bargaining our freedom of action and independence during the process. The foreign office can, thus be forgiven for its many acts of commission and omission. But how can other elements and segments of national life—the politicians, the intellectuals and the media—be absolved of their failure and forgetfulness to discharge their national duty in this respect and raise their voice against plunging Pakistan in an abyss of bottomless chasm. I shudder to state whether most of us lacked the courage or the true perception in this regard. I have often wondered whether the Pakistani press and our men of letters are ill-equipped to discharge their functions.

Considering our geo-political environment and looking back at our relationship with almost all our neighbours since our independence in 1947, one is not sure whether we have ever had a security policy of our own without dependence on others. Is it not time, with the dawn of so-called democracy, that we think about it for evolving a security policy of the future. There comes a point in every crisis-ridden situation, when the leadership involved should disengage from their personal prestige, stand back from day-to-day events and assess the national scenario afresh from the ultimate viewpoint of the future well-being of the "State." This is easier said than done. It requires a superhuman effort. Its prerequisite is the quality and grade of leadership called statesmanship.

Pakistan's history of the past four decades bears ample evidence that more catastrophes have been brought about by our leadership's lack of vision and failure to observe the above law, than in any other way. Listing these catastrophes will be a painful story. They are all part of recent history, which, unwillingly, we seem anxious to repeat. Pick up any newspaper to convince you, if any convincing is required, how the political leadership as well as the intellectuals are incensed and engaged with internecine battles over issues which pale into insignificance in the backdrop of the clouds that hang over our national horizon. It is understandable that the heat of the by-elections is one major cause of the current fever. But there is a balance in the law of nature, which, if violated could result in consequences beyond comprehension. This balance is being violently disturbed by the domestic news splashed on the front pages, indicating a battle royal waging between the Centre and the province of the Punjab. This feud has now been extended to NWFP [North-West Frontier Province], where the Punjab Chief Minister has staked his reputation, without realising the boomeranging effect of this ill-timed venture. Pakistan is thus presenting a picture of its domestic stability to the outside world, which does not seem to give any credit to its new democratic process. Under the circumstances, we are either extending a subtle invitation to martial law or failing this, we are sending signals to New Delhi and Moscow to go ahead with their plans in the region, without fears of any national resistance, because the

Punjab, Baluchistan and NWFP will be double minded to back up Benazir in whatever she may choose to do in a moment of crisis. On the contrary, the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] will be too happy to witness her fall from power, even if it results in martial law.

The political feud consuming the country has brought about a state of perilous complacency. This is a national tragedy, which must be brought to an end, before it is too late. In the face of this grim situation, not fully grasped by the common man in Pakistan, the intellectuals, the media and all those sane elements within and outside the Federal and Punjab governments, should ponder to evolve a national strategy, to meet the challenges that face the Federation of Pakistan.

In the regional scenario, projected by Western, mainly American experts, it has been assumed that South Asia will remain disturbed in the foreseeable future. Pakistan's security policy ought to acknowledge that the political configurations of the states of this region on our North, East and West, dictate that Pakistan should have alternative options to meet the contingencies of the changes that might sweep South Asia, including the Middle East. Since the mid-fifties, we have more than once, tasted the results of reliance on friends, who have used us as pawns in their own global games. Massive military and economic aid continues to pour into Pakistan, which is bound to blur our vision. We should not forget that all the military equipment and sophisticated weaponry supplied to Iran, could not save the Shah. Nor has the might of America ever saved any other friend in need. George Bush may be a good friend of Pakistan, but we cannot afford to stake the future of our country on mere hopes and promises. The perceptions of power within Pakistan are important for evolving Pakistan's national security policy and its ultimate aims.

In our precarious situation, national security will entail the ability to defend the country's territorial integrity, remembering that we have major disputes with neighbours involving extensive areas of Pakistani territory. It is therefore, inescapable for Pakistan to evolve in the course of time, a largely independent capability. For this Pakistan, preferably, should not have to take recourse to the existing international alliance systems.

Editorial Calls Industrialization Salvation of Pakistan

46000100c Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 7 Feb 89 p 4

[Article: "Industrial Peace"]

[Text] The Salvation of Pakistan lies in rapid industrialisation, and diversification of its economy. Industrialisation cannot be started unless the following conditions are fulfilled. Firstly, all existing capital in the possession of Pakistan, whether held here or deposited in foreign banks, should be invested in industry so that jobs are created for the millions now unemployed. Consumers

are supplied with goods of good quality so that they do not hanker after foreign goods and thus waste our foreign exchange on luxuries. The investment of savings and wealth on the construction of large palatial houses, high rise plazas, ostentatious and lavish expenditure on marriages and festivals must be cut down drastically so that we set an example of simplicity enjoined by Islam, and invest all our wealth on socially useful production of much needed goods and services. To attract capital government must create an atmosphere of security for the investors.

Secondly, we need to work out a plan of better relations between labour and their employers. The traditional pattern of organising labour and using the strike weapon will drive away capital and lead to the situation in which industry, instead of expanding, will actually shrink. This will further swell the ranks of the unemployed. There are several ways of ensuring industrial peace. One is to devise labour participation in industry as the Japanese do. Make labour partners and shareholders in the industry which employs them. Elected representatives from each of the various departments of an industry, from the unskilled labour to the highest level of the technically skilled employees, should be included in the management of a factory and charged with the responsibility of increasing the efficiency and improving the production of the factory so that as profits increase the employees get a fair share of the gains made through their efforts. Through the application of the science of accounting we can work out what each of the elements involved in the working of a factory, namely the owners, shareholders and employees, should get as fair reward for their contribution to the productivity of the factory. In this way there will be no labour-management disputes which will need to be settled through the strike weapon. Laws and rules can be framed in this regard which are acceptable to the employers and the employees and backed up by appropriate legal sanction and procedures.

In the present situation even when an industry or enterprise is making no profit and, therefore, cannot make adequate payment to its employees, it is the easiest thing for organised labour to go on strike and destroy the industry altogether. The formation of the new democratic governments and the freedom granted to the people long suppressed by military rule has resulted in a tendency among workers to demand immediate redress to all the accumulated grievances and deprivations of decades of misrule and the mismanagement of our economy. Labour has to be taught by its leaders to base their demands on a realistic appraisal of the facts relevant to their industry.

Lastly, industrial development must be freed from the crippling controls of the bureaucracy which bleeds an entrepreneur white before he is allowed to invest his money in an industry and operate it. The role of the government in industrialisation of the country should be, limited to short and long-term planning, the creation of the infrastructure necessary for industrialisation and

the provision of facilities and safeguards which will attract capital. The government should also assist industry, especially small scale industry with technical and scientific research facilities, loans and foreign exchange for import of machinery. It should also see to it that its own industries work to maximum productivity so that the steel from the Pakistan Steel Mill is made available at reasonable prices to downstream industries, the Taxila Heavy Mechanical Foundry and the machine tools factory produce machinery needed for industrialisation. There are grave suspicions that these national enterprises are not working except in a symbolic and perfunctory manner, and that production is being sabotaged by vested interests.

The government must close all doors for bribery and corruption in the departments connected with industrialisation, and get efficient and speedy disposal of requests and demands of investors. This is promised every time this subject is discussed, and the government is content to make a public statement that it will reduce bureaucratic control over industry to a single-window operation. But all the windows continue to take their heavy toll from the investors, driving them to despair and increasing their investments beyond the estimated figures.

The reported conference to be held in Karachi to settle matters between labour, owners and the government would be well advised to consider our proposals. In the meanwhile, labour must exercise restraint and curb its tendency to resort to the strike weapon as the first and only way of solving its real problems and getting a better deal.

Editorial Praises Publication of Punjabi-Language Daily

46000100a Peshawar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 3 Feb 89 pp 4-5

[Article: "SAJJAN a Brave Journalistic Venture"]

[Text] The publication of the first ever daily newspaper in Punjabi from Lahore is an event of no mean importance. The Punjab is nearly illiterate in its own mother tongue. The reasons for this neglect of the language which is so rich in literary works of the highest order are many. It was largely the result of the policy of the British. When they conquered the Punjab and established their government, they brought with them the lower levels of the bureaucracy from the Urdu speaking areas. The British encountered dogged resistance from the Punjab and the Punjabi narrative poetry has innumerable examples of the resistance poetry of the people of the Punjab in the days of Shah Hussain, who lies buried in Shalimar and whose urs is celebrated as a spring festival known as Mela Chiraghan. He was the ideological leader of the people of the Punjab especially the peasants who revolted against the Mughals under the leadership of Dullah Bhatti.

Urdu was thrust upon the Punjab by the British, and generations of the middle class of this province who rose in the hierarchy of the bureaucracy of the new foreign government soon compromised with the foreigners and adopted Urdu as their language, and turned their faces against their own mother tongue. This adaptability and flexibility of the Punjabi educated class is characteristic of this province to this day. In collaboration with their foreign rulers Punjabi bureaucrats feathered their own nests and soon were exploiting the people of other provinces. When the Sukkur Barrage was built the job was done largely by British and Punjabi engineers of the irrigation department. The lands irrigated by the new canals were colonised by Punjabi settlement officers who saw to it that the most fertile lands were allotted to Punjabis. Punjabis eagerly joined the British Indian Army and did very well for themselves, and in this way became a part of the foreign ruling class.

There are, therefore, now two Punjabs. One which belongs to the masses, the toiling peasants, the working class and all those who inhabit the less developed areas of the province. The Punjabi language is loved by them and the poets they know are recited in joy and sadness. It is this Punjabi poetry that has shaped the culture and the literary traditions of the Punjab. Most of these people are illiterate and only a few can read and still fewer write in their mother tongue.

The other Punjab is largely the urban educated population which has identified itself with the ruling class of this land and till a few months ago was wedded to the "ideology of Pakistan", Urdu, and the unity of Pakistan and masqueraded as the champions of Islam, the defenders of the faith. It is only recently that they have come out as champions of the rights of the Punjab. When they talk about the Punjab, it is in the language of Punjabi chauvinism.

SAJJAN, the new daily from Lahore, will represent the exploited, silent majority of the people of the Punjab whose love of their language and its literature teaches them love and brotherhood for all mankind and whose beloved poets are known and loved throughout the Indus valley from Attock to the Indian Ocean. With slight variations the Punjabi of the Potohar fades into Seraiki, and still further south into Sindhi. The word chosen as the name of this newspaper is, therefore, well chosen although its meaning cannot adequately be translated into any other language. It includes love, friendship, commitment, brotherhood and bonds of sympathy. The brave pioneers of this project have declared their faith in the unity of the people of Pakistan and asserted the people's concept of the identity of the Punjabi language.

All those who strive for the unity of Pakistan, based on the recognition of the cultural identity of various cultural units and provinces, will therefore welcome this daily and give full encouragement and support to this brave venture of working journalists and those committed to the development of the culture and language of the

largest province whose mother tongue has too long been neglected. SAJJAN will oppose Punjabi chauvinism and represent the unity of all, the toiling masses of all regions and provinces of Pakistan.

Upgrade of Women's Status Promised
46000100b Pesahwar *THE FRONTIER POST*
in English 5 Feb 89 p 4

[Article: "The Status of Women in Pakistan"]

[Text] A federal minister has promised to publish and implement the report of the commission on the status of women. He stated that the new federal government had lost no time to consider the report and despite many difficulties which were anticipated would start the process as early as possible.

Even in the enlightened sections of our society women and girls are unfairly treated. The birth of a girl in a family is a major calamity. Cases among the urban affluent classes have been known where a wife giving birth to three or four girls in succession is summarily abandoned and divorced. A mother is blamed for giving birth to a girl as if it lay in her power to decide the sex of the new born child. In most families, even in those of the upper educated sections of society, sons receive preferential treatment while their sisters are given the status of inferior offspring. With the exception of a tiny minority sons receive much better educational opportunities than girls, despite the fact that the academic performance of girls is better than that of boys. Girls may be pampered and receive all the care and attention of their parents, but they are seldom permitted to fulfil themselves and in the best of circumstances the personality of a girl is not allowed full scope and development. This is the reason that women spend their lives with a crippling sense of inferiority.

This is the inhuman condition in which the illiterate, backward people of the bulk of our rural population treat their women and daughters. They are married off at a very early age, denied all opportunities to educate themselves and the vast majority spend their lives as domestic drudges, on duty for 24 hours to serve their menfolk all their lives and in all circumstances.

Senator Javed Jabbar was correct when he said that a great deal of effort was required to implement the recommendations of the commission's report, and appealed to various women's organisations to undertake the great task of educating our people. Men, whether fathers or husbands, have to be taught how to treat their daughters and wives, while women and girls must be encouraged and assisted in acquiring knowledge and developing their personality so that they can be made aware of their rights and also know how to obtain them.

Commentary Details Plight of Women and Children in Jails

46000102d Karachi DAWN (Supplement) in English
10 Feb 89 p VII

[Article by Aquila Ismail]

[Text] These are stories of women deprived of their right to live, to love and to be free. These women are paying the price because the world around us is full of lies.

Sekina Ghulam Haider was married at an early age to a man of her father's choice who extracted a heavy bride price from the groom. When the money was all spent her father forcibly took her to a second man and asked for a heavy bride price. When he wanted to repeat the act a third time Sekina refused. Her father, according to her, became infuriated and sent her off to prison on charges of zina.

She has been in prison since 22-6-80 as an under-trial prisoner. Sekina has never appeared in court, no one ever visits her. Her two husbands have remarried and are leading their lives. She has been totally abandoned. Her two children born out of the two aborted marriages stay with her, in jail.

Sekina lives in despair. To the outside world she is a non-entity, thrust mercilessly into the totalitarian prison system which abuses her emotions, degrades her intellect and grounds to dust her dignity.

Sekina's younger child—a girl, was an infant when she came to jail. She is now almost nine, and has known of no life except that of the prison. The jail authorities have recently arranged for a teacher to teach such children who are in with their mothers, but at best the facility is erratic.

Sekina does not get any facilities in prison because there are none for under-trial prisoners. Her clothes consist of one set of khadar shalwar qameez; her daily diet is dal. The Ansar Burney Trust and the Edhi Trust distribute food on special occasions so sometimes she gets a treat of mithai or biryani. Some warm clothes and quilts are also provided by them.

Of course, she does not have access to any lawyer. She does not have the means to have one even if she was aware of her rights as an accused. Unlike the more socially developed countries the state does not house a Legal Aid system whereby every unrepresented person is provided with legal counsel at government expense. (State financed legal aid is provided only in the case of criminals facing death penalty).

In England, for instance, the state legal aid system offers its counsellors at competitive rates for handling a case so that quality of defence is assured. Also if the prosecution fails to turn up at court hearings for three consecutive instances the accused is automatically acquitted for want of evidence. So the concept of individuals languishing in prison for years and years without being convicted does

not arise. In Pakistan, however, the situation is entirely different. Like Sekina, an accused can serve sentence for a greater number of years than the alleged crime warrants, without the prosecution ever being present in court for a hearing.

Children are never sent to prison for their mother's crime in developed countries. They are instead put into foster homes or state run homes where effort is made to provide an environment closely resembling home. But what happens here? Sekina's two children are with her sharing a sentence for a crime which she may or may not have committed. So we ask, where is the humanity that an Islamic society promises?

Also consider, if means were provided by some sympathetic agency to obtain bail, where would Sekina go? The social stigma that a woman accused of zina, however falsely charged, will not allow her to survive. Like Sekina, all such women are reduced to the depths of social darkness where even their parents are unable to face the taunts of neighbors. The 'Izzat' of the family rests, as you know, with the moral behavior of its women, and her morality can be shattered totally by the men around her.

Sekina does not want to end up in another home for destitutes which for all purposes will be another prison. Why can't she re-center society, with the right to live in dignity with her children?

Perween, wife of Abdul Fareed is an eighteen-year-old Pathan girl who has been in and out of jail four times since 1987. She is married and her husband works in the Middle East. When Abdul Fareed left her as bride for the first time with his parents, her in-laws gave her away to the person they were heavily indebted to. When Perween's husband returned his family told him that she had run away with this man. As might be expected, the husband, totally in rage, went and registered a case of zina at the local police station and Perween was promptly arrested. The matter does not end here.

Whenever Abdul Fareed comes home from the Middle East, he takes her out of jail by providing bail and when he is returning, he cancels it, sending her back to prison. He has done this four times already. Maybe, this is his way of ensuring that his 'Izzat' remains intact. While she is in jail no one visits her. Needless to say, Perween stoically accepts this as her fate, for are not all women bound by fate to their men?

Can anyone else stand bail surety for her? Here it needs to be pointed out that zina is considered a non-bailable cognizable offence. Murder is another crime in this category. Non-bailable means that bail cannot be granted at the police station. A court will have to be moved. Now during the bail hearing the magistrate may grant conditional bail. Sometimes it is ordered that bail may be given by a "mehrem" only. That limits the woman's right to obtain bail and puts her in the hands of a chosen few male relatives.

Perween can refuse to accept the bail taken out by her husband. But, she doesn't know she can legally do so. Some of the women in jail with her have seen through the games men played with their lives and have refused to accept bail. It requires a lot of courage to do so.

For a non-cognizable offence a warrant is required for arrest of the accused. But being a cognizable offence a woman accused of zina can be arrested on mere suspicion without any warrant. The police or the magistrate can take cognizance of zina just as they can of murder, without attempting to find out under what circumstances the alleged act was committed and with whom. So when Sekina's father or Perween's husband reported zina no one bothered to find out that Sekina was married and Perween was forcibly given away.

A Catholic woman is not permitted by her religion to divorce. When one partner, however, converts to another religion the Christian marriage is deemed to have been dissolved. Razia Zafarullah was a Christian. She converted to Islam and married a Muslim man. Her former husband, a Christian, denied that she was converted and charged her with zina. She has been in jail since 10.11.83. She has no help, no visitors. Her community which was so outraged by her marriage has totally abandoned her.

Halima Suleman charged with zina and in jail since 21.7.88 gave birth to a child in custody. The delivery took place in an incredibly small room adjacent to the living barracks. Only cases of delivery with complications are sent to the Civil Hospital. The infant then stays on with the mother and is nurtured in the grim desolate environment.

Sekina Bashir Ahmed is also charged with zina and is pregnant. Both she and Halima have yet to be brought to court.

Right at the bottom of this heap of human misery are the Bengali and Burmese women arrested for possessing forged passports or for not having any documents at all. They have been booked under Foreign Act 51. They came to Pakistan to escape poverty and are victims of the immigrant labor racket which goes on to everyone's knowledge. Their own embassies do not recognize them. They will probably languish in jail forever, as they do no even have a country. Their relatives back home probably are unaware of their plight. Even if they were, being so utterly poor there is little they could do to provide any relief.

The recent proclamation of amnesty to all women prisoners except those convicted of murder has led to three women gaining freedom from the local Central Jail. The order does not say anything about under-trial women prisoners. Sekina, Perween, Halima and others cannot hope for freedom simply because they have not yet been found guilty and so do not come under the jurisdiction of this federal order. Can one help but see the irony of the situation?

One woman, Hasina Hauladar was convicted, and has even served her sentence but cannot leave the prison as the Bangladesh Embassy does not even acknowledge her existence. These women and their children in custody are nothing. They mean nothing to anyone nor does anyone care.

These women in their misery and despair need from us our anger and challenge as to overcome all those forces that deprive human beings their right to live and to real freedom.

Students in Gilgit-Baltistan Demand Separate Province

46000102a Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 89 p 2

[Text] Karachi, Feb 2: Karakoram Students Organization [KSO] has demanded of the Government to declare Gilgit-Baltistan as fifth province and restore the basic human rights of the people of the area.

A protest rally of the KSO on Thursday at Regal Chowk further demanded an end to "undeclared war" in Siachen, setting up of education board in Gilgit and revenue earned from tourism be spent on the people there. The participants of the rally said merger with Kashmir was not acceptable to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.

The protesters, carrying banners and placards, shouted slogans against Azad Kashmir President Sardar Abdul Qayum and "U.S. imperialism."

Commentary Examines Discontent in Sind

46000102c Karachi DAWN in English 10 Feb 89 p 7

[Article by M.B. Naqvi]

[Text] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto spent four hours on Feb 3 looking into the law and order situation in Sind. Earlier she had met Mr Altaf Hussain, the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] chief, and many of her own party functionaries. Well may she worry about peace and quiet in this much-troubled province because things are not really peaceful.

As it happens, incidents of unexplained violence keep taking place in Karachi and Hyderabad, creating fear and tension, and necessitating curfews and or extensive army patrolling. The crimes all over the province as well as ethnic tensions in cities—there were flare-ups in Sukkur, Hyderabad and Karachi a while ago—are norms rather than exceptions. Karachi's two main universities are closed off and on and the outlook is uncertain. The much-labored PPP [Pakistan People's Party]-MQM

agreement, with its fifty-nine points, is said to be under stress. All the old symptoms are, unhappily, still troubling. Things cannot, therefore, be allowed to go on as they are.

What is needed is bold leadership and the will to face unpleasant facts. Instead of opting for time-buying palliatives, basic causes must be attacked at their roots. Proper solutions, however long they may take to work out, are necessary. The PPP having received a handsome mandate, and with its leadership behaving in as democratic manner as any has done in the more than four decades history of Pakistan, there is hope for the future; and also because, the PPP, as a party, has been trusted by a distinctively clear majority of the people of Sind. It is strong enough for bold decisions.

Sind is afflicted with a number of difficult problems, of course. The primacy, however, goes to the perception among the large majority of educated, older Sindhi-speaking Sindhis that their distinctive language and culture are at risk and their sense of grievance of being discriminated against cannot be left unattended to just because the so-called Sindhi nationalists have been beaten in the elections. The basic sentiment and the causes that sustain it are all there. That is the fundamental cause for tension and strife between the Sindhi-non-Sindhi-speaking sections of the population.

Among these the most visible and especially over-emphasized ethnic conflict that has come to the fore in recent years is between Old and New Sindhis. It was confirmed by widespread riots in Hyderabad and Karachi since 1986. The November 88 elections have unhappily divided Sind into two ethnic sections. Things have, however, been patched up by the PPP-MQM concordat. That the later is making heavy weather is clear. But fortunately the situation is not really as bad as could have been. The PPP and the MQM are, for the immediate future, stuck with each other in an almost Roman Catholic marriage. The MQM is firmly entrenched in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad, without which cities of Sind cannot be effectively governed. MQM, on its part, is confined only to two cities without their hinterland being with it and the existence of small communities of Urdu-speaking minority in other Sindhi cities, towns and villages makes it utterly vulnerable. Thus no level-headed Sindhi nationalist can fail to seek the help and cooperation of the people of Hyderabad and Karachi, while no representative of the unhappily called Mohajirs can ignore his fundamental weakness and, indeed, isolation. Both need each other. If they do not hang together, they may have to do so separately in a political sense.

But dimensions of the ethnic problem in Sind many. Historically, the basic and substantive Sindhi grievance issued from over-centralization of powers in the Federal Government—mostly non-representative ones the latter's dominant sections presided over a controversial distribution of barrage lands to non-Sindhis. While there was not much option then and little notice was taken of

what had happened to Lloyd Barrage lands, the subsequent scramble for Kotri and Guddu Barrage lands has left deep scars on Sindhi minds. The bulk of those lands were, in fact, misappropriated by the bureaucracy, both uniformed and civilian. That much of it happened during One Unit years has produced the present climate of opinion among Sindhi nationalists against all forms of central domination.

Among the fundamental causes of discontent among ethnic-Sindhi sections, these experiences of One Unit periods—whether in the shape of martial Laws or the one created by Nawab Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Mumtaz Daulatana, Chaudhri Mohammed Ali, Isikandar Mirza and Gen Ayub Khan—have played a decisive role. Unless the symbolisms that remind the people of Sind of One Unit's characteristics are removed, the force sustaining the sense of alienation shall not abate. Real solution lies in true federalism; the Center ought not to be or perceived as being, dominated by any particular province or section. At a practical day-to-day level this calls for, basically, a more purposeful reorganization and reform of the bureaucracy in Karachi, at district levels, especially the police, and also punctilious and determined implementation of the PPP-MQM covenant. Local face of the government must be genuinely local.

There is also a sub-plot in the story of ethnic tensions: it refers to the peculiar demographic composition of Karachi and Hyderabad. Karachi, with its trade, industry and finance, has been a magnet drawing unemployed workers and youth from the Punjab and Frontier provinces. This has created a good deal of tension in Sind between the so-called Mohajirs and Pushto-speaking immigrants from the north. It has been repeatedly shown that there is no real clash of interest between these two sections of the population in Karachi, and to an equal extent in Hyderabad. But thanks to unexplained inspiration, the tension between these two groups surfaces every now and then.

The overall behavior of the MQM has certainly changed and it is much more sober now, especially after its electoral successes. But the PPI, under the disputed leadership of Malik Ghulam Sarwar Awan, continues to speak in a way that fans the fires of discord. (In recent weeks a more sober wing of this organization has begun asserting itself and seems to be working for amity. This is a happy augury. Let us wait to see whether it can overcome the resistance of those who flourish on conflict.) Insofar as this particular phenomenon is concerned, a firm handling of the law-and-order situation is called for. But that will not be enough. The factors and inspirations that promote discord and conflict have to be unearthed and neutralized—which again is contingent on the reorganization of the bureaucracy in Karachi. There is still far too much malodour of intrigue in higher echelons and democracy and PPP is by no means secure. Perhaps more patience, with education of public opinion, is necessary.

Among Sind's urgent problems, the state of Karachi and Hyderabad compellingly draws attention to itself: no city on earth can cope with the kind of growth in population that Karachi has been witnessing at between five or six per cent a year, on a conservative estimate. This creates chaos and insufficiencies all around. There are not enough jobs, water, electricity, gas, roads, transport, hospitals, playing grounds, schools, colleges to meet the soaring needs and, above all, housing for the low-income groups. The life of a common Karachiite is unmitigated misery. So many deficiencies are so much dry tinder. Local self-government needs reform; municipal governments have to be democratic local governments in letter and spirit, with all necessary attributes of a government.

The students, being the most aware sections of the population, feel strongly about these inadequacies, both consciously and are affected by them insidiously. In addition to polluted political atmosphere and mischievous political advice to them, they naturally tend to explode every now and then. One look at the student organizations in Karachi and NED universities, not to mention those in the Hyderabad region, is enough to unbare nearly all the unsatisfied and conflicting passions that are rocking the society in Sind. It presents a frightful picture of a total absence of integration.

Closing the universities either for long declared durations or in installments of short periods at a time, combined with the police and military interventions, is simply no solution. For that we must look to the PPP and MQM leadership to begin with. Other ethnic Sindhi political parties can also be associated with the effort at defusing the situation in larger educational institutions. But it is the larger problems of Sind that ought to be perceived as having been taken up in earnest, while the most volatile sections of the population, the students, should simultaneously be tackled on a priority basis. That would require a lot more democracy, bold action and responsible leadership which major parties like the PPP and the MQM, not ignoring the smaller but more respectable bodies of Sindhi nationalists, are capable of providing.

One hardly ever sees first rank PPP or MQM leaders reaching troubled spots at short notice for directly talking to embattled groups. Why cannot these students be collected in their respective institutions' auditoriums and made to argue their cases with vocal chords instead of arguing with Kalashnikovs. That will permit educational institutions' primary function being performed: instructions being given to seekers of knowledge.

Among the current controversies, a word about the ticklish problems posed by the proposed repatriation of the so-called Biharis, being fiercely opposed by Sindhi nationalists, is called for. The latter's sentiment is understandable. After all, Mr Altaf Hussain also thinks that uninterrupted inflow of unemployed youth from upcountry into Sind cannot be sustained for long. It is the same sentiment and problem. However, these Biharis are not the people of Indian state of Bihar; they

are authentic and patriotic Pakistanis who have, having been cynically used by Pakistan Army against the Bengali uprising, consistently refused to accept Dhaka's offers of local citizenship. There is no political, legal or moral ground to refuse admission to them—in Pakistan, not necessarily only in Sind.

Mr Bizenjo's suggestion that they should go back to Bihar state is jejune. They have to be accepted by Pakistan. The fear that they will end up in Karachi (and Hyderabad) is genuine enough. But how many are actually coming? They cannot be more than a year's quota of job-seekers from the north. And these families will be settled with foreign money and shall not send their earnings by money orders outside Sind.

Two considerations are decisive: there is no honorable way of refusing entry to them; it is too late to lament the loose ends and consequences of 1947 partition. Secondly, it is for genuine Sindhi leadership, democratic and humanist, to integrate all Biharis as well as Mohajirs into the larger Sindhi family, variegated as it has become.

While these symptoms and ills call for immediate action in Karachi and Hyderabad, the fundamental problems of Sind ought to be tackled with courage, imagination and, hopefully, some wisdom.

Here one last but very pertinent point need be made: while the country's financial bankruptcy may be a current fact, Pakistan is not a hopeless basket case; it is potentially among the richest countries in the region. Our politics cannot be based on the unspoken assumption of a zero-sum game; if a given quantum of jobs and finance is given to one section, the other sections have to go without them to the same extent. This is not true. There are plenty of ways to work simultaneously for expansion of economic opportunities and more egalitarian distribution. Let the goal of meeting the basic requirements if all be adopted with sincerity and determination and efforts made to remove the miasma of discontent, distrust and discord among various ethnic sections.

Commentary Criticizes Opponents of Cultural Pact With India

46000102b Karachi DAWN in English 9 Feb 89 p 7

[Article by Sultan Ahmed]

[Text] The three-year cultural agreement with Indian signed during the recent visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Islamabad appears to have upset some opposition leaders, and they are vocal in their protest.

If that opposition was coming from the Jamaat-i-Islami component of the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad], that would have been understandable as the Jamaat is even otherwise opposed to many art forms and cultural

expressions. But now even Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif of Punjab and some other major IJI leaders are vehement in their opposition to it.

Prominent opposition leader Ghulam Hyder Wyne, for example, has asserted in the National Assembly that the signing of the three agreements with India, and particularly the one for increasing cultural activities between the two countries, would ultimately bring Pakistan under complete Indian hegemony. He said the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] Government was deliberately creating circumstances to accept Indian supremacy, and the cultural agreement was the first step in that direction.

The Opposition cannot be serious in their objection to two of the three agreements signed. The first commits both countries not to attack each other's nuclear installations of any kind. The second protects PIA [Pakistan International Airlines] from paying income tax, wealth tax and surcharges in India and provides similar facilities to the Indian National Airlines in Pakistan. Neither agreement can bring Pakistan under Indian hegemony nor make it accept Indian supremacy in the region. In fact, the initiative for both the agreements were taken by General Zia a long time ago. And when Mr Rajiv Gandhi agreed to an accord binding each other not to attack their nuclear facilities that was hailed in Pakistan as a major diplomatic triumph of Gen Zia. But because of Mr Gandhi's distrust of Gen Zia and his policies, signing the agreement was put off during the last three years. And it was only in the new atmosphere of cordiality following the return of democratic process in Pakistan and the emergence of Ms Bhutto as Prime Minister that the signing became a reality to the relief of all Pakistanis who did not want an attack on their nuclear facilities.

Negotiations for a cultural pact have been going on for long, and did not start with the advent of Ms Bhutto in office. The fact is that this cultural pact, which is subject to ratification by both sides, is not the first of such an accord with India. Many such agreements had been signed in the past by successive regimes. No major uproar followed any of them.

A major framework for cooperation with India at all levels was negotiated by Gen Zia in 1981 in the form of the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission. There is a sub-commission for cultural cooperation under that large umbrella commission, which has met several times since that came into being in 1981. The present cultural agreement too, says that the joint commission would formulate cultural and educational exchange programmes and review implementation of the agreement.

The Simla Pact signed between Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto and Indira Gandhi, following the 1971 war, too, sought cultural exchanges between the two countries. In fact, the agreement provided for discussion of the Kashmir issue after achieving normal relations in all other spheres, including economic and cultural. So the new

cultural accord is a continuation of the past, and does not mark a departure from the past for the opposition leaders to become so worried.

Urging the Prime Minister to revoke the cultural agreement, Mr Wyne says the agreement would destroy all kinds of Islamic and Pakistani values and traditions. He is convinced, he argued, cancelling the agreement would save new generation of Pakistanis from "cultural aggression."

If signing a cultural agreement with India, as in the past, would invite India cultural aggression, hegemony or supremacy—or all of them together—what can be the outcome of the cultural pacts we have been signing with the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries year after year? Would that not subvert our cultural values and traditions and misguide—our youth? If that has not happened so far, why should the modest agreement with India be so explosively subversive?

We have cultural agreements with many of the Muslim countries as well. But there has been more of agreements and less of cultural exchanges. While Pakistan and some other Muslim countries are poor to send an adequate number of cultural groups of troupes to other Muslim countries, the richer among the Muslim countries are not particularly interested in culture or cultural exchanges. So cultural exchanges between Muslim countries have been too few despite strident calls for stepping up such exchanges at the numerous Muslim world conferences.

Scholar, artists or exhibitions coming to Pakistan are seldom from Muslim countries but are invariably from the United States, Germany or China. They have the money to send their men and women of arts to us and we want them.

Is there any element in the 12-article agreement with India that is so scary? I have not been able to detect any. It says the two countries will facilitate exchange of artists, poets, writers and musicians, exchange of art and other exhibitions and participate in each other's film festivals.

The agreement envisages translation and exchange of books, periodicals and other educational, cultural and sports publications, and whenever possible exchange of copies of art objects.

The two countries are to examine the diplomas, certificates and university degrees granted by each other to arrive at an equivalence. They have also agreed that text books prescribed in educational institutions, particularly those relating to history and geography, should not contain any misrepresentation of facts about each other's country.

Apart from the last part of the accord, which seeks to reduce efforts of one country to prejudice its younger generations, against the other, the format of the agreement is the same which Pakistan signs with most countries. It is more of a routing agreement, and not a radical one. And it is subject to ratification and the quantum of exchanges will have to be settled by the joint commission. The agreement is valid for three years, and will be extended to three years more unless either side gives notice of its termination six months before.

Opponents of the cultural agreement should study what has really been happening by way of cultural exchanges between India and Pakistan, totally outside the official agreements. While Indian films have been banned in Pakistan, millions of video-cassettes of Indian films are doing a roaring business in Pakistan. Trade in such cassettes has become a major service industry in Pakistan. While the Indian TV is seen in Pakistan, particularly the films telecast by it, PTV's plays have become very popular in India and their video-cassettes are having an enormous sale in India.

There is a flourishing piracy of Indian books in Pakistan and Pakistani books in Pakistan, particularly of our poets. Singers of the two countries have been making private visits to each other and performing privately though new checks have come in more for tax reasons than cultural. Even Gen Zia, despite his publicly postulated aversion to Indian artists performing here, invited singers Jagjit Singh and Chitra Singh and actor Shatrughan Sinha to the marriages of their children.

The fact is that the communications revolution is botching our efforts to block Indian arts from reaching us. If we have not been able to check Indian TV or radio from reaching us direct, we have not been able to block Indian video-cassettes from reaching us by the hundreds for reproduction and hiring out. In the light of this non-officials flood, what the new cultural agreement may produce will be a trickle.

How can we be a member of the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] and want that to expand fast, if we do not want the cultural cooperation with our neighbors? And it is not Ms Bhutto who took us to the SAARC but Gen Zia—after it was mooted by Gen Ziaur Rehman of Bangladesh. If there is to be no trade between major SAARC States or cultural exchanges why have this show at all?

Opposition leaders should realize they are in the wrong when they fear cultural contacts with other countries. They need not feel their own culture is too feeble or their youth so weak that they will instantly be seduced by any contact with Indian or other arts.

They should instead strive to do far more for the development of Pakistani culture and arts. Instead of merely paying lip service to Islamic art or Pakistani culture they should take positive steps to promote them. Instead of providing only token grants to them they must allocate large funds for its and utilize them well.

When we virtually killed our film industry in the name of Islam and increased the taxes on cinema-theaters stiffly, Indian film cassettes filled the void, and then spread like wild fire in Pakistan. This is putting Pakistan's cultural growth in reverse gear.

We achieved Pakistan on the basis of the Muslims of both the countries staying wherever they are. After that, must not Pakistanis admire maestros like Bismillah Khan, Amjad Khan or Hafiz Ali Khan who have been to Pakistan? And should not Indian Muslims be enabled to see the performances of Mehdi Hasan Ghulam Ali, Iqbal Bano and Farida Khanum? If the Muslims of the subcontinent cannot see their best performers that will be sheer cruelty. So instead of fearing foreign cultures, let us develop and promote our own arts and culture so that they can compete with others effectively and prove their excellence.

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